751. Comment #51031 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 21, 2007 at 7:47 am

Steve99 (post 743, or #50949):

Incidentally, I personally have no problem abandoning the intuition that the physical universe is objectively real.

And this basically sums up your entire argument.You are fundamentally a naive solipsist.

Solipsism is the thesis that no objective reality outside of one's mind exists. All theistic worldviews affirm that such reality exists and consists of or is centered in God. So theism and solipsism are incompatible. That much is clear.

Incidentally in post 741 (#50908) I explained my reasons for rejecting solipsism. I take it you reject solipsism too. What are your reasons for rejecting it?

You have no problem rejecting reality.

Yes, I have no problem rejecting naturalism's intuition about reality, namely that it consists of an objectively real physical universe. I think that's a wrong intuition, I notice you have offered no justification at all for it, and I notice that those scientists who share this intuition turn out proposing ever more fantastic descriptions of reality, disagree more and more strongly with each other, and have no justification for their individual worldviews either. As fir experimentally testing which of their descriptions of reality is actually correct there is no mention at all, simply because it's impossible: their descriptions contradict each other (so they can't be all correct) but they all exactly agree with scientific theory based on experiment.

Some of us are humble enough to allow our views to be tested. We compare our views both with other people, and with experiment.

There are many naturalistic beliefs that are not amenable to experimental testing (in fact I know of no naturalistic belief that is amenable to experimental testing – but no matter). For example a basic naturalistic tennet is the objective reality of the physical universe, but you can't suggest any experimental test for that belief, can you?

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752. Comment #51040 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 21, 2007 at 8:38 am

Steve99 (post 745, or #50974):

Similarly I have a very high level of confidence in the truth of the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong"

Why?

I explained this in post 571.

What do you mean by 'objective'?

I explained this in post 712.

and as naturalism contradicts that proposition I have very strong reason to reject it.

Why does naturalism contradict that proposition?

I explained this in post 582.

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753. Comment #51055 by stuartM02 on June 21, 2007 at 9:58 am

If reality is not objectively real, then DG's child in question is not objectively being tortured at all as apparently it is just their experiential environment. In your view (I think I may actually despise the word worldview after reading all of this) we are all sharing the same experiential environment (as I understand it) so it seems slightly odd that we can then interfere with each other (in an objective sense) within this experimental environment. Maybe nobody else is objectively real and it is just DG's own consciousness that is, and we are just placed in his experiential environment by God, oooooooo…….

I may go even as far to say that I have an strong intuition (or could propose such an intuition) that we could not interact in an objective sense in an experiential environment, hmmm

About time to stop dealing in intuitions and start dealing in facts. Intuitions are not even subjective data, they are just intuitions!!! or do you have a strong intuition that your intuitions have something to say about anything.
Anyway, I have enjoyed reading this, and just though I would make a contribution.

I can't see this going any further as DG is just essentially arguing for 'brains in jars', but hope you push on, maybe you could move to Christianity, as DG has escaped that somewhat....surely this man is a Deist…..but no..

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754. Comment #51078 by steve99 on June 21, 2007 at 11:28 am

I explained this in post 571.

No, you didn't in that post explain why you have a high level of confidence in the truth of the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong".

You said:

Sorry, I don't have any justification for my belief in objective morality. It's just an intuition:

That is not an explanation of why you have a high level of confidence. Indeed, it suggests you should, as a reasonable fellow, have a low level of confidence in it. Anyone reasonable knows that intuition is unreliable.

I explained this in post 712.

No. In this post you said:

We say "X is objectively true" when we claim that X is true independently of peoples' opinion.

But that is not the manner in which you are using the word. As quoted above, you say that you are basing your beliefs on intuitions. Intuitions are subjective. Objectivity is not based on subjective intuition.

I explained this in post 582.

No, you did not explain how naturalism conflicts with your proposition of objective morality. You are not using the term 'conflicts' correctly. I have, again and again, shown you how objective facts need not come from naturalism. The infinite number of primes is an objective fact - anyone can discover it. But you can take apart the whole universe atom by atom and not find that fact written anywhere. But no-one would claim that the fact of the infinite number of primes 'conflicts' with naturalism.

Similarly, there could be objective morality (although I think this idea is wrong), yet this need have no foundation in nature, and need not conflict with naturalism.

What you are trying to do is look for a physical foundation for abstractions you have defined. Your search is hopeless and pointless.

As I explained before, your reasoning here is flawed because you are falling in a philosophical trap. You are 'reifying' (assuming to be real) things that are abstract and need no substance to exist in. You are like someone forever trying to find the end of a rainbow - your search doesn't even make sense.

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755. Comment #51119 by krogercomplete on June 21, 2007 at 2:31 pm

We are going in circles here.

DG: Here is a list of my presuppositions and here is a worldview that fits all of them.

Everyone else: These presuppositions are either wrong or based on unreliable, subjective data.

DG: No they are not wrong and they are not based on unreliable data.

Everyone else: Yes they are.

DG: Here is a list of my presuppositions and here is a worldview that fits all of them.

. . . and on the record spins.

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756. Comment #51203 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 12:07 am

Steve99 (post 754, or #51078):

That is not an explanation of why you have a high level of confidence. Indeed, it suggests you should, as a reasonable fellow, have a low level of confidence in it. Anyone reasonable knows that intuition is unreliable.

As I explained in post 571 all reasonable people rely on intuitions. Here is a small sample of my intuitions:
1. There exists an external objective reality that causes my conscious experiences.
2. The inductive method is reasonable.
3. Other minds exist (in other words I am not the only conscious being in the world).
4. The world did not come into existence 10 minutes ago.

Now, is there any of the above propositions you disagree with? I trust you agree with all of them.

Can you justify any of the above propositions? I trust you can't.

If you agree with these propositions but can't justify your belief in them then they are intuitions.

Is there any of the above intuitions you have a low level of confidence in? I trust there isn't, e.g. I trust you have a high level of confidence that an external objective reality exists.

So in conclusion we all rely on intuitions and have a high level of confidence in several of them. This is a fact. Let's face it.

Now in my justification of why I think idealistic theism is more reasonable than naturalism I used one intuition of mine I have much confidence in, namely:

5. Gratuitous torture is objectively wrong.

I am curious: Do you agree or do you disagree with intuition #5?

In any case my justification of why theism works better than naturalism does not depend on that intuition; it only becomes stronger because of it. But, as I explained in post 749, even removing this particular intuition (and therefore this particular reason to reject naturalism) idealistic theism still works better than naturalism in all one to one comparisons I can think of. So, it seems to me, all the talk about my intuitions is a red herring.

