1. Hail, ceaseless complexity: Review of 'Reinventing the Sacred'

Comment #256202 by jwdink on September 29, 2008 at 12:36 am

Kauffman calls this ontological emergence, and I think this is equivalent to what Dennett describes as the "design level," as opposed to the physical level (Dennett uses the Game of Life and its array of ontological entities as an illustration). At every step up of ontological emergence, while violating no laws of physics, new rules apply that can not be reduced to or deduced from the rules on the lower ontological levels. Some of the rules are even platform independent, like evolution, and can therefore not even be tied down to any specific physics. At least, I *think* this is the idea Kauffman is arguing for.

See, this is where I become confused. Maybe the terminology is just confusing. I'm sure that Dennett never (in Freedom Evolves) claimed that the design level has an ontological separateness from the physical level. I think it's just an epistemological claim. For Kauffman, it seems to be more.

I know that the behavior of a hurricane can't be predicted with perfect accuracy because of its complexity, but I don't think that "not predictable" is equivalent to "not explainable".

I think, in this case, the two are the same. Explaining what happens in a hurricane on the level of our experience of a hurricane is apparently impossible via an explanation of the atoms within the hurricane. We know that one is built up from the other, but we don't know how this happens.

2. Hail, ceaseless complexity: Review of 'Reinventing the Sacred'

Comment #256172 by jwdink on September 28, 2008 at 8:53 pm

Dawkins' definitive answer, which predates Kauffman's argument.

http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Dawkins/Work/Reviews/1985-01-24notinourgenes.shtml

Today's other barrel, fired off with equal monotony and imprecision is "reductionist".

"(Reductionists) argue that the properties of a human society are... no more than the sums of the individual behaviours and tendencies of the individual humans of which that society is composed. Societies are 'aggressive' because the individuals who compose them are 'aggressive', for instance.''

As I am described in the book as "the most reductionist of sociobiologists", I can speak with authority here. I believe that Bach was a musical man. Therefore of course, being a good reductionist, I must obviously believe that Bach's brain was made of musical atoms! Do Rose et al sincerely think that anybody could be that silly? Presumably not, yet my Bach -- example is a precise analogy to "Societies are 'aggressive' because the individuals who compose them are 'aggressive"'.

Why do Rose et al find it necessary to reduce a perfectly sensible belief (that complex wholes should be explained in terms of their parts) to an idiotic travesty (that the properties of a complex whole are simply the sum of those same properties in the parts)? "In terms of" covers a multitude of highly sophisticated causal interactions, and mathematical relations of which summation is only the simplest. Reductionism, in the "sum of the parts" sense, is obviously daft, and is nowhere to be found in the writings of real biologists. Reductionism, in the "in terms of " sense, is, in the words of the Medawars, "the most successful research stratagem ever devised" (Aristotle to Zoos, 1984).

Brilliant.

I like Kauffman a lot, and I think his arguments are pretty valid. But they make a mistake. The claim, I think, is two fold:

We can't explain certain things by reducing them to physics. Therefore:

a) In practice, we need to explain emergent properties in other ways, possibly less reductionist.

b)In principle, emergent properties are INEXPLICABLE. Not only epistimilogically, but ontologically as well.

The a) claim is definitely solid and agreeable. The b) claim is something I have never, ever heard defended independently of a). It needs a special kind of argument: not just that we can't explain some things with glib reductionism practically but that we can't explain them in principle, because in principle they are fundamentally different. As far as I can tell, this is unsupported.

3. Bolus of nonsense

Comment #246916 by jwdink on September 13, 2008 at 2:16 pm

What a great exchange. Fuller's ostensible knowledge of these historical forces really was exposed as quite a bit of casuistry. As for the rest of it, Fuller never stood a chance.

4. Origins - The BIG Questions: 2008 Skeptics Society Conference

Comment #242291 by jwdink on September 3, 2008 at 2:18 pm

The Templeton Foundation comes in with people like Hugh Ross. Aside from that, a very legit lineup.

5. It's no wonder evangelical atheists need to shout so loud

Comment #239957 by jwdink on August 30, 2008 at 3:58 pm

What we have of Socrates is through Plato, who was a religious fanatic.

What? No.

6. It's no wonder evangelical atheists need to shout so loud

Comment #238502 by jwdink on August 28, 2008 at 9:07 am

I made this as short as possible, which makes it very un-thorough. But hopefully it works.


To the editor:

There's a lot to address in Mr. Cooper's August 27 article about "shouting Evangelical Atheists." He plays fast and loose with facts (it was Diderot, not Voltaire, who produced the "vulgar" quote), doesn't support his main thesis of "shouting," and uses a tired and impotent argument to justify God's existence--all while maintaining a tone of hypocritical stridence and aplomb that would match his fictitious caricatures any day. It's beyond my abilities to decide which of these faults would be more easily dismantled, so I'd like to briefly attempt to address both problems. I should preface by assuring Mr. Cooper that I am no unwavering fan of the New Atheists, so any obvious and trite metaphor which occurs to him ("Let's think… if Dawkins is a fundamentalist preacher, then this guy is surely one of the faithful followers! Wow! This metaphor is not only original and clever, but also boundless in potential!") should be considered wasted. I've only read one of the books in the "New Atheist" canon, and while this is (I bet) one more than Mr. Cooper has, it's not exactly unflappable fandom.

