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Comments by MPhil


1. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201590 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 9:06 pm

Finally, if you have had even a brief introduction to mathematics (set theory, algebra and the rest) these ontological arguments will be utterly painful to read as they are riddled with holes.


While I certainly cannot claim to have anything more than basic knowledge of mathematics, I have studied logic and philosophy of science, which - as you will know - make quite some use of set-theory, category-theory, model-theory etc.

I think it might not be possible to find all the holes in the ontological arguments from mathematics (including set-theory, category-theory) alone. I think you need basic first and second order predicate logic, modal logic, model-theory and semantic interpretations for that - but given that - yes, they are indeed painful to read - although technically interesting (as in - "Let's find out exactly where it fails")

Doesn't that remind you the typical undergraduate mistake that the maximum of any set of reals exists?


Hmm... I'm not sure if the analogy is sufficient to make this into a formal criticism. "Greatness" may have degrees, but does mean there is an ordered set of greatness-instantiations with the properties of the set of real numbers?

Yes, I've heard about that. That is basically assuming God exists without an argument. Personally, I find such an option unworthy of any answer.


I find it, well, not "worthy of", but demanding deconstruction - people who bring up that "argument" think they really have grasped some deep truth with this... they need to be taken down a notch or two.

Let's assume that a set of axioms A results in a sound logical system that mathematically describe our universe such that the statement that "God exists" is false in this system.


I doubt whether in such a system, "God exists" would be false. I would assume it would simply not be defined and thus meaningless.

2. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201577 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 8:23 pm

qomak,

actually, many theists claim that God is the ultimate source of reason, and of abstract entities/universals (the "ideas" of God) to which mathematical entities belong. Furthermore - I really don't see how a mathematical model of the universe could potentially dismantle the ontological argument.

Even if it were possible to construct a mathematical model that explains everything including the "beginning" of the universe, it would only disprove the "first cause" argument - not the ontological one... or perhaps I'm missing something, but I don't think so. (Then again, I don't think the ontological arguments are of any real consequence, either. I think they are technically - logically - interesting. But that's about it :)

3. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201571 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 8:16 pm

Actually, while it is certainly important, I wasn't actually talking about the conceptual/metaphysical assumptions pulled apart by Quine (and even he can be doubted), but about the fact that Hume's concepts of "ideas", "passions" etc and their relations are very outdated and simplistic - we know so much more about the mind, information processing, psychology and stuff.

Hume and Kant were absolute giants, and most theist arguments fail to even meet their criticisms - which aren't outdated at all (I think).

As for the last paragraph - I think I may just have to side with your wife here :) Either you are a fool like me and actually try to make a living out of it (all the while knowing that it's highly likely I will have to earn money some other way, maybe go into pre-university education or something) or you either wait until your retirement or restrict it to your spare time :D

4. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201564 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 8:00 pm

That is indeed an important section of Hume's, Brian.

I'm confident I wouldn't really need to tell you this, but you know me - I just can't keep my mouth shut: One thing you have to remember is that Hume's concepts of "ideas", "passions", "reason", their specific definitions and interactions are hopelessly naive. Not for his time, of course - but from what we know now from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy of mind etc... A brilliant, wonderful philosopher to whom we all owe very much, but I think this has to be kept in mind.

5. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201556 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:51 pm

mordacious1,

I'm not really, but I did watch the game. The German team was dreadful - the Spanish team was brilliant (especially Torres). They absolutely earned the cup.

I'm really anything but a soccer fan (and I really dislike the flag-waving and whole proto-nationalism in such sports), so I wasn't invested at all, I really don't care. But thanks anyway for extending your condolences :D

6. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201545 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:32 pm

Brian,

have you read Mackie's discussion of the ontological arguments as of yet? As I said, I find his arguments very convincing, except that I think he underestimates the force of the Kant-inspired argument that existence is not a predicate but a quantifier (and, as I said modal necessity or possibility are operators, not properties)

7. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201543 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:29 pm

Ah yes, I just re-read the last few relevant posts, and this indeed seems to be what he is claiming. Wow, I've never actually met anyone - including theist professors of philosophy who found the ontological argument convincing in any way.

8. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201538 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:23 pm

Brian,

you're doing fine, and for once I'm getting tired at an almost normal time... someone in your time-zone is better suited to do this right now - although I might stick around for a few more posts :)

9. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201537 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:22 pm

Okay - if Robert is not claiming that the ontological argument is a proof of god's existence, that's fine by me.... there are numerous other things to discuss about the invalidity of the premises of the ontological arguments, or the methods on which they rely (modal status or existence itself as a predicate for example)... but they have been advanced as proofs, because of what we now call the Axiom S5 of modal logic: (POSSIBLE:NECESSARY: P) -> NECESSARY: P

Meaning if it is possible that P is necessarily true, then P is necessarily true.

This axiom is not universally accepted either, though. At least not until the introduction of nested modalities, which makes sense of it.

10. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201532 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:19 pm

Robert - to get the umlaut, type (without spaces and inverted commata): "& ouml ;"

Like this: "Gödel"

11. Mormons urged to back ban on same-sex marriage

Comment #201527 by MPhil on June 29, 2008 at 7:15 pm

Dear me,
I leave for a few days and someone lets the ontological argument loose - how quaint.

Now I haven't read the entire thread - so please forgive me if something I mention has been discussed sufficiently before.

Robert - the concept of "Essence" is obscurantism, and no philosopher of any standing (except for theists of course - it's a refuge of theirs) has taken this pseudo-concept seriously for ages. And rightly so.