--

Incidentally, I think it's possible to explain why we all rely in intuitions: Take any proposition you believe is true. To justify it you must produce an argument based on some premises. Now suppose I ask you to justify the premises (without of course resorting to circular reasoning). In the end your argument must stop somewhere with some premises for which no more justification is given. What kind of premises can these be? Well, one such kind of premise is direct experience (e.g. "I saw water become solid ice" – now direct experience is always "subjective" and often "unreliable", but no matter). But most arguments cannot be based just on direct experiences. For example you need belief in logic to build arguments, i.e. you must assume logic as an intuitive premise. Or you need inductive thinking, so you must assume this as an intuitive premise. So, like it or not, all our reasoning is ultimately based exclusively on subjective experience and intuition. And I mean literally all our reasoning, no matter whether we are doing physics, or mathematics, or philosophy, or logic. If you disagree with that, please suggest one proposition you can justify without in the end relying exclusively on subjective experience and intuitions.

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757. Comment #51206 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 12:34 am

Krogercomplete (post 755, or #51119):

We are going in circles here.

DG: Here is a list of my presuppositions and here is a worldview that fits all of them.

Everyone else: These presuppositions are either wrong or based on unreliable, subjective data.

What presuppositions of mine do you think are either wrong or based on unreliable, subjective data?

To my knowledge I only used one presupposition, namely that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. Don't you agree with this presupposition?

Finally it's simply not true that my argument is "theism is the only worldview that fits my presuppositions". My argument is: Here is the theistic worldview I have, here is naturalism's worldview, and here are the reasons why I find the first works better than the second. I gave many reasons and many one to one comparisons. It's true that one of the reasons I gave is that naturalism contradicts my intuitive belief that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. Clearly, as I do believe that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong, this is a perfectly valid reason. On the contrary, a naturalist is obliged to believe that gratuitous torture is not objectively wrong, but is considered wrong just because of peoples' opinion - which is a position I think no humane person can feel comfortable with.

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758. Comment #51208 by Bonzai on June 22, 2007 at 12:41 am

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:

As I explained in post 571 all reasonable people rely on intuitions.

Intuition is only a suggestion and a broad hint for a possible answer,--or a question. Reasonable people don't stop with intuition, they will follow it up with systematic rational investigations, which you obviously don't. You can't really say you discover or know anything if you stop at intuition. It is intuitively obvious that the earth is flat.

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759. Comment #51216 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 1:38 am

Steve99 (post 754, or #51078):

This is the second installment of my comments to the 754 post. You wrote:

We say "X is objectively true" when we claim that X is true independently of peoples' opinion.

But that is not the manner in which you are using the word. As quoted above, you say that you are basing your beliefs on intuitions. Intuitions are subjective. Objectivity is not based on subjective intuition.

As I have explained "X is objectively true" means that X is true independently of peoples' opinion. (For example all propositions about reality are meant objectively, because reality is as it is no matter what peoples' opinion about it are; on the contrary according to naturalism no scientific proposition is meant objectively because they are all provisional and depend on current scientific understanding.) But how I or anybody else justifies their belief in some objective proposition (whether on subjective intuition, or whatever) is entirely irrelevant to what "objective" means. And if you don't agree with how I justify my belief in objective propositions this does not imply I use "objective" with some other meaning :-)

Incidentally it's important not to confuse what a proposition is with what a proposition means. So for example the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong" is an opinion of mine. But what the proposition says is that gratuitous torture is wrong independently of opinions, including what my opinion currently is or may be in the future.

No, you did not explain how naturalism conflicts with your proposition of objective morality. You are not using the term 'conflicts' correctly. I have, again and again, shown you how objective facts need not come from naturalism. The infinite number of primes is an objective fact - anyone can discover it. But you can take apart the whole universe atom by atom and not find that fact written anywhere. But no-one would claim that the fact of the infinite number of primes 'conflicts' with naturalism.

Similarly, there could be objective morality (although I think this idea is wrong), yet this need have no foundation in nature, and need not conflict with naturalism.

What you are trying to do is look for a physical foundation for abstractions you have defined. Your search is hopeless and pointless.

As I explained before, your reasoning here is flawed because you are falling in a philosophical trap. You are 'reifying' (assuming to be real) things that are abstract and need no substance to exist in. You are like someone forever trying to find the end of a rainbow - your search doesn't even make sense.

First of all, let's not confuse concepts with what these concepts refer to. For example the concept of fairies and the concept of the perpetuum mobile clearly exist, but what these concepts refer to clearly does not.

You introduce the case of numbers and I think that's a good idea. But instead of taking as an example the existence of an infinite number of primes, I suggest we simplify this and discuss the existence of a particular number, say the number pi – or, why not, even simpler, the existence of the number 7.

Now, according to your understanding, how does naturalism deal with the existence of the number 7? According to naturalism does what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to objectively exist or not? You also introduce "reification". So, I wonder, according to your understanding, does naturalism consider that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to is a part of reality or not?

I ask these questions because reading your argument above I am not sure what your point is. It seems to me you are saying that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to does not form part of reality. But if it does not form part of reality then neither does it objectively exist. On the other hand you speak of the objective facts of mathematics, so I get the impression you believe that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to does objectively exist. Isn't there a contradiction here?

Or maybe you have a good argument and I misunderstand it. Please clarify.

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760. Comment #51220 by Bonzai on June 22, 2007 at 1:51 am

So let's say numbers exist in some abstract Platonic universe. How does it require a God? Pythagoras didn't see the need of God in order for numbers to have a real existence.

You have consistently ignore such an obvious and persistent objection and focus on some silly word games about "objectivity". It should be obvious that you are just arguing for argument's sake.

To make it short and crisp, the objectivity of apparently "abstract" things such as order and numbers doesn't prove or require the existence of a God. Conversly, postulating a God doesn't help explaining why certain abstract concepts apparently have objective existence.

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761. Comment #51223 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 2:01 am

stuartM02 (post 753, or #51055):

If reality is not objectively real, then DG's child in question is not objectively being tortured at all as apparently it is just their experiential environment.

I never claimed that "reality is not objectively real"; I only claimed that "the physical universe is not objectively real" – that's an entirely different proposition. In fact reality is objectively real by definition. But whether the physical universe is objectively real or not is a question to be answered (haven't you seen The Matrix movie and how what appears to be not necessarily is the real world?)

My own understanding of reality is that it consists of persons, i.e. conscious beings. So the child and her pain are both objectively real.

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762. Comment #51226 by steve99 on June 22, 2007 at 2:11 am

I ask these questions because reading your argument above I am not sure what your point is. It seems to me you are saying that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to does not form part of reality. But if it does not form part of reality then neither does it objectively exist. On the other hand you speak of the objective facts of mathematics, so I get the impression you believe that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to does objectively exist. Isn't there a contradiction here?

No. Not at all. And this is where your deep misunderstanding is, I feel. Let me give you an example. It does not matter what your actual substance is as an intellectual being, I could still communicate the value of PI to you, with the formula for you to calculate it. Or I could give you the proof of the infinitude of primes.

These are objectively true, but independent of substance - they are true but not physical. (and by not physical, I also mean they don't need any supernatural substance either). They are abstract concepts, but that makes them no less objectively true.

Having no requirement for any material or supernatural substance for their foundation, and being true for any sentient being in any situation - be they Gods or humans - they don't conflict with naturalism (or any other theory of reality).