Nevertheless, I call nonsense when I see it. It's more than annoying when Mr. Cooper refuses to clarify or support his thesis that the New Atheists are "shouting"--it's just bad writing, bad argument, and bad thinking. The raucousness of Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, Dennett, etc. is an oft repeated, but seldom supported assertion (Hitchens excepted--but this is not unique to his writing on atheism). I typically find myself baffled at these assertions of stridence, and the bewildering dearth of good, in-context support; but Mr. Cooper doesn't even deign to give us bad support--for him, the vague and useless "We can see it all on a daily basis…" is more than enough to sustain his point. Certainly there are legitimate criticisms to be dealt to the occasional overstatement or onerous argument, but there is little to no evidence of genuine disrespect, or "shouting." Such labels belong to certain voices in the religion debate, but in a bipartisan manner: Dinesh D'Souza, for example, is just as (if not much more) guilty of metaphorical and literal shouting as any.

Mr. Cooper's aversion to good support, and penchant for arrogant proclamations, extends to his belief in God. "For my money, their arguments don't amount to a hill of beans," he says, as if this is an interesting or helpful opinion. Why does he find arguments against God unconvincing? We return to the well-tread "first-cause" argument, restated with a startling unawareness of its stale and dismantled nature, in an aggravating and enervating tone. Mr. Cooper wonders at the naivety of a big bang without explanation, then commits the philosophical suicide of filling such a gap with the worst possible entity: a mind, which science unequivocally tells us is complex and improbable (ask Libet). If such desperation--arguments which are anathema to parsimony and (hopefully) common-sense alike--is what Mr. Cooper needs for awe and wonder at the universe, then I confess bewilderment. As Douglas Adams famously stated, "I'd take the awe of understanding over the awe of ignorance any day."

Sincerely,
Jacob Dink


Thoughts?

7. It's no wonder evangelical atheists need to shout so loud

Comment #238458 by jwdink on August 28, 2008 at 7:29 am

Wow, four pages already.

I've seen a couple of people saying they were going to send letters to the editor, which sounds like a great idea. Thanks to rod-the-farmer for the email. I think I'm also going to send a copy to Mr. Cooper's email address.

8. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234562 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 3:12 pm

HA, nice misquoting of me.

How old are you?

I never concluded such things, I said it would be worth testing those things.

And it would be. However, you DID conclude that the traditional interpretation was not only unsupported, but bunk/wrong/nonsense. The only reasonable cause of this would be that you have a BETTER interpretation. But you didn't.

I never said that free will doesn't exist because most people here don't believe it exists.

Nor did I accuse you of saying this.

I was responding to your assertion that a lack of belief in free will causes people to be immoral. If that were true than a majority of the people commenting on this thread would be immoral, because most commenters here do not believe in free will. Therefore either your assumption is wrong, or a majority of people here are immoral.

Lack of belief in free will doesn't necessarily cause immorality. It's just a correlation in the general population. That's all I've ever asserted.

As such, your gesture towards people on this site is impotent: just because there are outliers, does not mean the tendency is bunk. Just because there are some people who hate doing altruistic acts does not mean that, GENERALLY, altruism makes people feel good. You should know all of this.

(Therefore, insisting that people on this site disprove my assertion is an anecdotal argument ad populum--an appeal to a handful of people who believe what you're arguing.)

And burden of proof.... ok, read the article. The experimental group DID cheat more than the control group. That was an observation. I don't need to prove it.

But you do need to prove that any alternative interpretation is reasonable in order to reject the traditional one so glibly.

9. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234457 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 11:51 am

Why is my explanation more parsimonious, oh perhaps because it is not making assumptions about things for which there is no evidence. Look it up asshole.

First of all, can I just say: I feel like you're the reason that sites like AtheismSucks.com (http://atheismsucks.blogspot.com/) exist. If you can't even have a reasonable argument about scientific matters, it's a small wonder that you're going to piss off people who REALLY disagree with you.

Second of all: seriously? You think your explanation doesn't assume anything unevidenced? It assumes that these people cheated because they read about a passage that disrupted their worldview, which led them to question everything else, which led them to cheat. This is a complex cognitive process, and a good scientist would require evidence of any or all of these steps.

Meanwhile, the original experiment assumes one thing: that cheating is correlated with moral responsibility. This is a valid, simple, and reasonable assumption, supported by common experience and (I presume) scientific data.

In other words, the burden of proof is on you to provide evidence for your more complex (aka less parsimonious) explanation.

10. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234448 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 11:24 am

I didn't unequivocally reject anything except your ability to read.

And, y'know, this:

"If people come to believe that they don't have free will, what will the consequences be for moral responsibility?"

None.

Come on.

I proposed a follow up experiment that would clarify the issue. If you have a problem with such a follow up it must be for fear of having your faith questioned.

You know I don't have a problem with such experiments because I've already stated that. C'mon, now you're just being dishonest.

Unless you think the vast majority of people commenting on this thread are morally irresponsible then yes there is such evidence.

You might want to try a better argument than anecdotal argumentum ad populum. I know it's got a cool sounding latin name and all, but it's not actually valid.

The point isn't whether or not there are people who believe in determinism and moral responsibility, the point is whether or not there is a correlation. Various commenters on this site does not vitiate what the data suggests.

Also, you didn't answer my question. Why is your explanation more parsimonious than the traditional one?

Thanks.

11. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234425 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 10:37 am

I gave an alternate more parsimonious hypothesis to explain the observation than that which has been forwarded by people such as yourself.

