Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis

801. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52576 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 27, 2007 at 10:20 am

Epeeist (848, or #52548):

can you explain how science and experiment might help us decide whether electrons objectively exist instead of only being parameters in scientific equations?

This is a joke isn't it? You want to make mathematics concrete and now you want to make electrons parameters to abstract mathematical equations.

Ok, let me explain why I am doing that. Starting with post 333 my goal here has been to justify the proposition that theism works better than naturalism. I picked the most powerful version of theism I can think of, namely idealistic theism. Similarly I picked the most powerful version of naturalism I can think of, because to do otherwise would amount to building a strawman.

Now I have heard Christian apologists argue that the objective existence of mathematical truths is some kind of problem for naturalism and its view that reality is exhausted with the physical world, or that the way numbers objectively and perfectly exist outside of time and space is similar to the way God objectively and perfectly exists outside of time and space. But I find that the most powerful naturalism I can think of does not have any such problem nor give any such handle – because I think that math can be reduced to matter. And I tried to explain why I think that is so. (Incidentally, in post 828 you suggest that the numbers e or i would be more difficult to account for than pi. But consider my argument again: Take any mathematical object or mathematical theorem. They make sense within the context of some formal system. This formal system can be simulated in a computer which is a material system. Therefore any mathematical truth describes a property of a material system. Therefore all mathematical truths can be reduced to matter. For example the infinity of primes can be reduced to the property that a computer that runs a program that inputs a number and outputs a prime greater than that number has: namely that the execution of that program will always end.)

But conversely I must reject what I believe are myths about naturalism. One such myth is that there is an implicit connection between naturalism and science, in the sense that you can't get science without naturalism. Another myth is that science has something to say about reality beyond the objective phenomena it studies. I understand that it's difficult to let go of myths (see how even serious religious institutions governed by educated people simply must hang on them), but in the context of our discussion I must try to dispel them. So when somebody believes that science and experiment is a way to find out about reality then I have to point out that neither science nor experiment can help us decide something as basic as whether electrons are real (i.e. objectively exist) and are not just parameters of some scientific equations.

Now please observe that the context of my two arguments is different. The first argument is within the context of naturalism. It uses naturalism as a premise and is the kind of argument a materialist could make, namely that objective math can be reduced to objective matter. The second argument is in the context of comparing naturalism with other ontologies. In this context we don't assume that naturalism is true because that would amount to begging the question. And it's in this context that the belief that science and experiment help us decide propositions about reality is fallacious. Actually, it's worse than that: Even if we assume that naturalism is true it is still fallacious to believe that science and experiment help us decide propositions about reality. For example the ontological view that we all exist within a computer simulation is a naturalistic worldview and even so cannot be decided by science and experiment. So, even if naturalism is true science and experiment can't help us decide about whether electrons objectively exist.

could you actually answer some questions before trying to move things on. You owe me a rather large one (817 - Comment #52012)

Oh, I meant to, but then when in another post I mentioned some facts about the various interpretations of QM you answered that I don't have a clue what I am talking about, which is not a very helpful comment, so I thought "why bother?" But I will. To save time could you explain where you think I am wrong about these factual claims (the contradictions between the various interpretations of QM)?

802. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52549 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 27, 2007 at 8:55 am

Epeeist (post 824, or #52045):

Theism is an ontological theory, and ontology is a philosophical field that concerns itself with a different kind of problem, namely what is real. (Or, if you prefer, the problem of describing the reality that causes the phenomena that science studies.)

It isn't a theory in the way that I would understand it. Hypothesis I might give you, or possibly speculation. In this it is no different from science. The many interpretations of QM, M-theory and the like are ontological speculations. The difference between theistic ontology and empirical ontologies is that one day someone just might come up with a way to validate the empirical one.

(I think M-theory is science and not ontology, but no matter, that's a peripheral issue)

Well, I can state an empirical validation of theism versus naturalism: that we shall continue having conscious experience after death. Now you claim that one day somebody might come up with a way to validate some particular naturalistic ontology (say some particular interpretation of QM). Can you explain how such a way might look like – no matter how strange that way may be? Because if you can't then theism works better than naturalism even in the empirical verification department. (Come to think of it there is a way to validate the many worlds interpretation of QM: Try quantum suicide and if you find yourself in a world where you clearly remember trying a series of very destructive ways to kill yourself which you have miraculously escaped without a scratch then you have an empirical validation for and reason to believe that the many worlds interpretation correctly describes reality. On the other hand one might argue that should you ever experience that you have most probably gone insane ;-)

Actually I have proposed another empirical validation of theism, which requires some time but will effectively settle the question of whether theism or naturalism gives us the best explanation for the whole of our experience: That in the future people in general, and intelligent computers in particular, will tend to adopt more and more a theistic rather than a naturalistic worldview.