Similarly, if there are objective ethics, then they should be true and able to be discovered for all sentient beings in any environment and of any form, and should not depend on any creator or higher power for their existence (because if they do they aren't objective!) So, again, they don't conflict with naturalism (or any other theory of reality).

By presuming that these things DO need some sort of origination and substance, you are making the 'reification' error - you are confusing different types of truth.

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763. Comment #51229 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 2:19 am

Bonzai (post 760, or #51220):

As I explained in post 571 all reasonable people rely on intuitions.

Intuition is only a suggestion and a broad hint for a possible answer,--or a question. Reasonable people don't stop with intuition, they will follow it up with systematic rational investigations, which you obviously don't. You can't really say you discover or know anything if you stop at intuition. It is intuitively obvious that the earth is flat.

But I did not stop with my intuition that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. On the contrary I partially justified on it my rejection of naturalism. And it played a role in my conceptualizing an alternative theistic worldview, which I tested against naturalism on various levels and found it to work better in each case.

I mean I agree with you. It's not reasonable to only rely on intuitions and just stop there. But my claim was that, contrary to what apparently many naturalists believe, all reasonable people have intuitions, strongly believe in them, and indeed act on them. See for example Einstein's intuition that no spooky actions at a distance are possible, his extremely strong confidence in this intuition of his (for which he could offer no justification at all except that it was obviously true), and how his intuition led to his work on the EPR paradox, which in turn led to the Bell theorem, and ultimately to maybe the most dramatic experimental verification of quantum mechanics and indeed the falsification of Einstein's intuition.

Similarly both theists and naturalists act on their intuition that an external objective reality beyond their personal experiences must exist, and therefore try to understand how that reality is.

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764. Comment #51230 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 2:40 am

Steve99 (post 762, or #51226):

Very good. I understand you are saying that objective truths have the property that any intelligent being could discover them. So mathematical truths are objectively true for this reason, and what is referred by the concept "number 7" exists objectively for the same reason.

Unfortunately you don't give a straight answer about whether you think what is referred by the concept "number 7" is part of reality or not. But I take it you believe it is. After all if it weren't how could other intelligent beings possibly discover its objective existence? (Not to mention that to claim that X objectively exists but is not part of reality is incoherent, as one normally understands reality as the set of all that objectively exists, correct?)

If we are agreed so far let's go back to the issue of the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture. By the same measure it is reasonable to believe that that the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture is part of reality itself, and therefore the truth of that ethical proposition can be discovered by any intelligent being independently from us.

From where I stand it all fits beautifully together.

Having no requirement for any material or supernatural substance for their foundation, and being true for any sentient being in any situation - be they Gods or humans - they don't conflict with naturalism (or any other theory of reality).

That's interesting. Let me think about it.

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765. Comment #51234 by Dr Benway on June 22, 2007 at 2:58 am

Dianelos,

"Objectively wrong" is nonsense. "Wrong" means "something one ought not do."

"Torture is wrong" means "one ought not torture."

This is a command. It's similar to "pick up that glass." It is not a fact about the world. It is neither true nor false.

Some call this "is-ought" problem "Hume's guillotine." I've made this point before.

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766. Comment #51235 by steve99 on June 22, 2007 at 3:09 am

Unfortunately you don't give a straight answer about whether you think what is referred by the concept "number 7" is part of reality or not. But I take it you believe it is.

The real problem is what you mean by "reality".

After all if it weren't how could other intelligent beings possibly discover its objective existence? (Not to mention that to claim that X objectively exists but is not part of reality is incoherent, as one normally understands reality as the set of all that objectively exists, correct?)

No, I don't think I would agree with that. We normally think of reality as based on time and space or at least physical existence. The nature of abstract things like the number 7 is not the same kind of thing. Objective truths don't have to have existence in time, space, or material form. I am not entirely sure it is 'real' in any sense, but that does not mean it can't be true.

The problem is that once you start to talk about 'reality', you can then define 'unreality'. That makes sense. However, it makes no sense to talk about a reality in which there aren't an infinite number of primes, or in which PI has different digits. These are objective things that are independent of what we normally think of as the matter of reality.

If we are agreed so far let's go back to the issue of the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture. By the same measure it is reasonable to believe that that the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture is part of reality itself, and therefore the truth of that ethical proposition can be discovered by any intelligent being independently from us.

This is where I disagree. First, let's leave out the supposed connection between truth and reality. The problem with the supposed objectivity of ethical propositions is that we don't know of any logical foundation for proving them, in contrary to our deep understanding of the logical foundations of mathematics. Until/if we do, your claim that they can be independently discovered is just a hunch, and as far as I can see, without proof.

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767. Comment #51255 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 5:10 am

Dr Benway (post 765, or #51234):

"Objectively wrong" is nonsense. "Wrong" means "something one ought not do."

"Torture is wrong" means "one ought not torture."

This is a command. It's similar to "pick up that glass." It is not a fact about the world. It is neither true nor false.

Well, ethical precepts are not commands per se, but represent a value judgment about some actions. Actions are real things – we all agree on that, right? Well, at least some actions are ethically good, and some are ethically bad. So ethical goodness and evil are properties of real things (namely our actions) and therefore they too are real and represent facts about the world. So: I ought to do this action because this action is ethically good; I ought not do this action because this action is ethically bad.

Finally I am disturbed by what you write above. Do you really mean to say that all ethical precepts, including such precepts as "you should not gratuitously torture children" is neither true nor false? I can't believe you mean that.

Some call this "is-ought" problem "Hume's guillotine."

My understanding of the "is-ought" problem is that one can't justify ethical precepts (i.e. "ought" propositions) on facts about nature (i.e. "is" propositions). I agree that's a problem, but it's only a problem for naturalism (and Hume was a naturalist). In idealistic theism reality consists of personhood, and here the "ought" becomes the "is", namely God's character. As I wrote way back in the description of the God hypothesis, God instantiates what is objectively good. So here ethics is understood as follows: Those acts are good which make you more similar to how God is. (This presupposes the realization that one's actions transform oneself, but if you think about it this is exactly how it is in our condition. You know the saying "you are what you eat"; actually the deeper truth is "you are what you do".)

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768. Comment #51257 by steve99 on June 22, 2007 at 6:00 am

So ethical goodness and evil are properties of real things (namely our actions) and therefore they too are real and represent facts about the world. So: I ought to do this action because this action is ethically good; I ought not do this action because this action is ethically bad.

No, they aren't properties of real things. They are just abstract ideals with which we associate things. They are just labels. For example, we have geometric ideals like right angles. But they are ideals. We can label a real-world shape as a right angle, but that does not mean that the right angle is a property of that shape - in the real world no object is actually that perfect shape.

As I wrote way back in the description of the God hypothesis, God instantiates what is objectively good.

No, this is wrong by definition.

As I have shown, truly objective facts are independent of any substance (material or supernatural), and are there for any sentient being of any nature to simply discover, then they are there for God to discover too! They aren't "produced" by a creator, they just are. If a fact is truly objective, then it is, by definition, not something that can be created, as the creator would have a choice about what the facts are, and with choice comes subjectivity.