How is it more parsimonious?

You were disrespectful, you were unclear. Both of those are your prerogative of course. And I am not mad. I just think you are a senseless fuck. There's no reason for you to be mad about me thinking you're a senseless fuck is there?

I guess not. I just think you're overreacting.

This experiment said nothing about anyone's feelings nor anything about moral responsibility.

Right, it said nothing, but the most parsimonious interpretation seems to suggest it. That's because we know that cheating is more heavily correlated with moral responsibility than being bummed because Francis Crick doesn't believe in free will.

--

Look, again: I'm not saying the traditional interpretation is the only one, I'm just saying that it makes no sense to unequivocally reject it for no reason like you did. If you're suspicious, that's certainly reasonable, but there is NO evidence that the answer to the question: "Does a sense of moral responsibility deteriorate if one doesn't believe in free will?" is "No."

So calm down.

12. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234404 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 10:09 am

"I find your abundance of faith disturbing."

What do I have faith in from your perspective?

What do you mean? I just explained. Your rejected the results of the experiment, and instead gave a (currently) unfalsifiable interpretation of it based on what you wanted to believe. You didn't seem to be tentative about your rejection at all, so I called it "faith."

EDIT: Not only that, but you glibly answered the complex and important question ("If people come to believe that they don't have free will, what will the consequences...) with a clumsy and unevidenced "No." There is NO evidence that supports this view (aka this rejection), thus: faith.

"Apparently: people will feel they have less moral responsibility."

That is an article of faith. There is not evidence for that. And this is precisely why I praised the article, they presented the work without drawing unwarranted conclusions as you just did.

I drew no unwarranted conclusions, because I carefully used the quantifier "apparently." These are what the results "apparently" demonstrate. This doesn't mean that I accept these results as indelible, or that I reject them for no reason (like you do).

I find your abundance of stupidity disturbing. Next time you insult my views take the time to elaborate the problem you see with them, or just fuck off.

I was perfectly clear, and not particularly disrespectful. Why are you mad?

13. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234397 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 9:59 am

Daniel Dennett has a nice point of view:

http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-Evolves-Daniel-C-Dennett/dp/0142003840/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1219261175&sr=1-4

Dennett's view is that free will exists, and is not ruled out by determinism.

But like his view on the soul
yes, it exists, but it consists of trillions of billions of tiny robots
his view on free will won't be popular with everyone
yes, it exists, but is due to incomplete knowledge of our behaviour, and is completely compatible with determinism

(Disclaimer: my words in italics, not Dennett's.)

*sigh* One that seems to be ignored by the ham-fisted reasoning of a great deal of New Atheists.

Dennett's view is that the free-will worth wanting is not (nor does it need to be) an uncaused first-cause. Free will is not a metaphysical concept, but a practical one: essentially, the ability to use reason to direct our actions towards goals and meta-goals. Since it's not a metaphysical concept, it's immune to the question of determinism v. indeterminism.

His book, Freedom Evolves, is a fleshed-out explanation of this (I think) very satisfying worldview, and I'm perplexed that more people don't recognize it.

14. Free Will vs. the Programmed Brain

Comment #234394 by jwdink on August 21, 2008 at 9:51 am

J Mac:

"If people come to believe that they don't have free will, what will the consequences be for moral responsibility?"

None.

I was suspecting I would hate this article, but it was actually well done and fair. It avoided the stupidity of "a lack of free-will makes people cheat, therefore there is free will."

But even just sticking to the facts, I'd like to do a similar study but do a preliminary survey before anything else to get their view on free-will. I suspect the cheating behavior is not the result of the notion of no free will, but rather it is the result of the partial shattering of the individuals world-view.

I find your abundance of faith disturbing.

Seriously, don't you think this is a bit (a lot) irrational? It's one thing to be suspicious of results because of methodology, it's quite another to just make up your own just-so interpretation of an experiment so that it accords with your biases. Very unscientific.

"If people come to believe that they don't have free will, what will the consequences be for moral responsibility?"

Apparently: people will feel they have less moral responsibility. This makes sense, and the data (until further notice) seems to support it.

15. Daniel Dennett: Autobiography (Part 1)

Comment #220659 by jwdink on July 28, 2008 at 8:10 pm

However, I am still convinced that philosophical free will is an illusion, and I think Dennett's view is really talking about something different than free will...

I think that is indeed the idea. If I remember correctly from the book, he makes a good case for why the classical definition is nonsense, but that his re-definition has everything "worth-wanting." And that's the point.

16. Daniel Dennett: Autobiography (Part 1)

Comment #220658 by jwdink on July 28, 2008 at 8:07 pm

Spinoza, I must confess that I'm still perplexed by your distaste for moral psychology.

17. Kenneth Miller on Colbert Report

Comment #195484 by jwdink on June 18, 2008 at 10:12 am

I can't make up my mind whether I think he's good for us or not? Sure the christians may actually listen to him because of his religious stance, and make more accept the evolution, but will he help us in any way? For the atheist cause he may be a problem for us, if people think you can accept the evolution AND be religious they will make that "transition" instead of the one we really want them to make(lose god).

Why exactly is the goal to get everyone to be atheists? I think removing the toxic forms of religion is a much more important and meaningful goal. Surely the non-existence of God is a good philosophical/scientific discussion, but it's not exactly essential that intelligent moderates like Miller give up their faith. His God is the least egregious.