Furthermore, don't be so quick to dismiss Kant - his objection that existence is not a predicate was entirely correct. The model status however, is also not a predicate - have you ever had a look at modal logic? It is an operator, not a predicate - also, to treat L and M as properties is also metaphysical nonsense. This becomes clear from any semantic interpretation of modal-logic, such as the possible-worlds semantics. We quantify over objects in possible worlds and do this via modal operators - we do not treat L and M as properties, just as we do not treat quantification as property-ascription.

Furthermore, the modal-ontological argument has been shot down so early on it is really quite lame. The IF part of the modal-ontological argument can very well be interpreted as nested-modalities, or nested/sub-branching possible worlds - and thus the argument completely fails to show anything of actual interest.

Your objection against the unicorn-persiflage doesn't stand up to scrutiny. As John Leslie Mackie so rightly said - I could just define the concept of a "real martian", or lets call him "remartian". Now, the concept necessitates existence - does it necessarily have a real referent? Certainly not.
We can either doubt that I can have a coherent concept of something necessarily existing, or we can say that even that doesn't show that it exists - only, as you said, that if it exists, it exists necessarily... and here we again come to nested modalities.

Then of course there are all the conceptual inconsistencies in any "supernaturalism" or specifically the conceptions of deities in abrahamic religions - which I am far too tired to go into now.

12. Stop distorting young minds!

Comment #200201 by MPhil on June 27, 2008 at 4:27 am

As I argue in my paper, I agree with the late, eminent political philosopher John Rawls who said that education HAS to make children able to be fully cooperative members of a society based on the basic liberties. This includes a full understanding and faculty to make free and responsible use of their liberties. In order to become capable of being fully cooperative members of society, they have to be able to make use of public reason as well.

Religious indoctrination in childhood violates all of that - no matter how benevolent the outcome.

13. A War On Science

Comment #200034 by MPhil on June 26, 2008 at 4:46 pm

I think Brian is referring to my reply to Bnonn's second post on the trinity.... And my reply has been "refuted" by 3 posts. At least they think so. Why don't you have a look and dismantle their counter-arguments against my counter-arguments? Would be excellent practice for you plus you won't have to leave them thinking they've finally defended the trinity sufficiently.

14. Science is not philosophy

Comment #198924 by MPhil on June 24, 2008 at 6:51 pm

Tera,

I meant that ID is "a" philosophy like a neo-conservative mindset is "a" philosphy. It is certainly not philosophy. And comparing religion to philosophy just shows deep ignorance of the academic discipline of philosophy - especially philosophy nowadays.

I'm off... my interest in this is fading fast.

15. Science is not philosophy

Comment #198921 by MPhil on June 24, 2008 at 6:24 pm

TeraBrat,

excuse me - I'm studying philosophy. I have a very good idea what it is. The author should have said "a philosophy", which denotes any ideological position not possible to be known to be factual. I object to this use of the term "philosophy" in general because it denigrates the discipline of philosophy. It's like saying a dog digging in the dirt is doing "empirical science"!

But the author did not say "a philosophy", she used the general term "philosophy" which denotes the discipline.

Perhaps you might want to be a bit more careful before claiming someone doesn't know what something is.

I know what philosophy is the same way a physicist knows what physics is.

16. Science is not philosophy

Comment #198900 by MPhil on June 24, 2008 at 5:06 pm

I agree with Spinoza, 82abhilash and others - this article is deeply ignorant and insulting.
ID is NOT PHILOSOPHY - "PHILOSOPHY" does not mean "personal opinion, not really conforming to standards of rationality". It does not mean "ideological pseudoscience". Quite the opposite!

ID is not even a philosophical hypothesis. The design hypothesis itself is - not a particularly good one (and that has been recognized by most philosophers), but not ID. ID is simply ideological pseudoscience.

The ignorance and lack of education in such matters displayed by the author of this article is astounding. What a fool this person has made of herself.

The criticism of ID is - of course - fine, but to call ID "Philosophy", or to equate philosophy with such bullshit is deeply ignorant.

17. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #198022 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 4:04 am

Brian,

enough with the intellectual self-flagellation already :) You're better than you think. Which makes you better than me in this respect - I think I'm better than I am. :)

18. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #198012 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 3:50 am

Yes, Hume was great.... but you should really try and read Kant as well. It's much more difficult, but it's worth it.

19. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #197998 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 3:22 am

Brian,

you can strengthen the argument:

Some brain-states being identical/corresponding to perception/observation etc have come about through "realiable causal chains" linking an actual object to the actual belief related to that object. But the same internal state can be caused by a near-perfect hallucination. So without knowing whether the "correct" causal chain holds, we have a problem of skepticism. But of course we have to assume a certain degree of reliability, and this is - I think - warranted.

But when potential defeaters arise (such as the wealth of arguments against theism in general), being skeptical is warranted - and this introduces a new value (or, depending on your method of calculation) a new variable into the Bayesian calculation, which can significantly lower the probability.

Then of course, there's the matter of explanation, and theism having no explanatory value in general (like substance-dualism) because any concept of causation works only in a spacetime-like framework - because direct intentionality-fulfilment is unintelligable. We need a concept of causation to understand intentionality and its fulfillment, the other way around won't work. Thus, "goddidit" is always the worst possible explanation (not to speak of the complexity it introduces unnecessarily).

But seriously - these guys are substance-dualists? Making their PhD? O tempora o mores.

20. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #197993 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 3:14 am

Re: Qualitative-Quantitaive.


I like to use the example of intentionality qua aboutness Daniel Dennett uses ("homuncular functionalism"): Basically, our intentionally is not different in essence from that of a thermostat - which also has representation and control - "aboutness". It's just a difference of degree so vast it is extremely "natural" to conceive of it as a difference in essence.

21. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #197988 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 3:10 am

Brian - had a look at the first three pages or so... nothing really worth commenting on. I spottet one blatant fallacy ("The 'stone to heavy for an omnipotnet being to lift' shows only the incoherence of that notion, not that of omnipotence"), a lot of petito principii, some ludicrious assumptions of substance dualism, and that the "causal impotence" argument supposedly fails (simply quoting Swinburne, how lame) - and the rest was uninteresting.

Don't think it's worth my time :) But by all means - you might use this as an opportunity to practice. Have at it yourself I say :)

22. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #197956 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 1:56 am

Hmm... I don't think "artificial" is necessarily confined to humans. It necessitates conscious, planned, intentional bringing-about, the conscious ascription of function to that which is constructed (and that by means of which we construct it). Rudiments thereof I think can be seen in animals - for example when they stack natural objects to reach something located at a certain height - that would be (in my interpretation) a proto-artificial object. If any other species should ever reach a complexity of conceptual mentality allowing for technology - that technology and what it brings about would certainly be (EDIT: An example of) "artificiality" (again -in my interpretation of the word). As such, at least the way I concieve of it, the term is not at all necessarily confined to humans.

23. Richard Dawkins Public Lecture - Liverpool 08

Comment #197954 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 1:51 am

Occam's Razor simply means "do not multiply entities beyond necessity".

At the dawn of human intellect, where no real explanations of natural phenomena were available, it was to be expected that intentionality was thought to be behind phenomena - and since intentionality requires a mind, people postulated a mind behind the growing of crops, lightning, thunder, rain etc...

...religion is stuck in this infantile notion. But we now have real explanations - we can describe the meachanisms, the causation-chains behind phenomena. These are explanations. "Goddidit" never is - it cannot describe the causal chains. It postulates direct fulfilment of the intentions of a non-spatiotemporal super-mind. Which is just a ludicrous concept. We need causality to explain intentionality and its fulfilment, not the other way around. It has no explanatory value whatsoever.

And since we can agree on the entities and phenomena in the spatiotemporal world, postulating a deity is never parsimoneous. If we can even conceive of naturalistic explanations for something, invoking a deity is always a multiplication of entities beyond necessity. And since it never has any explanatory value - it is always the worst possible "explanation".

24. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #197946 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 1:42 am

So, Steve - would you say that nothing is artificial?

EDIT: Oh, and - good morning :)

25. Award-winning comedian George Carlin dies

Comment #197932 by MPhil on June 23, 2008 at 12:46 am

Although I found nearly everything except for the "invisible man, living in the sky"-routine not really funny, that one was a classic and he has influenced many other great comedians. So even for me, it's a loss...

and to honor him, let us all worship the sun and pray to Joe Pesci

26. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #197823 by MPhil on June 22, 2008 at 5:54 pm

Couldn't we say that the difference is that we are the first and only entities we know who not just in the course of doing what they do happen to affect evolution, but consciously, moreover cognitively know about it and plan for exactly that - we could call "artificial" that which is designed through intent and planning - we cognitively, "artificially" shape evolution for us and other species.

The male chimp is not indifferent, but we have no reason to assume he does what he does with the intent of having a specific effect on gene-frequencies, bringing about or eradicating certain traits, executing a plan with the intent to modify the gene-pool.

As we and our consciousness are still part of nature, you might call it natural - but it's unique in being cognitively planned and has effects as intended effects that no other species could possibly even know about, and thus couldn't have as intents.

27. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196326 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 4:35 pm

I wish I could do that, then maybe I'd occupy less space in the universe....


Doesn't help - I only eat more the next day, or a lot of sweet stuff that just happens to be *cough* lying around the apartment :/ I need to lose weight myself.

Go to bed


Damn, Steve is sending me to bed again :)
But I thought I shouldn't eat in bed? Oh well, conflict resolved - mind at ease - off to bed.

You have a nice weekend as well - I'm sure we'll converse in the course of it :)

28. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196319 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 4:25 pm


But what evolution selects is the potential for flight.


I never doubted that - in fact, I explicitly agreed :)


But what evolution can select is the ability to do mathematics.


Here I would be more careful and say it selects the structures that make it possible to acquire the ability to do mathematics (as the ability is trained, not inherited - the possibility to develop that ability is)

but I don't think it means we can transcend evolution as such.


If we can agree on the distinction instantiation-process then I'm fine with this, since I think it then really only comes down to semantics.

Brain,
Mike, I think it's fair to ask a believer to justify who created God if they say 'everything has a creator' or 'God is immanent in the universe'. Horses for courses...

Yes - fair game if they say that. But the more sophisticated ones will say that the contingently existing things need a creator, and god is aseic.

By the way, the Mackie book is great.

Glad you like it :)


... finally, the noodles are done. I haven't eaten for about 16 hours

29. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196307 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 4:13 pm

With that distinction, our views would be compatible again - and it would certain not affect the truth of this or insights like it:

But that we have chosen to do one of these things can influence survival. So the capacity to choose, and perhaps even having the mental makeup to choose a particular one, can be distinguished by evolution.


So - can we achieve consensus? Yes, I'm one of those who doesn't want to leave a disagreement in the air before going to bed :)

30. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196306 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 4:10 pm

...just decided I'll have something to eat before I go to sleep, so I might as well respond while I'm waiting for the water to boil :)


I think the (meaningful) distinction that can be made here, which would make our positions compatible again is that between the nature of the process and the nature of the things that can perform it.

This may seem purely semantic to you - but I think it is a warranted distinction.