So if your ideas about objective ethics were true. That would be a reason to NOT require a God or a supernatural realm. The only types of things that require a creator, or arise from some sort of substance (natural or supernatural) are subjective things.

No being of any kind can instantiate objective things. If they are truly objective, they are independent of any being. That is the definition of objective.

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769. Comment #51277 by Benjamin Michael on June 22, 2007 at 7:36 am

DG: "On the contrary, a naturalist is obliged to believe that gratuitous torture is not objectively wrong, but is considered wrong just because of peoples' opinion - which is a position I think no humane person can feel comfortable with."

This is just rubbish and a strawman. It is not a matter of opinion. Certain behavioral values (or morals) tend to be universal amongst our species because they evolved and with good explanation. This is 100% compatible with naturalism.

Others: please help me here - am I missing something? This seems so obvious to me and I can't imagine why DG doesn't address this, or am I misunderstanding something?

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770. Comment #51313 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 9:58 am

Steve99 (post 766, or #51235)

Unfortunately you don't give a straight answer about whether you think what is referred by the concept "number 7" is part of reality or not. But I take it you believe it is.

The real problem is what you mean by "reality".

After all if it weren't how could other intelligent beings possibly discover its objective existence? (Not to mention that to claim that X objectively exists but is not part of reality is incoherent, as one normally understands reality as the set of all that objectively exists, correct?)

No, I don't think I would agree with that. We normally think of reality as based on time and space or at least physical existence.

Naturalism and theism are alternative ontological views about reality. I know that according to naturalism reality basically consists of what is physical, but you can't define that reality is that, because doing so is equivalent to declaring that naturalism is true by definition – which is of course begging the question. After all according to theism reality consists of God and His/Her creation, and it wouldn't do if I defined reality as being God and His/Her creation, correct? So we need a definition of reality that is independent of the alternative worldviews, and then evaluate which worldview works better in describing reality.

Now I suppose we all have an intuitive understanding of what reality is: Reality is what is really there, whatever you or I or anybody else may think. Therefore I think a pretty good definition of reality is that it is the set of all things that objectively exist.

An equivalent definition is that reality is what causes our consciousness and conscious experiences. At the very least it's pretty clear that whatever it is that causes our consciousness and conscious experiences is part of reality. Is it reasonable to assume that there may be parts of reality that cannot even in principle affect our conscious experience? I think the question is academic at best, because if there were such parts they would be fundamentally unknowable to us anyway. Thus the two definitions are equivalent as far as our knowledge about reality goes.

Please feel free to propose a better definition of reality if you like. As long as it isn't something like "reality is what naturalism says is real" :-)

First, let's leave out the supposed connection between truth and reality.

I am surprised by that statement. After all, the concepts of truth and of reality are intimately connected, aren't they? One normally says proposition X is true because it correctly describes reality.

There are some philosophical currents (post-modernism, post-structuralism, etc) that hold that all truth is subjective, and that all our knowledge of reality is nothing more than a matter of consensus reached between disagreeing factions. I think that's nonsense, and I suppose most naturalists (knowledgeable in hard scientific facts, such as the speed of light) would agree with me. There is nothing subjective in our knowledge of the speed of light, and no consensus needs to be reached about its value.

The problem with the supposed objectivity of ethical propositions is that we don't know of any logical foundation for proving them

You mean that naturalism doesn't have a way to test for the truth of an objective ethical proposition. But then again naturalism doesn't have a way to test for the objective existence of electrons either, not to mention the objective existence of the moon. At the very least this discussion has evidenced that naturalism is far less solid or clear-cut or functional than naturalists usually think.

Also, let's not forget that I don't claim objectively for all ethical propositions – that's a separate and complex issue. In other words I don't claim that in all situations where one has two alternative courses of action one action is objectively better than the other. - Actually let me tell you what I think about that: In my worldview objective goodness is instantiated by God. Also according with my worldview personal actions transform a person. When confronted with two different courses of action the action that transforms the person closer to God is better than the other one. So far it looks all objective, but there may be situations where which action moves one closer to God depends on one's own state as a person. In other words for two different people in the same ethically challenging situation confronting the same alternative actions, different actions may be better precisely because the two people are different. But then ethical precepts need not always be objective in the sense that they depend in part on the individual person - not withstanding the fact that all ethics is rooted in the objective reality of God. An example here is the famous case of Maria Magdalene using precious perfume to wash Jesus's feet, and Judas objecting that they should have sold the perfume and helped the poor. Judas's ethical argument is correct for most people in most situations, but not for Maria Magdalene in her situation. That such non-objectivity of the goodness of actions is possible is one more reason why we should not judge others or their actions, but only judge what we should do if we ever found ourselves in the place of others.

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771. Comment #51326 by SRWB on June 22, 2007 at 11:07 am

Also according with my worldview personal actions transform a person. When confronted with two different courses of action the action that transforms the person closer to God is better than the other one.

Better for who, the person affected or God? You still have not established an objective ethical standard. For instance, if I have a choice between life and death, for instance, and I have to kill someone to save my own, or someone else's, life have I just been transformed closer to God? I would argue that such a decision is "better" for me, but having just killed someone it may do nothing to "transform me closer to God" – you know that rule about "thou shall not kill" and all that! So such choices are still very subjective.

But then ethical precepts need not always be objective in the sense that they depend in part on the individual person - not withstanding the fact that all ethics is rooted in the objective reality of God.

So ethics (and morals) are objective, except when they're subjective. That clears it up!

Other Comments by SRWB

772. Comment #51329 by Dr Benway on June 22, 2007 at 11:21 am

Finally I am disturbed by what you write above. Do you really mean to say that all ethical precepts, including such precepts as "you should not gratuitously torture children" is neither true nor false? I can't believe you mean that.

A statement is true when it corresponds to some bit of the real world. If I say, "I've a fiver in my pocket," that's not true (you'll have to take my word), because there's nothing in my pocket, actually, at the moment.

"Ought" statements are not about the world as it is, but as it ought to be. These statements do not correspond to a bit of reality, but to a bit of potential reality.

Example: "I ought not eat that chocolate on the table." In this case, there is actually a chocolate on a table in front of me. Will I eat it, or not? You don't know. Maybe I don't know.

If I eat it, is the "I ought not eat" statement false?

Perhaps your emotional reaction to the notion of torturing a child is getting in the way of thinking clearly about the is-ought problem. Try an ought statement you feel more neutral toward, like the chocolate example above.

Other Comments by Dr Benway

773. Comment #51331 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 11:32 am

Steve99 (post 762, or #51226):

This is the second installment of my comments. You wrote:

Having [objective truths] no requirement for any material or supernatural substance for their foundation, and being true for any sentient being in any situation - be they Gods or humans - they don't conflict with naturalism (or any other theory of reality).

Your argument then is that in the same way that objective mathematical propositions do not conflict with naturalism, objective ethical propositions need not conflict with naturalism either.