18. The emerging moral psychology

Comment #176001 by jwdink on May 6, 2008 at 10:39 am

I'd be curious to know what you mean by this. I thought, since Hume, it's been well established that there is no separate morality outside of what we "call" it. The question is not "is human nature the place to establish ethics?" (what else would be) but rather "what is the best way to examine human nature?" Are you denying that it's some sort of scientific endeavor?

Hume established no such thing. In fact the IS/OUGHT Gap (Hume's Fork) establishes exactly the opposite.

You CANNOT derive an ought from an is.

...

Your last question strikes me as incoherent... but maybe there is something else you have in mind that wasn't conveyed directly.

You seem to have clearly and completely misunderstood me.

I think it's you that's misunderstood me (but I was being extremely unclear). I know ths is-ought problem. Hume established that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is' in an objective sense. So the question is whether there is another way to establish an 'ought' from an 'is'... perhaps not in an objective sense, but in some other meaningful sense. Now, judging from your subsequent discussion of ethics and meta-ethics, you think one can, but it must be grounded in some sort of philosophical discussion about what is good, and how to apply it.

My contention is that such a discussion's foundation is ultimately in our moral intuitions anyways, perhaps rationalizing them or making them consistent. If one decides that the flourishing of society (I'm paraphrasing you here) is "good", what is the foundation for that? The same goes for "happiness" or "following divine law" or whatever one wants to found their ethics on. I'm saying, in a sense, it's all baseless.

But in another sense, it's not baseless-- we just need to be looking more closely at the intuitions themselves, and less closely at our rationalization of them. Such is a study of human nature, and such a study can be well conducted by science, as long as we don't "rush from facts to values." The movement from facts to values is indeed the realm of the philosopher-- I just think these highly speculative exercises and problems that you describe bring us too far away from the ACTUAL facts about human nature, imagining man is something that he's not, and his morality is something that it's not.

Hopefully this clears up my contention. I'll admit that I'm not familiar with the modern philosophical problems and discussion you make reference to, but I get the gist of them... complete relativism/subjectivism vs. some non-relative alternative. I'm saying the alternative is impotent without some sort of foundation (even if it's not objective). I'd be curious to know if you think that there can be a foundation NOT in human nature (and if you could perhaps show me a dumbed down demonstration of what this would look like).


EDIT:
I was skimming over the thread. This clears your position up a bit.

Secondly, all I said was that the work being done in moral psychology is not NECESSARILY dealing with morality, and that they need to be careful to note that.

The reason is exactly that philosophers have not ironed out just WHAT morality is.

This I can agree with. But you seemed to think that philosophers have to figure this stuff out first, then the science might be helpful. I don't see why the two (scientific and philosophic inquiry into morality) can't be concomitant-- as long as neither oversteps its bounds.

19. The emerging moral psychology

Comment #175701 by jwdink on May 5, 2008 at 10:44 pm

This is almost totally irrelevant to Ethics as a discipline. The foundations of what people often CALL "morality" is important, to be sure... But it sheds absolutely no light on normativity per se, and science journalism needs to stop pretending that it does. Scientists should indeed be investigating the biology and evolution of socio-cultural values, but leave the Ethics to the philosophers (at least, for now).

I'd be curious to know what you mean by this. I thought, since Hume, it's been well established that there is no separate morality outside of what we "call" it. The question is not "is human nature the place to establish ethics?" (what else would be) but rather "what is the best way to examine human nature?" Are you denying that it's some sort of scientific endeavor?

Now, I'll grant that philosophy needs to step in to give that prescriptive/normative push, to decide whether stuff like "sanctity" is a separate moral motivator from "justice" or whether it's just an heuristic shortcut. But you seem to think that the science is useless. Can you explain?

(PS: One of my favorite quotes from Daniel Dennett:

"Ethics must somehow be based on an appreciation of human natureâ€"on a sense of what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to have or want to be. If that is naturalism, then naturalism is no fallacy. No one could seriously deny that ethics is responsive to such facts about human nature. We may just disagree about where to look for the most telling facts about human natureâ€"in novels, in religious texts, in psychological experiments, in biological or anthropological innovations. The fallacy is not naturalism, but rather, any simple-minded attempt to rush from facts to values.")

20. Does science make belief in God obsolete?

Comment #172591 by jwdink on April 29, 2008 at 6:58 pm

My answer to the question:

"Does science make belief in God obsolete?"

Yes.

a) Belief in theism is very much a scientific question. Theistic religions makes bold proclamations about the nature of the world, of man, etc. But these sorts of questions CAN be explored with science.

b) Continuing the previous: once one realizes that theism makes such bold claims, one must examine such pseudo-scientific, as well as non-scientific, claims with a rigorous and science-like methodology. For instance, the poor/moderate historicity of the gospels, coupled with what we now know (scientifically) about eyewitness testimony and claims of the paranormal, makes religious accounts (as evidence for the divine) completely crumble.

c) Once we shift into deism, we indeed leave the realm of science. But deism is philosophical suicide. We know that consciousness is complex (see Libet experiment, for instance: consciously-willed actions are spaced out through time and neurons, so there can be no simple quiddity of mind). Yet God, an omnipotent and conscious creator of the universe, would have to be unimaginably complex, despite protestations of outdated theologians. (This is a perfect example of science improving and augmenting philosophy, which can then delve into non-scientific questions.) Either God must be complex, and he explains nothing, or we must reject our notions of simplicity/complexity/mind/etc. But once we do this, we've rejected the very notions which with we wish to appeal to a God (so as to explain), and we open the door for any other equally incomprehensible entity. Instead, we should preserve our knowledge and understanding, and admit that God is obsolete.