For example science's methodology is based on objective experiments.

This is only a small part of the scientific methodology. You missed out all of the problem analysis and hypothesis formation which are the major parts.

I wouldn't call objective experiment "a small part" of the scientific method because it's the only way to falsify a scientific theory. On the other hand I would agree that experiments are not the most important aspect of the scientific method. For me the most important aspect of the scientific method is that ultimately it works: it does discover ever deeper patterns in the physical phenomena we observe. For example some people say that string theory is not true science because it is not based on experiment, but I think that's irrelevant: if string theory (M-theory or whatever) is ultimately successful in discovering a deeper pattern in physical phenomena then that by itself is validation enough.

Are you suggesting that therefore we should use theistic ontology in all other cognitive fields also?

That's an interesting question. As I believe that theistic ontology correctly describes reality I suppose my answer is 'yes', because it's hard to imagine a cognitive field where it's irrelevant to know something about how reality is. Can you suggest any such field? (Of course the same goes for those who believe that naturalism correctly describes reality.)

What value does a theistic world view add in the above? Little, if any, I would suggest. Apart from the feel good factor it offers no explanations and, at best, a confused guide to behaviour. It offers no help to the mathematician, let alone the scientist or sociologist.

Here I strongly disagree. First of all "the feel good factor" is no small matter. We build beautiful houses, or look out for interesting friends, or listen to music, or marry a gorgeous wife or husband, for this very reason. Secondly idealistic theism is ethically empowering and so helps all humane people live closer to the way they wish to live. Thirdly I find idealistic theism much more powerful, coherent, and elegant than naturalism. I mean "powerful" in the explanatory sense: indeed theism gives me all that science gives me and then much more, for example it explains to my satisfaction why the experience of beauty is like it is, why pain feels like it does, why love makes people feel closer to each other, why ethics is objective but a theory of ethics that works in all situations is impossible, and much more. (And last and least idealistic theism does help the scientist avoid wasting time studying or designing interpretations of QM :-)

803. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52534 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 27, 2007 at 7:55 am

Steve99 (post 809, or #51853):

But anyway, his argument is irrelevant, as humans have a way of investigating reality that helps to counter our cognitive weaknesses - science and experiment

We disagree on this, for I think that science and experiment cannot tell us anything about the objective reality that produces the physical phenomena we observe beyond that it does produce them. In fact science and experiment are not supposed to tell us anything about objective reality, in the same way that a sewing machine is not supposed to brew coffee. But as you believe that science and experiment can tell us something about objective reality, can you explain how science and experiment might help us decide whether electrons objectively exist instead of only being parameters in scientific equations?

804. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52520 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 27, 2007 at 7:25 am

Steve99 (post 823, or #52032):

Science discovers patterns in physical phenomena

No. This is just the way you want to use the term. Science is a general technique.

To quote from wikipedia:

"In the broadest sense, science (from the Latin scientia, 'knowledge') refers to any systematic methodology which attempts to collect accurate information about the shared reality and to model this in a way which can be used to make reliable, concrete and quantitative predictions about events, in line with hypotheses proven by experiment."

I see no 'physical phenomena' mentioned there.

No, it's not mentioned literally but that's the meaning of "information about the shared reality", don't you agree? Or if you don't agree, what kind of information other than our observation of physical phenomena do you think that is? Also, when the Wikipedia editor wrote about making "reliable, concrete and quantitative predictions about events", what kind of events do you think he or she meant?

Finally my "to discover patterns" and Wikipedia's "to model" are equivalent. If you don't agree can you suggest an example of modeling some information without discovering patterns in it, or of discovering patterns in some information without modeling it?

805. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52417 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 27, 2007 at 2:00 am

Krogercomplete (post 820, or #52029):

Interesting post. I have known of Plantinga's paper for some time now, but did not use it in my justification of why I think that theism works better than naturalism, because 1) I have many reasons for that so I did not need Plantinga's argument, and 2) because Plantinga's claim is so dramatic and so counterintuitive that it would dominate the whole discussion. Also I still can't completely swallow that claim. I think I understand naturalism and its implications pretty well, and I distinctly remember reading Plantinga's argument and thinking "this can't be right, there must be some obvious error somewhere".