I think it's a good idea to think about naturalism and math. You claim that naturalism does not conflict with math, so let's see if that's true. If what the concept of "number 7" refers to objectively exists then the question is where does it exist? Bonzai in post 760 hints that numbers may exist in "some abstract Platonic universe". Similarly a naturalist who believes that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong may say that there exists another objective realm of ethics. A naturalist can do that and claim that no supernatural being such as God is asserted, which is true. On the other hand this is case of saying "the surgery was successful, but the patient died". After all "supernaturalism" does not entail witches or ghosts or gods. It entails that nothing objectively real beyond nature exists. And a naturalism that asserts not only the objective reality of the physical universe, but also the objective reality of mathematical realm, and so on, is not naturalism anymore. (Similarly, when Chalmers asserts that consciousness is a fundamental principle of the universe just like matter is, that was considered by others, correctly in my view, as denying monistic materialism and asserting dualism. And when Dennett denies the very properties that make consciousness consciousness it was pointed out by others, correctly in my view, that he was denying the existence of consciousness).

Having said that, I do agree with you that the objectivity of mathematical objects does not contradict naturalism. Let me put on my naturalist hat and explain why:

=== putting on my naturalist hat

According to naturalism reality basically consists of the physical universe we observe: physical space and time with complex configurations of material particles and energy in it. Naturalism moreover accepts the objective existence of mathematical objects such as what is referred by the concept of "number 7" (which for shortness we shall call "7" in what follows). Superficially one could argue that "7" cannot be part of the physical universe. After all objects such as "7" or "circle" are supposed to be perfect and exist timelessly and outside of physical space, and are therefore quite dissimilar to physical things. But this argument is based on a particularly naive version of naturalism (that for good measure is called "naive materialism") according to which only physical things objectively exist.

According to naturalism all that exists supervenes on the physical, or can be explained on purely physical grounds. That all math can be explained on physical grounds may at first sound surprising, but observe that even the most sophisticated and abstract math describes facts that obtain when one pushes symbols following particular rules on a piece of physical paper, so all math describes a concrete property of the physical universe.

Let's see the case of the objective existence of "7" and of "circle": A plain fact of the physical universe is that it contains elements that are countable. So the number "7" objectively exists in all parts of the physical universe where there are seven countable things. In other words the existence of "7" resides in the feasibility of a particular physical event (namely counting) that is possible only because the physical universe is objectively as it is. Similarly the existence of "circle" resides in the feasibility of a particular physical event (say estimating how much paint fits in a cylindrical can) that is possible only because of the physical universe is objectively as it is. So all mathematical objects (including mathematical theorems) are nothing more than properties of the physical universe as it objectively is, and knowing math is useful precisely because all mathematical propositions describe objective properties of the physical universe. There is no need then to assert that they exist in some other realm of reality beyond the physical universe.

One can suggest some arguments against the above explanation. For example it's true that there is a natural number, let's call it "omega", that is so large that it can't be represented even using all entropy of the physical universe (according to our current understanding the physical universe is limited). One could then claim that "omega" and all natural numbers larger than it do not describe any property of the physical universe. That's all correct, but then again propositions about such numbers cannot by definition ever affect our conscious experience, cannot therefore be tested one way or the other, and are therefore meaningless (according to logical positivism). And of course meaningless propositions (such as "omega objectively exists") are not even false and cannot conflict with naturalism.

=== taking off my naturalist hat

So, in short, I agree with you that the objective truth of math does not contradict naturalism. But I don't see a similar way to describe objective goodness as a property of the physical universe, and therefore cannot see a way to make the objective existence of goodness compatible with naturalism. The reason is that I cannot imagine a way to describe objective goodness as contrasted to objective evil as a property of the physical universe, the way I can describe all meaningful mathematical objects and theorems as properties of the physical universe as understood by naturalism. And to my knowledge no other philosopher has managed to do that either. Indeed that's the crux of Hume's "is-ought" problem that Dr Benway mentions in post 765: "Given our knowledge of the way the world 'is,' how can we know the way the world 'ought to be'?"

Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

774. Comment #51335 by Apemanblues on June 22, 2007 at 11:47 am

For torture to exist there needs to be at least one mind. A mind of some kind, no matter how rudimentary, needs to exist to feel pain (otherwise it's not torture) and to make a value judgement on it (ouch, ouch, this hurts, it feels wrong). Nowhere in the universe, independent of mind, can torture be 'wrong', because torture cannot exist independent of mind. A rock cannot torture another rock.

The question "Do you think torture of children/puppies/fluffythings is objectively wrong?" is a flawed question. Torture depends upon mind for it's very existence and the ethical opinions of minds are subjective by definition. This question is purely invented to get an emotional response. To say "Hey, I think it is even MORE wrong than you non-believers do, because I think it is MAGICALLY wrong as well".

It's the usual trite nonsense.

Other Comments by Apemanblues

775. Comment #51343 by Dr Benway on June 22, 2007 at 12:07 pm

For God so loved the world, that He tortured His only begotten Son...

Other Comments by Dr Benway

776. Comment #51372 by steve99 on June 22, 2007 at 2:01 pm

You really haven't understood the implications of what I have said.

What you have done is separated math into the countable parts, which can be detected in the natural world, and the supposedly uncountable parts, which can't. You are ignoring the fact that there are clear mathematical facts that are true, but don't require any physical basis. No God can redefine what the definition of PI is, but you can hardly claim that PI has no impact on our world.

But I don't see a similar way to describe objective goodness as a property of the physical universe, and therefore cannot see a way to make the objective existence of goodness compatible with naturalism. The reason is that I cannot imagine a way to describe objective goodness as contrasted to objective evil as a property of the physical universe

Then you really, really haven't understood what I have written, and your understanding of mathematics is lacking. Let me try and explain it again.

Objective facts are not founded on a physical universe.

If they are truly objective, they are there for anyone to discover, in any universe, and in any context, be it supernatural or natural.

Let me explain yet again.... you are falsely 'reifying' abstract concepts. You are trying to look for a physical basis for abstract truths.

(This reminds me of the Auditors in Terry Pratchett's 'Thief of Time', who took apart a painting atom by atom in order to find out where the Beauty was).

Mathematical proofs are objective facts. They require no physical reality to support them. They require no supernatural reality to support them. They are there for any sentience to discover, be they men or Gods.

ANY truly objective fact is similarly there for any sentience to discover, in any context.

If you claim that some ethics are objective, then, by definition, any sentient being of whatever nature, should discover them. But that also means that they are independent of any reality, physical or otherwise.

If this is the case, then truly objective facts cannot arise from a creator - they don't need a creator: if they needed a creator, then, by definition, they would not be objective.

If you are looking for the foundation of ethics in any substance, then you really don't consider them objective.

I am sorry, but the entire foundation of your requirement for a God in all this has gone.

If you need a God to define something, then by definition, that thing is not objective. So you have a choice - God-defined ethics, or objective ethics!

Sorry, Danielos, but I know I can win this debate. I have a lot of respect for your opinion, and you have debated here with rare politeness and skill, and I appreciate that. It has been a real pleasure to debate with you. But, I now know in detail the flaws in what you say, and I am sure I can present them in a way that you can accept.