As such, even flight would not be ITSELF biological. Biological systems instantiate that process, and in such biological systems, the properties that allow it to instantiate the process are of course biological. As such "biological flight" would be a paraphrase for "biological systems instantiating the property of flight".

This is related to multiple realizability. It does not threaten the exhaustiveness of the disciplines for their domains at all.

Calculating a certain function is not ITSELF biological in nature, because then it could not possible be found outside of biological systems - and that is why the distinction Process-Implementation thereof is meaningful.

fizhburn,

no problem - perhaps another time. I also don't think our views are really incompatible.

31. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196299 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 3:54 pm

True - as we define things. But the process that brought us to the stage where we can think these things is a biological process.


Absolutely - the structure that instantiates (in us) the thinking is biological, and the processes that developed it and allowed for its development are biological. The base-level of these things is propositional and computational. AI could do such things, which would most definitely not be biological.

EDIT: Steve, I agree - that's what matters in terms of sufficient conditions for such things arising.


Now I really have to try and get some sleep.

It's been nice! Talk to "y'all" soon

Good Night!

32. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196296 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 3:49 pm

I'm sorry Goldy - thinking is not biological at its base level... or do you think artificial intelligence is a priori impossible? Non-biological systems might well think one day. Thinking and thoughts are about information and propositions - and these just aren't biological. I'm not making an artificial distinction here. See my edit. If it was artificial - please tell me how to derive the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (or the thoughts that lead to its conception) from biology.

33. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196292 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 3:40 pm

Not really, no, as brains are biological. Dolphins will play with objects in the water with quite a lot of thought and planning. Does that mean that dolphin play is not biological?


That is astounding - I did not expect that answer.

I think this is a fallacy... thoughts and deliberations, investigations, art, mathematics - these are not biological.

You cannot describe (for example) mathematical theorem in biology - you can describe what sociological effects it has on the scientific community, even (in principle, not in practice) what effects (if any) developing that theorem or implementing it has on the passing on of one's genes - but you cannot describe the theorem itself in biology, it's not in its domain. But it is something constructed by our minds.

Try and derive Gödel's incompleteness theorem from biology...

Do you see what I mean?

EDIT:Yes, we always evolve and are under selection pressure - but there are things our minds do that are not in the domain of biology. If that was not so - then you would HAVE TO be able (at least in principle) to get the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem or the Mary-thought experiment from biology.

As such, such things as the theorem and the thought-experiment (things we construct) transcend biology.

34. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196283 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 3:25 pm

Don't you think there are dimensions to human social life, intellectual pursuits etc that do not fall under the domain of evolution or biology in general?
Because I think that's what I was getting at. Science, Philosophy, Modern Art etc - those things are possible because of our evolved brains - but they are definitely nothing in the domain of biology. And (I think) that's what I was aiming at with "transcending biology".


Also, ideologies and thoughts (alongside such things as science) seems to pretty pretty much uniquely human... ideology can influence behaviour in every way possible, and thus have effects on our evolution, but they are not genetic and not biological in general. They are - again - possible because of our brains, but not themselves genetic or genetically determined.

That mice-example was fascinating, thank you.

35. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196265 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 2:46 pm

I am a guitarist, concert guitar and electric - and play all kinds of styles, from Progressive metal to Jazz, to spanish music to classical music... as such the Lute-works by Bach are of special interest to me (still trying to play BWV996 Gigue fluently :)

Kazuhito Yamashita has probably more for the guitar than anyone since Segovia (whose transcription of the Chaconne by Bach is amazing) - for example his transcriptions of "Pictures of an Exhibition" and the "Firebird Suite"

The most complex pieces for classical guitar I know (and thus two of the most fascinating to me)
are

"Cappricio Diabolico" by Mario Castelnuovo Tedesco
and
"Invocacion Y Danza" by Joaquin Rodrigo


But the most beautiful piece for guitar I have ever heard (I could cry each time I hear it, the beauty is just so overwhelming) is the second movement of:

Concierto de Aranjuez by Joaquin Rodrigo (I prefer the interpretation by Paco de Lucia)

36. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196258 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 2:29 pm

Steve,

I think that we are unique in that through our complex faculties for planning, for investigating and conceptualizing, we have reached a state where incredibly many people for most of their lives to not have to worry about food, shelter or evading predators..we have achieved a level of "leisure" (many individuals have not, but we as a technological species have) that gives us the resources (time and energy) to do use up these resources to do things that we don't do so as to produce surviving descendants, that did not arise as something providing a benefit to the genes. Chess for example, or videogames, or blogging.

Also, I think this is where the metaphor(if it is one) of memes come in handy. We can devote ourselves to benefiting ideas and ideals so that our behaviour is actually detrimental to the genes we carry.

Did you watch Dan Dennett's "Ants, terrorism and the awesome power of memes"?

http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/116


In a literal sense, we can of course neither transcend biology nor physics - but we can transcend boundary conditions on behaviour and potential occupations that have held throughout the history of life. Science would be something like that. Doing moral philosophy - reflecting and justifying moral positions would be another. "Falling prey" to destructive memes like to a virus would be another. That our evolved brains allow for information processing and exchange that has the form of memes (that "is" a meme) would be another example.

But I certainly didn't mean that we can "transcend biology" in the sense analogous to "transcending physics".

37. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196220 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 1:25 pm

decius,

yes - so sad how many cultural treasures were lost in the war. Treasure of immense value to all humanity.

I guess I tend to favour Bach because I am so incredibly fond of lute-music and less fond of opera than other forms.