First some clarifications to avoid confusion. I am not here to defend Plantinga's worldview and as far as I know his and mine do not agree in some particulars. Neither do I claim complete understanding of Plantinga's argument against naturalism; I might misunderstand it to some degree.

a) Naturalists believe that the natural, physical world is the whole of objective reality.
b) Naturalists believe that evolution is wholly responsible for the evolution of our cognitive functions.
c) We cannot be sure that evolution would produce in humans the ability to reliably decipher objective reality.
d) Therefore, we cannot trust any belief we hold about the supposed "real world."

No, that's not exactly it. Plantinga separates belief in naturalism from belief in evolution. That's very appropriate; after all I believe in evolution but do not believe in naturalism. Let me be clear on this point: Evolution works too well, it has too much explanatory power (not to mention productive potential in many fields including artificial intelligence) for any educated person to really entertain any doubt that it is true. Also your c) and d) points above were probably influenced by the example I gave in post 784. In fact Plantinga claim goes further than my example about ontological beliefs. So let me improve on your list:

a) Naturalism is basically the belief that the natural, physical world is the whole of objective reality, and that reality is exclusively guided by physical laws (and specifically not designed or guided by any supernatural personal will to any degree).
b) Evolution is basically the belief that all our observations of the objective properties of the species (including the human species) can be explained by a particular process of step-by-step development based on random mutation, natural selection for reproductive fitness, heritability, etc.
c) (For brevity let's call the cognitive capacity of successfully finding out whether propositions are true or false "truth seeking capacity".) If both naturalism and evolution are true then the probability that our species would evolve with truth seeking capacity is low, or at best inscrutable.
d) If the probability of us possessing truth seeking capacity is low or inscrutable then no belief we have is justified, because any justification is based on the premise that we do have truth seeking capacity.
e) If the probability of us possessing truth seeking capacity is low or inscrutable then there is no justification for any method we may choose to circumvent d).
f) Therefore if both naturalism and evolution are true then we have no justification for believing in naturalism or evolution either. In other words the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is self-defeating in reason: it's irrational to believe both in naturalism and evolution.

It goes without saying that Plantinga's claim is dramatic. After all most people consider naturalism and evolution not only compatible but complementary. It's the knowledge of evolution that made naturalism plausible for many people.

Now the most difficult step is step c). If Plantinga can show that naturalism and evolution imply that the probability of us possessing truth seeking capacity is low or inscrutable then the rest of the argument is easy. One would think that one needs truth seeking capacity in order to survive, in other words that truth seeking capacity must be a competitive trait in the evolutionary sense, and therefore would evolve by itself if both naturalism and evolution are true.

So how does Plantinga show that c) is true? Well, first of all he points out that as far as evolution is concerned what matters is behavior and not beliefs; after all evolution selects that behavior that tends to optimize our genes' reproductive success; what beliefs influence that behavior is entirely irrelevant from evolution's point of view. Then he analyzes what beliefs are according to naturalism, namely some specific physical processes that happen in our brain. He distinguishes the syntax of these processes (namely the purely electrochemical part) and the semantic content of these processes (namely the beliefs they somehow embody). At this juncture there exists a difficulty for naturalism that is much discussed in the context of the mind-body problem: how to account for meaning within a naturalistic understanding of reality (If life is basically a very complicated chemical reaction then there is nothing in it that chemical reaction that carries "meaning", and therefore no meaningful propositions we are justified to believe are true; some naturalists even suggest that the very concept of truth is meaningless). Anyway Plantinga oversteps this difficulty of materialism and assumes that commonsensical position that beliefs exist and do play a role in shaping behavior, in short that they have causal agency within the naturalistic understanding of reality. (Of course, if beliefs do not have causal agency then c) is trivially true.)

So how does he argue that if naturalism and evolution are true then the probability of us having truth seeking capacity is low – considering the evolutionary success of our species, our success in taming nature's forces, flying to the moon, and so on?