No.

a) I don't think everyone will ever stop believing in God.

b) I don't think it would be good if everyone immediately stopped believing in God, with nothing to replace it. I do think if we could reduce belief in God and replace it with more secular community/altruistic enterprises, that would be good. I do think if we could reduce toxic forms of religion by better religious education (cf. Dennett) that would be good.

21. Does science make belief in God obsolete?

Comment #172589 by jwdink on April 29, 2008 at 6:55 pm

"Belief in God is not… a judgment about physical facts in the world… [but] an element [of a] worldview, the set of assumptions by which we make sense of our world as a whole."

Mrs. Midgley has put forward a vague argument resembling the easily-discredited (but at least more rigorous) apologetics of "Presuppositionalism." The idea is that everyone has a worldview-- a set of propositions that are taken on faith. In the apologetics form, this argument then proposes that the Christian God is the only valid grounds for belief in most the most essential premises: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, etc.

Mrs. Midgley has decided, in an absurd expression of pretentious empirical relativism, that all worldviews are just about equally valid. Whether she knows the similarity her argument bears to the apologetics--or the lax and unscrupulous glance that one would have to take at their own presuppositions/worldview in order to make her argument seem plausible--is unclear.

But let's not fall into the trap. Human nature is such that we do indeed have presuppositions-- but we can't just choose them inchoately, unless we lie to ourselves. We have an underlying confidence in the uniformity of nature (we evolved in such a universe) and thus induction. Similar accounts can be given for deduction, and etc. Now, it's important to note that whatever these bare-bones faith-claims/ worldviews/ presuppositions are, they will be shared by all. Once one adds ADDITIONAL claims (ESPECIALLY if they could potentially conflict with these bare-bones claims) the even ground, the lax empirical relativism of Midgley, is obliterated. God is NOT an underlying and essential worldview. It is a proposition about existence within reality. Such propositions can only be explored with our rationality, and if there is no reason/evidence for them, they should not be assumed.

Scientism is indeed a plausible problem. But the solution should not be nonsense-- the solution lies in rigorous and rational philosophy.

22. Does science make belief in God obsolete?

Comment #172586 by jwdink on April 29, 2008 at 6:51 pm

Response to Dr. Phillips.

Dr. Phillips, I think, has been a bit glib in his characterization of science. Falsifiability is indeed an essential requirement in scientific theories, and (in a sense) the scientific method isn't a method we are obligated to apply to our lives. But another essential attribute--of both science and (I think) rational thinking in general--is a commitment to evidence, and a commitment to parsimony. These are similar ideas: we can explain the world without invisible, undetectable fairies, so we don't believe in them. Fairies are both unparsimonious and unevidenced. Dr. Williams, for some reason, doesn't seem to think that this applies to a belief in God: for some reason, a lack of evidence--aside from vague numinous feelings (which is more parsimoniously explained by the relevant psychology)--is irrelevant when talking about an important aspect of Dr. Williams' life. Perhaps he can claim that the most abstract deistic concept is non-scientific, but Dr. Williams is being dishonest when a) he refuses to apply, not just science, but even rationality and rigorous thinking to his beliefs, and b) he refuses to acknowledge the eminent falsifiability of the THEISTIC creator that he professes belief in. He believes that Jesus was resurrected? This is very much a claim that could be falsified-- and even if it's not already, the dearth of evidence should be enough to dissuade him from such a belief… If he were thinking in a rigorous, scientific, and (above all) rational manner about his life. But apparently, he is not. Such compartmentalization in otherwise intelligent scientists is by no means appalling or unique (and I wouldn't call it a delusion), but it is a bit frustrating and sad.

23. Does science make belief in God obsolete?

Comment #172581 by jwdink on April 29, 2008 at 6:47 pm

My Response to the Cardinal:

"Fast-forward to the present..."

I think the Cardinal has demonstrated a respectable grasp of some big philosophical and scientific concepts, but he draws all the wrong conclusions. Does this intelligibility and teleology imply an ontological existence of these things? Or that we evolved in this world, so of course we can attempt (often successfully) to understand it? That we interpret things SO THAT we can understand them, that we ASCRIBE teleology to things? I think the latter two are more likely. It's indicative that this world wasn't made for us (but we in it), when we get to those smallest scales of QM-- we can't seem to comprehend this in an orderly or sensible manner, because we didn't evolve with these capabilities. Such problems are endemic to the reality that science presents us: in what way is the second law of thermodynamics rational? In what way do we find eleven dimensions intelligible or comprehensible?

There has been a veritable litany of theistic worldviews. The Cardinal has taken the most respectable and (in hindsight) most prescient, and interpreted science so as to fit it. Many religious figures have attempted to do this: when atoms were king, Newton declared this a demonstration of God's perfection and rationality. Now, non-atoms does the same. So too (for others) with circular orbits. And elliptical ones. And now, with a (well, not really) "rational" universe.