Other Comments by steve99

777. Comment #51401 by alovrin on June 22, 2007 at 4:28 pm

Boy, the pub was going off...Sheez, you guys are still at it, Ah well the dialogue must go on I suppose. Hey go have a read here anyone, DG you as well.
http://www.naturalism.org/plantinga.htm
A few quotes:

This means Plantinga is also mistaken to say that "naturalism...is in conflict with a premier doctrine of contemporary science [evolution]." If science, conforming to its canons of explanatory adequacy, were to demonstrate a role for god in guiding evolution, then naturalists would happily accept that conclusion. But of course in that case god would have been naturalized, integrated into a scientific account of the world.
..........

Plantinga raises the possibility that, if our cognitive capacities are merely physical, we're living in a dream. This possibility, like that of global, brain-in-a-vat skepticism, is something naturalists are happy to live with if the only cure is to posit god. That cure is worse than the disease, since it requires we give up our commitment to explanatory transparency as the touchstone of factual truth. Indeed, we naturalists are constitutionally unable to abandon our demand for clear evidence-based explanations, even if that leaves us (possibly) vulnerable to rationalist critiques.
.........
None of this, of course, will cut the least bit of ice for Plantinga and other supernaturalist rationalists (such as John F. Haught), since their commitment isn't to explanatory transparency but to discovering unimpeachable foundations for reason (and ethics, another story). Such foundations, they argue, cannot be supplied by a world whose ultimate constituents are inherently mindless. Only in god can we trust.

So be it. Some people want certainties of the sort that god can deliver, some don't. Some want explanations of the sort that science delivers, some don't. So long as naturalists and supernaturalists don't demonize one another, we can all get along, enjoying some good arguments as we go.

Other Comments by alovrin

778. Comment #51639 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:03 pm

Dr Benway (post 772, or #51329):

A statement is true when it corresponds to some bit of the real world. If I say, "I've a fiver in my pocket," that's not true (you'll have to take my word), because there's nothing in my pocket, actually, at the moment.

"Ought" statements are not about the world as it is, but as it ought to be. These statements do not correspond to a bit of reality, but to a bit of potential reality.

Yes, I think I understand you. Or at least if I understand you correctly your position is as follows:

== putting on my naturalist hat:

According to naturalism reality consists of the physical universe and nothing else. Everything that objectively exists is part of that universe or is a property of it. An objective proposition then is only meaningful when it refers to an objective part of the physical universe or an objective property of it. For example the electrical charge of the electron, or the speed of light, or the mass of the moon, are all objective properties, and one can suggest (and test for truthfulness) meaningful propositions that contain such concepts.

Now actions are objective facts, and therefore propositions about human actions are meaningful and are either objectively true or false. In our culture we moreover speak of a particular property of actions, which we call "goodness" or "badness". These properties do not belong to an action itself, but to somebody's subjective evaluation of an action. So these properties are subjective properties. Similarly, Cindy Crawford objectively exists, but Cindy Crawford's beauty is a subjective evaluation of her and is not an objective property of Cindy Crawford. So to say "Cindy Crawford is objectively beautiful" is a meaningless proposition, and therefore neither true nor false. Meaningful objective propositions would be "I find Cindy Crawford beautiful", or "85% of men and 82% of women find Cindy Crawford beautiful" etc.

As there is nothing objectively good or bad in an action, to build objective ethical propositions and ask if they are true or not is nonsense, because all objective ethical propositions are meaningless so they are neither true nor false. Some objective ethical propositions, such as "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong", may strike us as obviously meaningful and true, but this is only because of our emotional reaction to visualizing such an action. When we look at other less emotionally charged propositions such as "eating chocolate while not hungry is objectively wrong" it becomes quite clear that no objective morality exists. The plain fact that large groups of people deeply disagree about some ethical questions (e.g. about female circumcision) further evidences that there is nothing objective in the ethical properties of actions.

Naturalism can explain (at least in principle) why virtually every human being finds it intuitively obvious that gratuitous torture is wrong, but there may be civilizations out there where virtually everybody finds it very questionable whether gratuitous torture is wrong, or even where everybody finds it obvious that gratuitous torture is good. Now we don't as yet exactly understand the properties of the evolution of civilization, and the above may turn out to be false. That is, it may turn out that no civilization can evolve in which gratuitous torture is not considered obviously and objectively wrong by virtually everybody. But even if that were the case it would still not imply that actions have objective ethical properties. Why not? After all, isn't the fact that any intelligent being in the cosmos can independently discover the same mathematical truths – isn't this fact sufficient evidence that mathematics is objective? Well, no ethical proposition is objective even if it turned out that all intelligent beings in the universe would independently agree on it, because naturalism can explain that state of affairs without assuming any such objective property of actions. Actions, after all, are complex causal events driven by the sophisticated information processing organs that all intelligent beings in the universe have; and these causal events are governed by physical laws; and physical laws do not have any "goodness" or "badness" properties.

== taking off my naturalist hat

Would you agree with the above? If you don't agree with some particular, could you point out which?

Incidentally in this context there exists a fallacy that goes like this: If an idea is entirely subjective then there is nothing objectively real that corresponds to it, but rather it's all an illusion. To think so is a fallacy. Let me explain:

== putting on my naturalist hat

Now the fact there is nothing objectively wrong in gratuitous torture does not imply that those who see something objectively wrong in gratuitous torture are "imagining things" or that "it's all a figment of their imagination". This can easily be seen in the case of beauty. Let's assume that 85% of men find Cindy Crawford beautiful in independent tests. If Cindy Crawford's beauty is "a figment of the imagination" then how do they manage to give such a highly correlated result? In other words, if there weren't something objectively there in Cindy Crawford (the particular proportions of her face, the particular curvature of her hips, or whatever) that men's brains interpret as beautiful then one would get a 50%-50% result. But one doesn't get such a neutral result, so there must be something objectively beautiful in Cindy Crawford but only in relation to men's brains. In other words, Cindy Crawford's beauty is not an objective property of Cindy Crawford, but is an objective property of a system that combines Cindy Crawford and men's brains. Similarly actions of gratuitous torture have no objective ethical property, but the conjunction of such actions and human brains do have objective ethical properties, because there must be something objectively there in actions of gratuitous torture that most human brains are so sensitive about. (Strictly speaking mathematical theorems are not objective properties of particular physical systems either, but rather objective properties of the conjunction of these systems and intelligent information processing systems.)

== taking off my naturalist hat

Now in the context of our discussion about my reasons for thinking that theism works better than naturalism, the above is more or less irrelevant. It shows that naturalism's incompatibility with the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture need not be reason to reject naturalism from the point of view of a naturalist. Fair enough; I never claimed the contrary.

On the other hand the same is good reason for me to reject naturalism because for me the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong" (i.e. is wrong by itself and not because of peoples' subjective opinion) is eminently meaningful. So from my point of view if according to naturalism this proposition is nonsense then so much the worse for naturalism. And as I explained in post 333 (and in a shorter form in post 470) I have many more reasons than just the problem of objective morality for finding that theism works better than naturalism.