In a previous post I used the example that we certainly would not have any truth seeking capacity for deciding ontological beliefs (i.e. beliefs about reality). You understood this as an implication of the brain in a vat thought experiment, but I meant it within the context of Plantinga's argument: evolution selects behavior that furthers the reproductive success of our genes, and such behavior does not depend on our knowledge of how reality actually is but only on our knowledge of how reality affects that reproductive success. So it is clear that to have truth seeking capacity for discovering how reality actually is gives us no evolutionary advantage whatsoever within a naturalistic understanding of reality – and therefore such capacity would not evolve if both naturalism and evolution are true. This example of mine is relevant in our comparison of opposing ontological views of reality, but Plantinga's claim is much stronger: He claims that if both naturalism and evolution are true then the probability of us having truth seeking capacity is low (or inscrutable) for any kind of beliefs, including, say, basic arithmetic such as 7+5=12. That's what makes his claim so maddening. So, again, how does he argue this?

Well, Plantinga develops to some effect a doubt first suggested by the great Darwin himself: namely that evolution has no obvious reason to produce in us truth seeking capacity. Plantinga first points out that behavior is not caused by individual beliefs only, but by a complex pattern or conjunction of beliefs and desires. So for example somebody may believe that his children's illness is caused by evil spirits, and also believe that these evil spirits are afraid to enter hospitals. The conjunction of these two wrong beliefs would produce the right behavior from the point of view of evolution (i.e. the behavior that optimizes his genes' reproductive success), namely to take his children to the hospital when they are ill. An example that Plantinga mentions is that of a prehistoric man who feels a great desire to pat a tiger each time he sees one, but also believes that the best way to pat such a timid animal is to run like crazy away from it – thus producing the right behavior from the point of view of evolution. But what about our success in building airplanes? Well, if evolution and naturalism are true then, according to Plantinga, we have no reason to believe that the beliefs we use to build airplanes (aerodynamics and whatnot) are true, but only that reality happens to be such that our behavior driven by such beliefs is successful. At this juncture we may protest and retort that a set of beliefs that allows us to build such improbable things as airplanes must be true – that the very success of the enterprise justifies the premise. I think Plantinga would recognize the plausibility of our argument but also point out that we can't really know one way or the other. In fact reality may be such that to actually have truth seeking capacity may be an evolutionary disadvantage; maybe truth is such that is motivates people to act in ways contrary to their genes' best interests. How could we know that this is not the case?

In any case Plantinga recognizes that the above argument is weak, but then points out that he does not need a strong argument. Just the presence of a valid albeit weak argument is sufficient to make us doubt the probability that naturalism and evolution would produce in us truth seeking capacity, in other words makes this probability inscrutable. In this way c) is convincingly argued.

--

My take on Plantinga's argument is that it is overkill. Why claim low or inscrutable probability for our truth seeking capacity concerning all beliefs, and not just beliefs about reality, i.e. ontological beliefs? The latter weaker claim is much easier to justify and is sufficient for his overall point, namely that the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is self-defeating. Why? Because naturalism itself is an ontological belief, so if naturalism and evolution imply that we do not have truth seeking capacity for ontological beliefs, then we are not justified in believing in naturalism.

The upshot is this: If it is irrational to believe both in naturalism and in evolution, and if one is not prepared to disbelieve in evolution for the reasons I gave above, then the only rational reaction is to abandon one's belief in naturalism. Of course idealistic theism does not have any problem with the theory of evolution whatsoever. Which is for me one more reason in a long list of reasons why I find that theism works better than naturalism.

Of course none of this disproves naturalism

Right. Plantinga himself makes clear that his argument does not disprove naturalism. For all we know reality may be such that both naturalism and evolution are true. His argument is that even in that were case it is irrational for us to believe that both are true, because the conjunction of the two cannot be justified in reason. Maybe the more knowledgeable naturalists are starting to realize that this is the case, and maybe that's why the www.naturalism.org site is making noises to the effect that reason is not the last word (e.g. "The empiricist in us trumps the rationalist.")

As I understand your position Dianelos, we actually do live in God's Matrix.

:-) That's not a bad way to put it. Indeed that's the worldview I find by far the more powerful and coherent for understanding the whole of my experience, not to mention the more elegant and useful too.

This debate has left me with the same feeling I had after the first day of my freshman philosophy course in college when the professor dropped the brain-in-a-vat theory on everyone and concluded that the probability of objective reality actually being as we perceive it is virtually zero (given the infinite number of possible alternatives).

The fact that many different realities could produce our experience does not imply that the probability of objective reality being as we perceive it (as naturalists believe) is virtually zero. It only implies that we must compare naturalism (which is the default way to understand our experience) with other alternative worldviews. In other words the fact that we may conceive many different objective realities causing our experience does not imply that they are all equally reasonable. For example I have gone to some length in this thread to explain why I find idealistic theism more reasonable than naturalism.