Re: Hip Hop.... I usually don't listen to it at all. And as music (harmony, melody, rhythm) I find it boring and indeed not art in any way - what I think is (or can be) artful about it is the lyrics.

This may sound shocking at first - but it's the creative expression of feelings and situations never before touched in poetry - even of a new social group that make this artistic (not to mention that - at least in some of the German Hip Hop I know - there are actually lyrics which achieve a certain degree of "depth" in lyrical expression).

If you are going to give the other bands I named a try - please remember that Necrophagist (and death-metal in general) actually want to express crass and disgusting situations. The Gottfried Benn-example I used illustrates that this is in itself not a disqualifying criterion in terms of "is it art?".
So, they want to express crass and "disgusting" situations and express related feelings. It is, I think, only appropriate that this is reflected in the music itself in some form.

The growling vocal, the high tempo, the dissonances, the "brutality" - this is what most people think makes this disgusting noise instead of art... but it is extremely complex and difficult to execute.

More "likeable" is certainly the Liquid-Tension Experiment-Song I linked, which combines in an original way several different styles, has complex interactions between the melodies and has parts with time-signatures that are extremely intricate.

One last thing - RE: establishment of art... I agree, but I think that there is single genre that did not survive... I personally can find something of value in most, even if its only one or two songs in a genre. Also, pop music has been around for half a century - so that is already quite significant I think.

Have to go now...

Best,
-Michael

38. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196206 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 1:07 pm

Al,

This may be a matter of wildly differing definitions of transcend


I think this is correct.

When it's just about transcending evolutionary imperatives - we certainly can (for example wipe us all out through war or live in complete celibacy, or use contraceptives etc).

I think this is because the evolution of the brain produced something incidentally (in evolutionary terms) capable of far more than just making us better at spreading our genes. When complex language and culture came along, these properties that "transcend" evolutionary imperatives were strengthened through society: Your brain-structure is largely dependent on the input you get (for example the conditioning in childhood to use language, to behave in such and such ways etc) - and in a society where complex interactions that themselves transcend basic evolutionary imperatives are required to be successful, they get reinforced over time - so that we end up with minds that can do things of little evolutionary value, like mathematics, philosophy, sociology - being a music-producer, choosing to live life as a monk or whatever.

In that sense of transcend and with "biology" here meaning "evolutionary imperatives", yes we can.

In the sense you explained, which is the most fundamental, I think you're absolutely right (but you already knew that :)

39. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196192 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 12:41 pm

I forgot:

most of you will not be familiar with the term "Gymnasium" to describe a place of intellectual education...

see here:

Wikipedia: Gymnasium (Germany)

Wikipedia: Abitur

40. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196191 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 12:39 pm

Podaar,

I'll think about it :)

If I come up with something I think is good enough for the blog, I'll do it.

41. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196190 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 12:38 pm

fizhburn,

this is a thread that has so many off-topic conversations that I don't think anyone will mind if we talk about this :)

(Note to all: If you do, let us know)

Now, concerning universals - I am drifting between three positions: Trope Nominalism, non-realist conceptualism and "the problem is a pseudo-problem"(think Wittgenstein).

I do recognize the point about sets. Quine has made it quite well. But it doesn't convince me, somehow (and I tend to agree with some people that there might be ways in which we can assume sets without assuming independent, non-spatiotemporal entities).

Back to metaethics:


Think about it this way, starting from a simple example. Ants are very simple mechanisms, behaviorally speaking. If an ant deviates from its program (as it were), it dies or perhaps does no good for the colony. It's "broken". In a more complicated example, think of a cat. Cats inclined to eat twigs and bark, because they have a messed-up behavioral control system, are similarly broken.

Now in humans, we can identify similarly miswired individuals.


Wonderful example - BUT: This is a functional definition. And this is entirely compatible with my position - it does not warrant (I think) ascription of objective moral value. Moral values are conceived as more than merely functional.

To deny this would be to say that in "a good car" (as in a car that functions well) and "a good act" , "good" has the same sense, which I would say is untenable. My position (Rawls-type contractualism) has similar elements - the "cannot reasonably be rejected" depends on functions to a certain degree.

A functional definition is compatible with "no objective moral values" from my position of reductive physicalism:

From a physicalist perspective, we can say that the entities have no genuine "function" per se - because "function" relies (tacityl) on a concept of "good for something" ie is related to interests. An ant just is, whether or not it behaves in a beneficial or detrimental way to the collective and itself. All there is is outward and "inner" behaviour. This can have certain objective properties in relation to a society. But to assign to that behaviour "objective moral value" that is beneficial to the group is to presuppose teleology in nature.

To say that there are intrinsic requirements in terms of function and that moral value relies on that and is objective is to think of nature as itself teleological. Function is only defined with respect to a normative definition of an outcome as something that it "has to fulfill" or "should fulfill".

I think function is something that gets assigned based on natural properties of an entity in relation to its environment. We say the soldier-ants have the function of guarding the colony. But in fact they only behave in a way that we can interpret as fulfilling that function. Thus I think function is nothing intrinsic.

Also, intersubjectivity of moral values does not only mean "dependent on what people think/feel about this" - it means in general "dependent on facts about relations between individuals".

It might even be that some facts about societies in general are not contingent. But whether or not this is the case - the moral values are still dependent on facts about the relations of individuals, and not intrinsic in actions/dispositions/things themselves. They are not metaphysically objective.

Also, I think methodological naturalism is important here - what can "objective moral values" explain that a concept of moral values as intersubjective in a certain way (for example as specified here) cannot explain?