Finally I note that not all naturalists find it possible or reasonable to accept that all objective ethical propositions are meaningless. So there are naturalists who think that there must be a way to place objective goodness and badness squarely in the naturalist worldview. For example Roger Penrose, one of the most famous mathematicians of today, hypothesizes that consciousness exists as an objective property of the lowest level of reality, the Planck scale (about 10e-33 cm), the level at which space-time geometry is no longer smooth but quantized. Qualia (i.e. the basic elements of conscious existence) are embedded as patterns in this fundamental granularity of the spacetime geometry that makes up the universe. Systems that are organized in such a way that the necessary patterns obtain are conscious systems. In this way Penrose tries to account for consciousness on naturalistic grounds (which is the first big naturalistic problem I mentioned in post 333). Now, interestingly enough, Penrose also hypothesizes that the abstract objects of mathematics, as well as ethics and esthetics are embedded there. In other words according to Penrose's hypothesis, mathematical, ethical and esthetical truths are all objective and instantiated in patterns that exist in the Planck scale of physical reality.

Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

779. Comment #51641 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:21 pm

Benjamin Michael (769, or #51277):

Certain behavioral values (or morals) tend to be universal amongst our species because they evolved and with good explanation. This is 100% compatible with naturalism.

Right, but the question here is whether such morals are actually true. We can understand the evolution of all morals on naturalistic grounds, but we all agree that some ethical precepts are true and others are false (we disagree though about which :-) So the question is how to find out which are true and which are false. And for this naturalism appears not to be incapable of giving one the necessary epistemological tools. One way out is to claim that no such thing as good or bad morals objectively exist. So, for example, according to this view gratuitous torture is wrong only because of peoples' opinion. But this is a view that I (and many other people) find entirely unpalatable. And as I know of theistic worldviews that don't require me to swallow such unpalatable things, and moreover only offer advantages as compared to naturalism, I find it reasonable to prefer them over naturalism.

(Incidentally, in the context of naturalism and ethics look up "naturalistic fallacy". It's the fallacious idea that naturalism can deal with ethics because it can explain how moral views evolve.)


Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

780. Comment #51644 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:39 pm

Apemanblues (post 774, or #51335):

For torture to exist there needs to be at least one mind. A mind of some kind, no matter how rudimentary, needs to exist to feel pain (otherwise it's not torture) and to make a value judgement on it (ouch, ouch, this hurts, it feels wrong). Nowhere in the universe, independent of mind, can torture be 'wrong', because torture cannot exist independent of mind. A rock cannot torture another rock.

I agree that for torture to exist a mind must exist. Actually two minds must exist: one that decides to torture and another that experiences the pain of torture. From this fact though it doesn't follow that whether torture is good or wrong must be subjective opinion. Torture requires at least two minds but the world may be so that torture is wrong independently of what these two minds (or any other minds) think.

Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

781. Comment #51646 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:50 pm

Dr Benway (post 775, or #51243):

For God so loved the world, that He tortured His only begotten Son...

Well the dogma of atonement does not make much sense to me either. So, what's your point? If your point is that there are many wrong theistic propositions then I agree.

There is one way though that the idea of atonement makes sense to me, but it goes the other way around: Jesus atoning not for our sins but for our suffering (in other words atoning not for moral evil but for natural evil). See post 488 (#49065) about this.

Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

782. Comment #51647 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:57 pm

Steve99 (post 776, or #51372):

Objective facts are not founded on a physical universe

If they are truly objective, they are there for anyone to discover, in any universe, and in any context, be it supernatural or natural.

I am not sure I follow. By that measure the existence of poster Steve99 is not "an objective fact".

As for mathematical theorems, such as "1+1=2", they are not objectively true either, because there may be universes where no countable things exist, and where therefore numbers are meaningless concepts.


Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

783. Comment #51650 by Downunder on June 24, 2007 at 12:20 am

I posted this earlier as comment#51635 because I could not find this "God Delusion" site where it belongs. My apologies.
re: The God Delusion
It seems to me that anyone who uses the lack of "a logical argument for the existence of God" as a logical reason to be an atheist, is having-us-on, or is rather narrow-minded or childish. A certain mental agility is required to realise that religions of whatever creed are only human efforts, not a God's, to guide the masses through their individual lives. The life span of a human is utterly insignificant compared to that of our planet and the universe. I congratulate Dawkins for using his "God" given talents to stir, those who listen, into vigorous discussion about religions. Congratulations for being able to make a living from it and for doing it nicely. Discussions are more civilised then generation after generation of stupid wars.
WAKE-UP all of you, you'll be dead before you know it. The Universe lives on, for ever. Eternity is beyond our human dimensions, so is the comprehension of the universe, let alone the concept of a God. What are we arguing about? Are we allowed to have different concepts? Must we all back the same team because only one team will be the winner?
To all ATHEISTS: forget about religion, forget about God, it are mere pebbles along the track, concentrate on what is LIFE. To ALL: find out where life comes from and where life goes back to. Why are we here? I have had 80 years sofar, and have found my answers in "My God", I'll name him "Mod" for short, short also for modified. Life is on loan from Mod and goes back to Mod. Mod is omniscience, omnipresent, omni-dimensional, omni-everything, intrinsically beyond our intelligence. Study the UNIVERSE, infinity, evolution and science. Discover and do not waste your intelligence & energy on arguments about religious details. We should learn from history that religious fanatics cause wars. If killing of innocents is condoned in wars, let us end swiftly and humanely those fanatics who start wars. Teach all to live and let live with mutual respect.
Dawkins' world-wide attention may be "God sent"! Now that is a new tack to help the dogmatic believers.

Other Comments by Downunder

784. Comment #51660 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 24, 2007 at 1:52 am

Alovrin (post 777, or #51401):

Hey go have a read here anyone, DG you as well.
http://www.naturalism.org/plantinga.htm

Thanks for the link. I quote from it:

Somehow, we aren't particularly bothered by the rationalist argument that merely physical creatures can't track truth, since we want, justifiably, we think, a story about how supernatural creatures do better.

I don't find that justifiable at all. When Plantinga offers an argument that naturalism and evolution are incompatible then you try to find errors in that argument. The argument engages naturalism on its terms and shows that if naturalism is true then we can't have any reason to believe that evolution is true. So to bring in the issue of how "supernatural creatures" do any better is simply a red herring and evidences the weakness or uneasiness of the naturalist position vis-a-vis Plantinga's argument.

Now Plantinga's argument is counterintuitive, and in what follows the naturalism.org article simply pumps our intuitions as well as pointing out how good a scientific theory evolution is. But Plantinga's original paper is very precise on this point and argues why adaptive behavior and truth seeking behavior can and probably do deviate. Actually the article in naturalism.org is pretty mediocre I think, and contains such nonsense statements as "The empiricist in us trumps the rationalist" as if there were any contradiction or opposition between empiricism and rationalism. Not to mention blatant examples of the naturalistic fallacy as when it says "That many people nevertheless believe in god suggests that the belief is driven by non-cognitive, such as fear of death, the desire to reunite with loved ones in the hereafter, needs for affiliation and community, etc." with the clear implication that therefore belief in God is unreasonable.