I suppose you could retort with the following: well, if you subscribe to naturalism then there is no reason to trust our cognitive faculties and any one of these crazy possibilities would be equally likely, BUT according to my worldview, God has given us the necessary tools to decipher objective reality! I think the operative phrase here is "according to my worldview." I am reluctant to take you seriously because it appears that, in the face of all this uncertainty, you just went ahead and made something up to provide objective pillars of knowledge, ethics, etc.

I understand, but what better way does reason offer us but to compare worldviews and check which works better? Surely worldviews that are internally coherent (for example by not implying doubt in our truth seeking capacity) work better than worldviews that aren't. And as I explained in post 728 (#50452) it seems to me that by asserting a self-similar reality idealistic theism is the only worldview that gives us a way out of the brain in a vat conundrum. This strikes me as especially relevant. And of course the comparative practical/experiential gains a worldview gives to one who adopts it is especially relevant too. I find that idealistic theism not only works better than naturalism or other possible worldviews (including other theistic worldviews), but indeed works splendidly well by itself: I can't find any flaw in it.

806. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52132 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 26, 2007 at 8:51 am

Steve99 (816, or #52010):

And a photon does not travel at any speed. It travels at the speed of light.

I am afraid you are factually wrong in this. According to Quantum Electrodynamics a photon does not always or even usually travel at the speed of light. In fact a photon can travel at speeds much higher than the speed of light. It's only on average that a great number of photons travel in vacuum at the speed of light. I understand Epeeist is a physicist and can confirm this. As you can easily do so yourself if you research a little.

You are typing this comment using a computer which has been built and designed entirely using science and naturalistic principles.

I agree that my computer was designed and built using scientific principles, but I object that it was built using naturalistic principles. Can you point out what naturalistic principles are those that one must agree with in order to design or build a computer?

I tell you again and again about maths that CAN'T BE REDUCED TO MATTER.

If that were true then naturalism has one more problem, namely how to account for mathematical objective truths. After all most naturalists believe all there exists in reality is this physical universe. If math cannot be reduced to matter they should have to affirm the objective existence of some platonic parallel universe. But I think math can be reduced to matter and therefore naturalism does not have this particular problem.

One example is PI, which has infinite precision. So show me any physical structure in this universe that has infinite precision.

Oh, three beans would do nicely: they are, with infinite precision, exactly three. Or, for that matter, the electrical charge of an electron has an infinitely precise value. You mention the number pi, but of course pi is used in many scientific equations, such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. In other words a naturalist can safely claim that the value of pi forms part of how physical reality is, or if you will that the value of pi is an integral part of the structure of physical reality.

The following are my comments to your post 818 (or #52014):

What you think is of no importance. If you make a claim, you had better back it up, and simply saying that you 'think' it is no argument.

Well what somebody thinks does have some importance in the context of a discussion. And I do try to back up my claims, and I try to answer the questions people ask of me. Think, Steve99, about whether you are doing the same.

Indeed in the context of my claim that many people believe that naturalists have pretty much figured out everything I asked:

I wonder, what important questions do you think naturalism has yet to answer? Or, alternatively, what important questions do you think is naturalism unable to answer?

To which you responded:

These questions are irrelevant.

But they are clearly relevant to the claim I made and you objected, because they help clarify what your own beliefs concerning naturalism are.

You need to realise that if there are indeed any problems with naturalism, to then conclude that supernaturalism is any kind of easy answer to those problems is the weakest possible form of reasoning.

Well I figure that if naturalism has problems and idealistic theism in comparison doesn't, then I have reason to prefer theism over naturalism.

Reality does not have to concert it self with your personal opinion of what is absurd.

I fully agree. Neither has reality to concern itself with your personal opinion. But if I find that naturalism produces a number of contradictory descriptions of reality that all strike my as absurd when idealistic theism produces basically one description of reality that doesn't strike me as absurd, that's certainly one more reason for me to prefer theism, don't you think?

In fact, to our knowledge so far, Quantum Electrodynamics exactly models everything we normally observe (except for gravity and some nuclear phenomena).

You do realise that Quantum Electrodynamics involves the term 'Quantum'? And to claim that a Quantum model is exact is nonsense?

I stand by my claim, and invite you to point out any physical phenomenon we normally observe (except for gravity and some nuclear phenomena) that according to our knowledge so far Quantum Electrodynamics does not exactly model.