Which theistic outlook has been fully vindicated? Cherry picking (both from science and religion) can indeed be utilized to accommodate your worldview. Perhaps we should avoid this, and attempt to be more intellectually honest. The most honest perspective on science, and the order of the universe, tells us a) we're a speck in a not-so-orderly universe created by the (random) Big Bang, b) it is untenable to call our consciousness a simple entity, not a complex emergent phenomenon. Thus, by trying to attribute to God a (fictional and anthropocentric) order, we explain something non-existent with something unhelpful.

24. 'We Make Our Own Heaven'

Comment #151476 by jwdink on March 28, 2008 at 8:04 pm

Oh, and I agree with Steve.

25. 'We Make Our Own Heaven'

Comment #151474 by jwdink on March 28, 2008 at 8:02 pm

I'm torn on this.

Cons:
-Creepy
-These kids are a bit too young for this sort of thing, and are probably just miming.
-Promotes the "atheism is a religion" nonsense.

Pros:
-Well, what will replace the sense of community that religious people have a monopoly on? What will discourage loneliness and foster inter-group support and charity. Religious people are, after all, statistically happier, more charitable, more blood-giving, better at dealing with tragedy, etc. I have heard no refutation or excuse for these statistics (actually, does anyone know of any? would be immensely helpful), but, as far as I can tell, I suspect it has very little to do with the religious aspect, and a great deal to do with the community building aspect. But without foundational nonsense to commune about, what will replace it? This might be a step in the right direction. As many of us are ambivalent about it, and find it a bit perturbing, it seems likely that people might need some sort of group to belong to like this. The beliefs are irrelevant (as long as they're not pernicious), so long as they get people together.

26. Austin Dacey - The Secular Conscience

Comment #149576 by jwdink on March 26, 2008 at 12:25 am

Link isn't working.

27. The Secular Conscience

Comment #147473 by jwdink on March 20, 2008 at 2:28 pm

This book is meaningless after Nietzsche.

Secular liberalism is slave morality (Christianity in disguise).

Actually, I'm going to make fun of this before you respond.

As if one writer can make "obsolete" or "meaningless" certain ideas, just because of their grand, bombastic pronouncements about them.

There is something deeper being appealed to in any system, whether it be Christian, liberal, fascist, etc. We can call these systems good or bad through reference to this deeper value, not relative to themselves. Secular liberalism fails or succeeds based on these merits.

Nihilism is fun, but it's not... actually... correct.

28. The Secular Conscience

Comment #147094 by jwdink on March 19, 2008 at 7:30 pm

This book is meaningless after Nietzsche.

Secular liberalism is slave morality (Christianity in disguise).

What? Could you say more?

29. Richard Dawkins on The Alan Colmes Show

Comment #145962 by jwdink on March 18, 2008 at 12:10 pm

Yeah, it just means they're wrong. I don't quite see what you're trying to get at? Are there intelligent people who believe in God? Lammie is right, it depends on how you define intelligence, but it is obviously the case that intelligent people believe in God.

But that's not what Lammie ended up saying. He said, 'when you define intelligence as ability to reason, then these people obviously aren't intelligent'. This is drivel.

All we can say is that it is faith, i.e belief without evidence.
But no-one can believe that god is a single parent who writes books and be taken seriously on the proposition. Its does not affect their intelligence, it just means they depart from rational discourse.

That's not really how a lot of religious people define faith. Granted, their redefinition is nebulous nonsense, but they're still not necessarily departing from reason. They usually believe they have excellent reasoning on their side. It's generally deism (which seems a little sensible considering fine-tuning) plus gospels (which are, by some historical measures, surprisingly reliable historical documents). It's still wrong (deism is philosophically untenable, the gospels are unreliable because even modern day accounts of miracles are unreliable) but it's not stupid. That's "what I'm trying to get at": theism isn't necessarily deluded stupidity or stupid delusions.

30. Richard Dawkins on The Alan Colmes Show

Comment #145622 by jwdink on March 17, 2008 at 8:06 pm

Yes. Depends on how you define God. Some definitions are ridiculous, others perfectly sensible. Christian, Judiasm etc, I think wrong. The proposition that there is a God that interferes in human affairs, depends what you mean. If god is the sum of physical laws, yep I believe in him. When you say you don't believe in God you have to do it case by case.

"Wrong" and "mildly unreasonable" are two very different things which you are trying to equivocate. There are a great deal of professors, philosophers, etc. that believe in a mild form of the Judeo-Christian God who are much smarter than you or I. Just because they're wrong doesn't mean they're stupid.

It really depends how you define "intelligence" - a typical definition is "Endowed with the capacity to reason" - Wikipedia had a detailed section on definitions: "Intelligence is an umbrella term used to describe a property of the mind that encompasses many related abilities, such as the capacities to reason, to plan, to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language, and to learn..." Certainly accordingly to these definitions Dawkins was correct in his statement.

This is utter nonsense. So because these people are wrong about one very difficult issue, they are poor thinkers and reasoners? How does your conclusion even follow from those definitions?

(No wonder sites like "Atheism Sucks" pop up. Atheism seems so obvious when you're only around people who espouse it intelligently and people who who deny it stupidly. But this feeling of apparent obviousness leads to some serious overstatements.)

Now, personally, I don't think Dawkins meant this comment quite like he said it, as evidenced by his talk about YECs and IDers directly afterwards. I doubt, for instance, he would say that the Bishop of Oxford was stupid or deluded. I suspect he was mostly referring to the more probably fact that 'no one believes in the God which is instantiated from a literal reading of the holy texts'. But what I think he misses is that there is a God between a) this capricious and inconsistent monstrosity and b) some form of deism or vague panpsychism, which a lot of very smart people (like Obama) believe in.