So, in short... I still think there is just intersubjectivity :)

________________

That, at least, is the position I take. And (naturally) I think it is the most reasonable of the alternatives I have considered.
_________________


Oh, and Al,

and - the biological entities, structures and processes are of course nothing over and above the physical (atoms and such). Thus they reduce as well - ontologically at least, if not in scientific predictions.

42. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196179 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 12:09 pm

There is still a profound difference, though, between what's fun to listen to and what constitutes art


Interestingly enough - I think even hip hop and some pop can be "art". It's just not based on intricate, complex structures like classical music (do you prefer Telemann to Bach? For me it's the other way around) or - and yes, I insist on this :) - Jazz or good prog-rock/metal like King Crimson, Necrophagist and other.

Just like a piece of modern art (like an installation) is still art although it differs wildly from the "David" or the entire art from the classical period and up to the 20th century.

Actually, while not a "paragon", I consider myself to have a very refined taste in music and art in general. And, as I said - by any halfways sensible, objective standards, something like King Crimson or Necrophagist is certainly art.

Take Necrophagist - for about 95 % percent of the people, this is unbearable to listen to, and they certainly would not consider it art. Just brutal noise.

But consider the case of modern poetry describing the "poetry of the disgusting", as for example Gottfried Benn, one of my favourite poets did.
I think Necrophagist does something similar for music.

Also, it is original, extremely complex (concerning rhythm, melody, harmony, phrasing, voicings etc), unpredictable and takes extremely skilled instrumentalists. The mastermind behind the band for example is also a fan of classical music - they even quote Prokofiev in their music.
It is - in short - highly sophisticated.

I would not go as far as to say it has the "kind" of sophistication found in Bach, Schubert, Maler or Schoenberg (which I love). But this is largely because such music is riff-based. Such music has a different structure, which allows for completely different forms of structural complexity. And the complexity in their music (just as with KC and others) is incredible.

I can (and have) had discussions with scholars of classical music and music theory about such things - it takes time to open their minds, but when they have overcome their aversion to "such sounds", they usually readily see what I am talking about and recognize the sophistication.

I have studied some music theory myself and have had a thorough education in music history (I live in Bayreuth and studied at a Gymnasium that specialized on Music - the teachers were pretty good. They had to be - many of their pupils made it to the Wagner-Festspielchor) - so I have the theoretical knowledge to make out the "objective" characteristics of music. Whatever subjective position one might take concerning the question of where the term "art" applies or what "sophistication" means... complexity is pretty objective, and certainly a feature of many pieces of sophisticated music.

I don't think my taste for classical music rests on different criteria than my taste for prog and jazz and modern music a la Schoenberg, Nono, Stockhausen, Bartok etc. As such, I do think these are far more than just "fun to listen to."

So, to summarize: I personally think that complex music well executed is sophisticated and artful (although I think art can be simple as well), and from that position, these terms do apply to music by bands like King Crimson, Necrophagist, Dream Theater, LTE and many others.

Anyway - except for the complexity part (which is pretty objective), the rest is all just my personal view and I do recognize that there is no question of "more valid" when it comes to subjective feelings.

43. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196158 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 11:28 am

One last link:

This is an example of a very simple I find so overwhelmingly beautiful and sad that it literally moves me to tears: The poetry of the minimalistic lyrics - the minimalism of the underlying melody, the instrumentation, the voicings, everything fits together perfectly, and the result is (at least for me) that it can create this incredibly powerful ambience.... but the best part is when the strings set it and "expand" the song from minimal to broad. It's a song about a relationship falling apart - and up until the strings set in it almost a little resigned and fatalistic, but the second half - with the strings - "open the gates" and the emotions of having to deal with losing someone you love are no longer contained underneath sad resignation. I have a pretty decent sound-system, and also a DTS-5.1-Audio-DVD of the Album this song is on... when I turn it up and this part begins, it's so amazing and overwhelming that people I showed this song at my place usually were moved to tears as well.
Usually, songs trying to describe such situations are kitsch - but this, although "simple" isn't:

Procupine Tree - Collapse The Light Into Earth


....and yes, I know "enough with the talk about music and the links already"... I'll stop for now :)

44. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196150 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 11:09 am

A good example of a complex rhythm in a repeating pattern would be the rhythm played by the guitar in this song starting at about 0:58:

Pain of Salvation: Deus Nova

Try to clap that rhythm (I love body-percussion :) Better: try to do that while stomping your foot on every quarter note... good luck. Took me a while. The orchestration at the beginning is also quite nice.

They also have some very nice neo-classical parts, like this song:

Pluvius Aestivus

For another prime example of prog, take a listen to this:
Liquid Tension Experiment: Biaxident

45. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196141 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 10:54 am

Well, maybe some of Yes is indeed predictable, but they have genuinely surprising and fascinating songs as well. I think those "spherical" carpets of wide chords on keyboards are overused, but can also be well-placed. And then there's of the interesting keyboard-melodies and the interactions of those with the melodies of other instruments.

But actually, there are certain properties of "progressive rock/metal" that are at least to some extent "defining", such as the use of complex rhythmic and harmonic structures.

And one thing you certainly cannot say at least about King Crimson is that their music is predictable -
"Frame by Frame" for example is very catchy I think. But the polymetric structure of two guitars playing the same riff, but one of them with a 8th note less every other time (so that a 7/8 overlaps with a 7/8 PLUS 6/8) (Frame by Frame - the polymeter starts at 1:14) can hardly be called predictable. And things like these, or even just frequent time-signature changes, tempo changes and complex rhythmic structures in general is at least regarded as characteristic of much of progressive rock/metal.