(Also, the descriptions that QM provides are certainly not incompatible. They are so compatible that it is very difficult to think of experiments that can distinguish them).

It's a fact that the interpretations of QM (i.e. naturalistic descriptions of the physical reality that causes quantum phenomena) are incompatible: Some claim the existence of one physical universe but others the existence of gargantuan and ever increasing number of physical universes. Some claim the physical reality is deterministic but some that it isn't. Some claim that the wavefunction is real but some that it isn't.

807. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52030 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 26, 2007 at 1:38 am

_J_ (812, or #51890):

Now, which society of stranded time travellers has the best chance of recreating the sort of world you're accustomed to living in - ie one where you don't die of tuberculosis before your thirtieth birthday, and where more than one-in-five kids makes it to adulthood? Is it a society of naturalistically inclined folks who'll reason, experiment and produce? Or is it a society that holds a theistic interpretation of 'reality' which accepts scientific discoveries but contradicts the methodological framework necessary to make any?

Hmm, the way you put the question the answer is obvious, isn't it? (Even though there were no sparsely populated countries in the Middle Ages with naturalistically inclined folks who'll reason and experiment, but no matter, I get the point).

You are saying that theism contradicts science's methodological framework, but this is like comparing apples and oranges. After all, why do you think theism should use science's methodological framework in the first place? Science discovers patterns in physical phenomena. Theism is an ontological theory, and ontology is a philosophical field that concerns itself with a different kind of problem, namely what is real. (Or, if you prefer, the problem of describing the reality that causes the phenomena that science studies.) So, if the problem is different, why do you think that exactly the same methodological tools should be used by theism, or by any ontological theory for that matter? For example science's methodology is based on objective experiments. Are you suggesting that therefore we should use objective experiments in all other cognitive fields also? Would you criticize politicians for not using objective experiments before making decisions? Or ethicists for not using objective experiments before developing ethical theories? Or mathematicians for not using objective experiments before proving theorems? Or sculptors for not using objective experiments before creating a sculpture? Or people for not using objective experiments before choosing their friends? Or people for not using objective experiments before choosing an ontological worldview? Let's see. I assume you yourself have chosen the naturalistic ontological worldview. What objective experiment did you perform before deciding that this is the correct ontological worldview?

I agree that what is required in all cases is reason. But to think that exactly the same methodological tools that science uses should be used in all fields of human discovery is quite unreasonable.

And as for reason, my goal in this thread has been to explain the reasons why I find theism to work much better than naturalism. And if one finds that one worldview works much better than another it's reasonable to adopt the first one, don't you agree?

Anyway: I'm not here; I'm not doing this debate anymore;

Pity. I am interested in your thoughts.

808. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52021 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 26, 2007 at 12:53 am

Dr Benway (post 810, or #51855):

I originally wrote:

I would judge that the naturalist who believes that everything ends with death would tend to behave more egoistically or aggressively than the theist who believes that life here is only the beginning and that what one does in this life has relevance for the next.

To which you respond:

Wow. Your brain isn't like mine.

I very much doubt that :-)

We think differently, but not that differently, as evidenced by how much importance we both place on ethics.

My reaction to being stranded on a desert isle with one other person would be to form a bond of trust and solidarity with that person. He or she would be more precious to me than any other resource.

Ah, but you are making this too easy. If survival on that island depended on solidarity and cooperation then the other person's ontological worldview matters very little anyway. In such situations it's only a question of minimum intelligence to see that the best strategy for survival is indeed solidarity and cooperation.

The question of ethics becomes interesting in situations where resources are scarce, where defending the other person's interests (say against the attack of a wild animal) may well go against one's own, in short in situations where ethics matters. After all ethical challenges are such where the right thing to do is not what serves our own personal interest of survival, future reproductive success, etc.

Now what follows is a little macabre, but I think is a good example:

Suppose that in that desert island there is some potable water but no food whatsoever and no possibility of catching any food. After a week or so of waiting for a passing boat you are both becoming weak. The best strategy for one's own survival is to kill the other person in his sleep and eat him to keep alive until a boat hopefully passes (while making sure to leave no evidence of the murder that the rescue party could discover). Of course the above is a very nasty course of action. The question at hand now is who is the one more likely to seriously consider or even resort to this course of action: the naturalist who believes that death is the definitive end, or the theist who believes that death is just a door to the next life in which our actions in this life will have relevance?