31. Richard Dawkins on The Alan Colmes Show

Comment #144861 by jwdink on March 16, 2008 at 9:58 pm

I did find Dawkins' purport that all intelligent people don't really believe in God (and specifically applying it to Obama was even worse). There are plenty of people who are somewhere between deist and young-earther that are extremely intelligent, and it's disrespectful for Dawkins to write them off.

32. The Transcendental Argument for God

Comment #142583 by jwdink on March 12, 2008 at 7:44 pm

From an essay I've been writing:

Even if we agree to call axioms or presuppositions 'faith claims', or even if we agree that we accept some things simply based on faith (maybe the mild reliability of my memory and sense-perceptions falls into this latter category), then there is still a degree of difference between religious faith and secular "faith." This is, in the very least, with respect to quantity: since the religious and irreligious all share the same "faith" claims above, and the religious have additional faith claims, then it appears the even ground which the theist was attempting to create has been obliterated. It's key that the claims described above are shared by all. Some religious apologetics attempt to make it more acceptable to take the bible as a 'presupposition' than it is to take induction/deduction and etc. as presuppositions. The claim is that one cannot even argue about God, or indeed do anything, without the trusting in induction/deductionâ€"yet, allegedly, it makes no sense to do so unless one believes the Bible, which tells us that an all loving God makes the universe consistent and rational.
This is called 'presuppositionalism', and it is a surprisingly frequent (and apparently compelling) attack on atheism. I say 'surprising' because it rests on some fairly uncomfortable premises. First of all, it claims that it makes more sense to accept as presupposition biblical veracity than it does to accept induction/deduction. There can be no defense of this: they are at least equally valid, since both presuppose that which allows for any sort of discourse or action, but are both (in a way) indefensible. Either there is no way to know that induction/deduction etc. is true/valid, and we must presuppose it, or there is no (good) way to know that God's existence is true, and we must presuppose it.
However, we can take this further, to the point where the secular seems to make more sense: the primacy of a bare bones rationality over any other alleged presupposition is undeniable. Obviously, presuppositions (or consequences of them) should not be able to conceivably be opposed. Yet it is at least conceivable that the Christian God could be disproved via inductive/deductive reasoning or empirical evidence. Since these alleged presuppositionsâ€"rationality and Christianityâ€"have the potential to be in conflict, they cannot both be legitimate. Yet which is more foundational? To really assert that the bible is more foundational to his or her thinking (and thus the true presupposition), an apologist would have to accept that, even if it were incontrovertibly empirically proven that Christian God were not true in some important way, he or she would nevertheless deny such valid rational proofs and accept the bible instead. One doesn't, of course: the axioms of rationality are always preserved (because they are the real presuppositions), and instead these axioms are somehow asserted to be compatible with religious faith.

33. Darwin's dangerous idea

Comment #138084 by jwdink on March 3, 2008 at 10:02 pm

Damnit. Don't say "begs the question" unless you're referring to the logical fallacy!

34. New atheists or new anti-dogmatists?

Comment #117469 by jwdink on January 28, 2008 at 10:52 pm

But they very decidedly AREN'T the anti-dogmatists! That's the problem! They're against religion, and have debates with mostly religious moderates who are ALSO against dogma. There is something extra in the new atheists that specifically targets religion, and then the big question is:

a) does religion engender dogmatism? The religious debater can then point to Stalin, Mao etc. as an example of the ease of dogmatism without religion. The truth is probably in the middle: it's probably more likely to have dogma when you encourage faith in made-up and unreasonable/non-reasonable things, but it's certainly possible to have dogma without it. The debate can then go to where it belongs: whether this stuff is actually true, or actually "made up things."

b) is religion the only dogma for which criticism is socially unacceptable? The religious debater could reply that no, religion examines itself all the time, and that the solution to bad religion isn't atheism, but good religion. Again, the truth is probably somewhere in the middle: religious moderates probably deflect much criticism and encourage (accidentally or not) dogmatic beliefs just as much as they probably de-fundamentalize religion and encourage moderate beliefs. However, as long as it can be agreed that an examination of religion is important, it can be kept in mind for the next time, when the religious person attacks the atheist for doing so (like Breaking the Spell). They often will explicitly accept the idea of examining religion, until they realize what a rigorous and careful examination implies: not taking this stuff at face value. As a side note, even the moderates will support some pretty bad stuff, like no condoms or no stem cell research. If they want to give a non-religious rational support for their views, then good, but if they want to use their religion as support and then get offended when this isn't considered legitimate, then they're being hypocrites.

Thus, either way, I guess it ends up okay. But these steps are still important, because on the surface, most people intelligent enough to listen to the new atheists are just as anti-dogma (or at least profess to be) themselves.

35. Arguments From Design, First Cause, Something Rather Than Nothing, Fundamental Constants

Comment #109830 by jwdink on January 9, 2008 at 9:32 pm

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/vic_stenger/

36. What is the role of free will to an atheist?

Comment #109818 by jwdink on January 9, 2008 at 8:15 pm

I personally like Dennett's stance on free will:

1) Determinism/indeterminism has nothing to do with it.
2) Free will is something that humans are equipped with as an evolved trait.
3) This evolved freedom isn't the same as theistic free will, which unsurprisingly doesn't make much sense anyways. But it's still a variety of free will worth wanting, and something morally significant.