Al,

thanks - you gave me a good laugh! :)

46. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196134 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 10:41 am

One thing on the ID/creationism/complexity-topic:


I wish people would FINALLY stop using the "who created god" argument or "the complexity required to produce god" or "it is far more unlikely that something like god just appeared"...

We argue against conceptions of god where god is outside of time! As such, the question of causal origin doesn't even make sense here!

The real problem is the conception of some agent outside time itself. This is what is conceptually impossible - the arguments for the unlikelyhood of god "appearing" or asking "who created" are void, because they don't even make sense in regard to some supposed thing supposedly outside of time.

It is enough that we can show that the concept of an agent outside time is contradictory and that, in terms of compexity, god is always the most complex thing imaginable and as such always the worst explanation because it has NO parsimony whatsoever.

47. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196127 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 10:29 am

fizhburn,

I'm interested in what you think of Mackie's "argument from queerness" against moral realism. For my own part, I think there can be objective moral values that only hold contingently for certain species (based on common structures found in all human societies)


Actually, I think it still holds. Yes, if "objective moral values" was a coherent and sufficiently detailable concept, I think it would be possible for there to be such values that only hold for certain species... but if they are objective (as "over and above" intersubjective), how could they be contingent? We know that objective moral values wouldn't be spatiotemporal entities, that leaves abstract entities either as concepts or as some platonistic "forms", ie as metaphysical entities. But concepts that are not or do not represent platonistic forms are theoretically reducible to the workings of brains in a certain frameworld - and as such wouldn't be objective over and above intersubjective - and even if we do not assume reductive physicalism this would be true - which leaves only metaphysical entities (forms) for obejctive moral values - and those cannot exist contingently, for they have no need for causal origins (and, as Kim argues convincingly, "causality" doesn't make sense outside of a spatiotemporal framework).

Also, the argument from queerness states that we cannot have a "real" concept of what it would be for such entities (aside from the fact that we cannot have a "real", coherent concept of such entities themselves) to stand in the relation to physical events (someone shooting someone in the head for example) that they would have to in order for things (actions, events, whatever) in this world to have objective moral value.

What would such a relation be? Entailment? certainly not - because the values do not entail the actions/events etc... "Conferring value to them"? - what does that mean? How? I agree with Mackie that we simply cannot have a coherent concept of that.

If we (as for example Wilhelm Vossenkuhl does) say that there are objective moral values, but that they are not independent of what people/groups think about morality - then that is, I think, a cop-out... because in such a case the values would be inter-subjective. And if the distinction "intersubjective"-"objective" makes sense, then the position would be false.

Personally, I prefer a contractualist account of ethics - some application of rawls political thoughts to morality. Scanlon has provided a good attempt at this - showing that there are moral statements which we cannot reasonably reject. But that this is due to facts about the psychology of individuals, about societies and about reason - not due to some platonistic moral values.


Re: Williamson - I agree that our methods and topics are not discontinuous in that way. For one thing, many of the sciences arose from philosophy, and there is still fruitful interdisciplinary work. But I don't understand the use of "although" in "although we do ask some conceptual questions" in this context? In the end - isn't all philosophers do conceptual work? Certainly, it concerns not only concepts in general but specific concepts and their relations, and relations between "concepts and world" and such - but I would also categorize this as conceptual work. What is your opinion?

On a side note - I just had to give a talk about a chapter in Timothy Williamson's "Knowledge and its limits"... and I have to say: Although his thoughts are very interesting, and his position seems (so far) tenable, his writing is abysmal here. Far too dense, not structured enough - not recapitulating and summarizing, not specifying up front where he's going with something, the concepts are made especially clear - although he tries to do that (for example: what IS a "Virtual-C". I understand how he uses and relates it, but what am I to understand this IS?)

Especially that chapter (3) was just cruel to read.

Re: Reasonableness - This requires just one statement from me: I agree wholeheartedly

:)

______________

Oh, and - Quine:

well placed quote! :)

48. The Mother, The Child, The School Board And The Psychic

Comment #196109 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 10:00 am

Hey, I'm 24 and I agree with Steve that the musicians of Yes are highly accomplished musicians, and that their music is far more complex and "sophisticated"(if you will) than pop music or hip hop or whatever. That is not to say that the latter have no artistic value.

I'm a fan of progressive rock. King Crimson for example - some of the most sophisticated music I have ever heard (and I am also a fan of classical music and Jazz), and extremely accomplished musicians. Same goes for Bands from Progressive Metal or even Progressive Death metal, which most people think is only disgusting noise.

Think of it: A time-signature change every few measures (and not just 4/4 - 3/4... rather something like 9/8 - 17/16 - 5/4 - 21/32) - polymeter (various time-signatures played on top of one another), complex interactions of melodies with complex rhythms providing ever-changing harmonic structures - the use of atonal melodies and disharmonic structures - and the complex interactions of dissonant and con-sonant elements.

It's just fascinatingly complex - and requires extremely talented musicians to write and perform. Okay, the music of Yes often isn't nearly as complex as King Crimson or even Dream Theater/Pain of Salvation/Necrophagist - but it still is vastly more sophisticated than anything you are likely to hear on the radio (except for classical music and jazz) or anything from genres such as pop, hip hop, techno or some such.

Again, that is not to say that there are not great songs in those genres. I do enjoy a lot of pop music, and find some extremely simple songs to be incredibly artistic in that they convey powerful emotions for example, in that the phrasing and voicing of notes/chords is perfectly suited to what the song wants to convey etc.

But I do love and am fascinated by complex, sophisticated music requiring skillful instrumentalists to perform.

Oh, and yes - I am aware that the next-to-last statement about "you young people" was meant in a humorous way... still, I think the points about "punk and hip hop" are at least somewhat true, concerning "sophistication" of music at least.