Anyway make up your own mind. You can find Plantinga's original paper here: http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/an_evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism.pdf It's not an easy read. My take on it is as follows:

If evolution is true then our cognitive faculties evolved because of their success in furthering our genes' reproduction and not because of their success in distinguishing between true and false proposition. So far so good. Now intuitively one would think that the two are related, i.e. that only by helping us distinguish correctly between true and false propositions can our cognitive faculties be successful in getting us to reproduce. Plantinga uses some nifty probabilistic arguments to show that this intuitive implication does not obtain. I find it hard to swallow his arguments myself, but I note that no philosopher of note has pointed out some clear mistake in Plantinga's paper.

Plantinga's paper is very technical but let me try to elucidate his point by using an example. Let's take one of the most important propositions one can make about reality, namely "The physical universe is part of reality". Now for evolution to guide our reproductive success the production of a cognitive capacity for finding out whether that proposition is true or false has no use at all. Why not? Because correctly knowing whether the physical universe is real or not is entirely irrelevant from the point of view of our selfish genes. It suffices that we don't doubt that the physical universe our brain models is real. Whether the physical universe is real or is only an appearance created by a reality that is entirely different than the physical universe makes no difference at all, correct? But if evolution would not produce a brain capable of finding out whether the physical universe is real or not (because doing so is entirely superfluous), neither, obviously, would it produce a brain capable of finding out whether anything in the physical universe is real or not.

This is a powerful argument, and I think that naturalist philosophers' response to it has been very quiet indeed. Anyway let's be careful about what the argument says: It does not say that evolution is wrong, in other words that evolution does not correctly explain the phenomena we observe concerning the complexity of the species. It says that evolution in conjunction with naturalism is wrong – the two conflict with each other. Why? Because according to naturalism all facts of our condition including our cognitive faculties have been produced by evolution. But if that is true then we have no reason to trust our cognitive faculties on which our discovery of the theory of evolution rests. So we have a logical conflict here. Either naturalism is true and the belief in evolution is not justifiable, or else naturalism is false and belief in evolution may be justifiable. But one cannot coherently claim both that naturalism is true and that that there is a good justification for believing in the theory of evolution. Strictly speaking Plantinga's argument shows that if naturalism is true there can be no justification for any of our beliefs. And observe that Plantinga's argument nowhere uses any presuppositions of theism; it attacks naturalism on its own grounds.

In conclusion Plantinga's argument about naturalism and evolution (though probably not Plantinga's worldview) is exactly consistent with what I have been arguing here, namely that there is nothing wrong with science but there is something wrong with naturalism's view of reality.

You can find an audio file where Plantinga himself gives a lecture about his argument here: http://www.hisdefense.org/OnlineLectures/tabid/136/Default.aspx It's kind of light-hearted but an interesting listen anyway.

Other Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

785. Comment #51661 by steve99 on June 24, 2007 at 2:15 am

As for mathematical theorems, such as "1+1=2", they are not objectively true either, because there may be universes where no countable things exist, and where therefore numbers are meaningless concepts.

No, this is no argument at all.

Objectively true things require no substance to exist in. The infinity of primes is an objectively true fact, yet there is no space in our universe for an infinite number of primes.

You need to read up on your philosophy and logic. Your strange idea that objective truths require substance to exist is seriously wrong, and because this is wrong, it undermines your whole argument.

I can easily show you an objective proof that PI has an infinite number of digits. You can't refute it, and that proof is there for anyone to see. But there is nothing in this universe that has infinite precision. But that does not make the statement any less true.

You seem to have a major problem understanding what 'objective' means. In means independent; independent of substance, and independent of who knows about it (including Gods!)

Other Comments by steve99

786. Comment #51686 by steve99 on June 24, 2007 at 5:23 am

Danielos: Let me give an example of how your analogy of a universe without countable things is wrong.

The constancy of the speed of light is an objective fact. It comes from Maxwell's Equations. It can be explained even to a blind scientist - who can never experience light! You don't need to be able to experience in the physical world things that are objectively true.

Other Comments by steve99

787. Comment #51690 by newatheist on June 24, 2007 at 5:37 am

Hey ho, back again (black coffee in hand)…

mathematical theorems...are not objectively true...because there may be (emphasis mine) universes where no countable things exist, and where therefore numbers are meaningless concepts.

It's "mights" and "maybes" from DG again. This should obviously read (Steve99's latest entry aside) -

"mathematical theorems...[may not be] objectively true...because there may be universes where no countable things exist, and where therefore numbers are meaningless concepts.

Continuing in "amateur observer" mode, and undaunted by the fact that greater minds than mine are at work on this (after all it was the child who pointed out the emperor's nakedness) I'd like to add:

Mathematics is objective. When you have seven things you have seven things. Nobody can count seven things as six. Nobody can do that. There are seven things. It's correct to all people.

Morality is subjective. You can say child torture is wrong, but people can still do it. It's incorrect to most people.

Dr Benway made a similar point about the temperature of water, and whether or not it was okay for swimming. Seems to sum up the objective / subjective question.

Dianelos?

Anyway, back to the central commentary position….

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788. Comment #51713 by Dr Benway on June 24, 2007 at 9:03 am

Dianelos,

Your ethics sounds like a sub-set of esthetics. Good is perceived and experienced in a similar manner to beauty. Doing the right thing would seem to be fairly easy, if this were generally the case.

But often what we feel is the "right thing" is contrary to our natural impulses. There's an inner struggle to overcome a disinclination to do it.

Ethical principles arise out of the need to form cooperative relationships. They're like promises or social contracts. Humans develop general rules of thumb forbidding stealing, killing, bogarting the TV remote, etc., in order to live peacefully together.

But the rules can be broken under exceptional circumstances. We allow a positive defense like, "Yes, I broke the law. But a reasonable person in my situation would have done the same thing." This "reasonable person" defense needs a jury to prove by agreement that it's accurate.

The fact that we need juries proves that absolutist rules do not suffice.

In short, I don't see how anything supernatural is required to provide a foundation for a system of ethical principles.

It seems to me that you're using the word "objective" as an intensifier. Some things are bad. Some things are "objectively bad", meaning they're really, really bad. That's why you chose the emotionally charged example of child torture as your case. Child torture is very bad indeed. So it must be "objectively bad."

"Objective" when used thus means, "You'd have to be nuts to argue about this. Seriously, when I say bad, I mean bad. BAD I TELL YOU, BAD!!!"

I don't see how the term "objective" adds much to a discussion of ethics.

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789. Comment #51716 by Dr Benway on June 24, 2007 at 9:37 am

Dianelos:

Well the dogma of atonement does not make much sense to me either. So, what's your point?

According to St. John, God disagrees with your position regarding torture being "objectively" wrong. So there isn't universal agreement for that proposition. Guess you've only got your "intuition" as a basis.

But am I obliged to take your intuition seriously? If not, doesn't that make this entire debate moot?

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