His book "Freedom Evolves" argues for this nicely. But I don't know if this is a simple enough theory to enter into the public consciousness.

37. Sam Harris debate with Rabbi David Wolpe

Comment #108053 by jwdink on January 5, 2008 at 11:17 pm

Wolpe did a fine job of countering Sam's (B. Russell's) teapot analogy in that the orbiting teapot can be verified yet God cannot so the analogy fails.

Why should it matter if it's verifiable (essentially, falsifiable)? Unverifiable claims should be accepted?

38. Sam Harris debate with Rabbi David Wolpe

Comment #108052 by jwdink on January 5, 2008 at 11:15 pm

I don't think Sam Harris did very well, especially on a few key points. I'm getting a little frustrated by so many on the side of atheism by the lack of concession of the (limited, but genuinely significant and important, especially in a historical context) philosophic wisdom of theology. As far as I can tell, there has been and can be no proper response to the argument that Jesus, in a way, invented compassion, or that respect should be given to the ideas of Maimonides and his interpretation of the Hebrew Bible. Nor do I care about Richard Dawkins' opinions on the crucifixion, or the near sacrifice of Abraham's son. We take a lot of philosophic wisdom from Plato, despite the fact that his masterpiece "The Republic" describes a rather dystopic utopia. Granted, no one claims that Plato's work is divine.

As soon as we get into a technical and involved discussion about the specifics of theology, we're getting into unfamiliar territory. Not only is this rhetorically unwise for debating, it's disingenuous in the same way that religious debaters trying to use cosmology and biology to prove the existence of God is disingenuous. Religious debaters are far better at construing the bible as possessing (some) wisdom, sometimes fairly and sometimes unfairly, than atheist debaters are at construing the bible as evil. Unless, of course, it's short, biting quotations of silly and harmful laws endorsed in Leviticus or Deuteronomy. On a whole, I think biblical criticism should be in this minimalistic spirit, so as to avoid apologists' specialty.

Instead, philosophic and empirical points should be emphasized: for example, the Occam's razor violating nature of God and his violation of physics' constancy (yes it's an article of faith, but to assume the alternative violates Occam's razor! Stop misusing Hume!). Or, for example, the absurdity of saying that religion is a foundation for morality when morality has changed so much throughout the history of religion. Religion has been used to endorse and condemn slavery, misogyny, etc. Which is it? The Bible (old and new) can and has been used both ways.

On that point, I think it can and should be conceded that perhaps religion is responsible for a significant amount of the historical foundations for our current morality. But I like Dennett's analogy of the plant that helps the crops grow, but then is done away with when no longer needed (indeed, when it becomes a hindrance). Perhaps we did need religion for the basis of some morality when we were too stupid to figure it out. But it's not difficult to rationally derive the sensibleness of utilitarianism, or the categorical imperative, without any theological nonsense.

And whenever the religious debater tries to insist that the mind-body problem is insoluble, or morality or free will can have no basis without God, I think we (and the atheist debater) should be genuinely offended, and express this in the debate (again, somewhat like Dennett). A lot of good, hard-working philosophers and scientists have put a great deal of thought and effort into these problems, and I bet they don't think that the problems are insoluble, and it's disrespectful to their efforts to say that they are without exploring the matter. While I think a defense of free will in a deterministic universe isn't really viable for debates, I think just the idea that there CAN be an answer to these questions is response enough. De Souza looks idiotic, for instance, when he tries to talk about these issues, and the more attention that can be drawn to his naïve and unrefined perspective on the matters, the better.

Also, I don't understand this response tactic by Harris and others of "Science CAN answer all our questions, including the spiritual/philosophic ones!" When Wolpe says something like "science can't tell us our purpose in life!", I would agree that's not really it's realm. But as Dawkins has often said, what on earth makes anyone think religion can? Rational, skeptical philosophy which UTILIZES scientific knowledge (What really makes us happy? This is a psychological, and therefore scientific, question that we've made a lot of progress on. This might be disrespectful, but give me a psychology textbook over Nichomachean Ethics any day) is a much more sensible, and I think satisfying source, at least for the intelligent person. Whether we need a benign religion for unintelligent masses (though it's pretty condescending to refer to anyone like that) is still an open question, and (I think) one that would be better addressed in debates in this open manner, instead of insisting on the (rather inconceivable) superiority of all of religion's abolition.

Finally (well, there's more, but I can't remember until I re-watch the video), I really wish Harris had pursued Wolpe's exception for ontological claims that are non-physical. He could have addressed it quickly, by insisting that non-physical unicorns or teacups still shouldn't be believed without evidence. Or he could have simply asked him: why he believes non-physical things require no evidence, or aren't a proposition? I agree that believing my life is worth living isn't a scientific claim, but a) that doesn't mean I don't have a certain type of evidence, and more importantly b) existence claims ALWAYS require evidence. It is completely unfair for Wolpe to equate the existence of God with a non-propositional intuitive world view. Such fatuous and specious reasoning should not go uneviscerated . I suppose Harris was stopped by the moderator, but I really would have shoved myself in on that one.

Anyways, I'm being overly critical of Harris, who really responded superbly to some points, and seemed to get the audience on his side with his humor and eloquence. Especially good was his response to the "Mao, Pol Pot, Hitler, Stalin" regurgitation.

I'm just frustrated by these debates. At least Wolpe is likable, unlikely the insufferably whiny De Souza.