BTW, I don't see why I need a belief one way or the other regarding life after death. The notion seems like improbable wish fulfillment to me, so I'm assuming it's false. But give me evidence for it and I'll happily change my mind.

Naturalism is very clear about life after death: All of one's consciousness and intelligence and character and memories – in short all that makes a person a person – are produced by one's brain. One's brain is destroyed at death. Therefore there is no personal survival after death.

As for belief in life after death being wishful thinking - I agree, but then of course if I am right about how reality is (i.e. centered on a benevolent God) then there is absolutely no reason to think that wishful thinking could be misleading, quite the contrary.

As for the evidence you ask, I can describe the evidence I have: Life after death is implied by my worldview, and my worldview works better than naturalism in all one to one comparisons. It even works better than naturalism as a worldview for a scientist to adopt. And what works better on all fronts is probably true, don't you agree?

809. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52009 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 11:29 pm

Steve99 (post 806, or #51846):

No-one is claiming that naturalists 'have pretty much figured out everything'.

Well, I think most naturalists believe just that. I wonder, what important questions do you think naturalism has yet to answer? Or, alternatively, what important questions do you think is naturalism unable to answer?

Then you use the 'argument from incredulity': You don't like the implications of Quantum Mechanics, so you claim it is not a workable worldview. That is no argument at all.

On the contrary, I like the implications of Quantum Mechanics very much, such as how absurd it gets when naturalists try to describe an objectively real physical universe that could produce the quantum phenomena we in fact observe. That's why I wrote that I wished more people would study Quantum Mechanics: to see how flimsy and unstable naturalism in fact is.

What you neglect, again and again, that QM is not used because of its worldview, but because it allows predictions of unparalleled accuracy - because it works.

Actually what I affirm, again and again, is that QM works just splendidly for modeling physical phenomena. In fact, to our knowledge so far, Quantum Electrodynamics exactly models everything we normally observe (except for gravity and some nuclear phenomena).

If you don't like its worldview, then you are free to ignore the fact that the computer that you are using to post these comments would not work but for QM, so it seems a bit bizarre!

Sorry, it's not QM that has a worldview, it's naturalism that has a worldview. And when naturalism tried to actually describe that worldview in a way that is compatible with QM it failed, not just because it produced almost a dozen wildly incompatible descriptions, but also because every one of them is wildly implausible.

810. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52004 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 11:04 pm

Epeeist (post 807, or #51850):

He has also studiously avoided answering my question about the disagreements across the "theological worldview".

I did answer your question in the last paragraph of post 805 (or #51836), just after "But I digress." :-) Let me know if you want me to elaborate on this.

811. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52003 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 10:56 pm

Steve99 (post 882, or #51802):

So to just respond "this is nonsense" won't do.

I didn't. I explained why later in the post.

Bellow I quote your full text:

Nonsense. This is an entirely false dichotomy. If naturalism is true, this means nothing more than we have to be cautious about how accurate our beliefs might be, nothing more. To claim that the belief in evolution is not justifiable is absurd.

Science does not study things with perfect tools. It samples reality. And even sampling reality with imperfect tools gets you a very, very long way, in terms of both understanding and predictive power.

I don't see any criticism of Plantinga's argument here. I only see you stating your belief in a much weaker (and obviously true) claim, your personal sense of a claim that Plantinga does not make (he does not claim that "belief in evolution is not justifiable"), and some irrelevant platitudes about science.

To constantly try to defend science or to show how splendid science is as if anybody was criticizing science strikes me as a very big red herring.

But you are criticising science - you are claiming it can't be used to investigate reality.

That's like saying that I criticize a sewing machine because it can't be used to make coffee, or that I criticize a coffee machine because it can't be used to drive around :-)

My point all along was that science's job is to model phenomena, a job that is performs remarkably well, and a job that is of obvious practical importance. But it seems that you think that science's job is also to describe reality according to naturalism's view of reality. Well, maybe you are not alone in this belief; many scientists may also think so. Not all though: the great Feynman famously said that he didn't care about what the calculations meant as long as they produced the right result. I suppose he had little choice: what QED (quantum electrodynamics – the most advanced form of QM) says is that if you shoot a photon at point A and detect it later at point B then in between that photon has passed through all points of space in the universe following any possible trajectory at any speed.