49. Is the Universe Actually Made of Math?

Comment #196097 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 9:46 am

Bamboospitfire,

You got right to the critical point with this:

but nevertheless correct axioms
.

What does "correct" mean in this context? Something like "true"? I can have a concept (actually, several :) of what it is for a proposition/statement to be true - for example (this is not an uncritical concept in philosophy, but it is common and serves an explanatory purpose here) that the proposition describes an actually obtaining state of affairs.

But axioms do not make claims about the world - they are the foundation of a structure generated upon them via inference-rules(/allowed operations). So how could they be "correct"?

There is large consensus that to speak of axioms as being "truth-apt", ie as being capable of being true or false is nonsensical, that it is a category mistake. Even if this wasn't so (but, as I said, people who study such questions largely agree that is is), how could we possibly know whether they are correct?

We can only know that they generate a system that us useful for explanatory purposes, but not that it accurately describes the world (see my points concerning 1, 2.I and 2.2), because in order to know that, we would have to know indepently exactly what is true about the world.

Only if we already knew what is absolutely true about the world could we know whether a theory we use or even a tool or a framework we use to make sense of our perceptions serves to accurately describe the world.
But that is of course impossible - the whole point of science is providing explanations and a progression of explanations in that anomalies are being solved etc...

I also think my theory as outlined above has the immense advantage of providing a natural explanation for the phenomena of logic, or formal systems in general and why they are so useful. Without such an account - they would lend themselves to people arguing for dualism, or even theism. I have actually heard people make that argument - that in a purely material world without a fundamental "mindfulness" or mind (such as god) it is inexplicable how there could be such things as logic, formal systems, conceptions of abstract entities and also inexplicable why they should be so applicable.


It doesn't help that the concepts you have identified mean nothing to me and my internet searching has just given me a headache.


Okay, let me try again :)

A logic system with the principle of bivalence has the following axioms:

* Law of bivalence:

For any proposition P, P is either true or false.

* Law of the excluded middle:

For any proposition P, P is true or 'not-P' is true.

* Law of non-contradiction:

For any proposition P, it is not the case that both P is true and 'not-P' is true.

These three are obviously related.

Seems intuitive enough - actually, it's one of the things that is so basic to all our thinking that for millenia it was assumed that this this reflects a genuine truth about the universe itself.

If you haven't thought about what I am going to show now, you are likely to think "Well, isn't it? Of course it cannot be that something is both true and not true":


Think of quantum theory and the statement "Particle P has location L"
In quantum theory - this proposition is not either true or false. It isn't that we cannot know whether it is true or false - it doesn't correspond to the principle of bivalence!

Same thing is true in relativity theory concerning statements like: "Event E had a duration D"
Here, this is also not either true or false - it depends on your vantage-point in relation to other vantage points.

But we humans live, think, explore on a mesoscopic scale, where bivalent logic (like "It is either true that John is Mary's father or it isn't") applies perfectly.

In different logical frameworks (for example bivalent versus non-bivalent), you have different axioms - and thus the set of provable theorems is different.

50. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #196079 by MPhil on June 19, 2008 at 9:21 am

Jethro,

The various concepts people have of what is "good" or "bad" in a moral sense are causally active in their decision making, and thus in their relations to other people.

Research into such areas as Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Theory tell us that an individual behaving in certain ways relating to how it treats others and itself are advantageous for that individual.

This can be done for individuals, groups, or even for "inhertiable" dispositions to behave in certain ways.

As it turns out, a group in which a certain degree of altruistic behaviour is present does far better than a group of egoists.

This does explain to a great degree why we decide and act under certain concepts of moral values, especially since having a certain morality - seeing certain things as having positive or negative moral valuable does greatly influence our behaviour.

Interaction between humans is also to a great part linguistic. We talk to our children about how to behave - we teach them "values", and give reasons for adopting them (in the best case, anyway).
Our concepts of "moral value" and related concepts play a certain role in our linguistic behaviour, which plays a role in determining our future behaviour.

To infer, however, that there - fundamentally - in the ontology of the world EXIST such things as moral values independent of the way humans relate to each other... moral values that are thus objective and not "merely" inter-subjective - that inference is entirely unwarranted.

There are also many more reasons why "objective moral values" in this respect are not things we have sufficient reason to include in our ontology.
(see e.g. John Leslie Mackie's "Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong")
________________________
Speaking of Mackie and picking up a topic of of a few pages ago discussed between fizhburn, Frankus and Brian....

Fizhburn, (Brian and Frankus already know my opinion on this :)

I think Mackie's "The Miracle of Theism" is a wonderful book even for "beginners" into critical thinking about theism. More modern than Hume, discussing more arguments from both sides and various positions of theists, but not as technical and strictly concerned with logic as Sobel's book.
It also discusses Hume in some detail.

Have you read it?

Anyway - people falsely assuming they have good reasoning faculties and an open mind.... as a philosopher myself, I see this very often as well :)

But being philosophers, we are in a bad situation here... our field and the one tool we almost formally specialize in using (since we have no others) IS critical thinking itself (and applied to specific conceptual questions).... as such we might and often are accused of the same thing.
Mind you I don't think this is warranted as a generalization :)

But then, we all only hold positions which we think are reasonable/rational to hold. As such, at least to a certain degree, don't we all assume that we have good a good faculty for reasoning? Okay, some have strong opinions on subjects they know next to nothing about and others are very tentative when it comes to that. But concerning those positions we actually hold - I think we all do assume that it is reasonable to hold them and thus that our reasoning faculty is quite good... don't we?