Anyway, what science is is a matter of definition. It seems to me that propositions that cannot be experimentally tested for fundamental reasons should not be called science – and ontological propositions cannot be experimentally tested because they all (except the most naive ones - and even that is debatable) purport to describe what causes the phenomena we observe, and are therefore exaclty equivalent as far as scientific observations go. But suppose I would accept your definition of science, namely that science is not only about modeling phenomena but also about describing reality according to naturalism. This would amount to dumping all of naturalism's dirty linen on science's doorstep. That, it seems to me, is equivalent to finding a way to criticize science, because it's a fact that naturalism has done a terrible job describing reality, and has not even come up with any epistemology for how one is to justify ontological claims. As I have no interest whatsoever to take a perfectly successful intellectual enterprise as science is and cloud it with naturalism's failures I refuse to accept your definition of science. I mean take any book of physics: it clearly only describes patterns present in physical phenomena. A book of paleontology may be somewhat misguiding in this respect but at least it can be read as a description of patterns present in physical phenomena too.

And as I keep telling you, science works as a way of investigating reality because it allows for investigators to be proved wrong by tests against what is 'out there'. It doesn't matter what that reality is.

Science's tests cannot prove wrong what is 'out there' causing the phenomena we observe; these tests can prove wrong scientific theories about the phenomena themselves. As you put it "it doesn't matter what that reality is". Exactly right.

However, this is still a side issue. You are avoiding the key problem - why you believe that objective things require substance.... why should the proof of the digits of PI suddenly become false depending on what universe or supernatural domain you are in?

Oh, maybe I have misunderstood you. When you wrote in post 776 "If they are truly objective, they are there for anyone to discover, in any universe, and in any context, be it supernatural or natural." I understood you meant any possible world we may imagine and not only in the world we find ourselves in. So I pointed out that one possible world is a world with no countable things in which the concept of numbers is meaningless. But if you did not mean "any possible world" but rather our world then I don't understand your point. Because in our world it is possible to reduce math to matter, which is a good thing for naturalism.

812. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51836 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 8:44 am

Epeeist (post 800, or #51793):

So now we are getting to the basis of your beliefs, Christianity, Platonic idealism and a dash of Pythagorean number mysticism.

The basis of my beliefs is "what works, works" :-)

I am an entirely pragmatic person. I find that naturalism is plagued with a lot of deep problems and that idealistic theism works much much better than naturalism on all levels. So why should I believe in naturalism? To escape the scorn that many naturalists typically shower theists with? Or to assume the mantle of the tough kind of guy who can "take it"? Or to belong to a group of people who fancy themselves especially smart? From where I stand naturalism is a concoction of fallacies and myths that will not withstand the test of history. We'll see.

In a number of posts you berate science for the variety of interpretations of QM. I wonder how you reconcile this kind of lack of agreement with the arguments in theology. The number of sects within Christianity and the disagreements between them is hardly trivial. And of course Christianity isn't the only religion.

Actually I don't berate science for the variety of interpretations of QM, simply because I don't consider that it's science's job to describe reality. Science's job is to model phenomena, a task that science performs very well, and a task that is very useful for obvious reasons (if you can model phenomena you can also tame them). It's ontology's job to describe reality, ontology is a philosophical field, and naturalism is one ontological theory about reality. The scientists who designed the various interpretations of QM were (probably unbeknownst to them) doing ontology, not science. How can one tell? Well easily enough: Competing scientific theories make different experimental predictions. Competing ontological theories make no such experimental predictions, and that's why nobody is suggesting any scientific experiment to decide which of the various interpretations of QM is the correct one. There can't be any such scientific experiments. Why not? Because the result of all imaginable QM experiments is predicted by QM and all interpretations of QM exactly agree with QM and are therefore exactly equivalent as far as the evidence goes. In conclusion, by pointing out the fiasco of interpreting QM within naturalism I am only berating naturalism itself. I do notice though a clear tendency by naturalists to try and toss naturalism's job on science's lap, and argue away naturalism's failures with "science has solved hard problems before, just wait and see how science will solve naturalism's problems too".

You may ask: How is theism any better than naturalism in this respect? Well, there is no need to interpret QM within idealistic theism, because according to idealistic theism all phenomena, including QM phenomena, are produced directly by God without the mediation of an objectively real physical universe that needs describing. In fact I interpret the impossibility of describing how the objective physical universe is, or even ascertaining whether the physical universe objectively exists in the first place, as God's way for telling us that no such thing as an objective physical universe exists. I cannot but marvel at God's intelligence. Indeed what I find so impressive (and the discussion in this thread has elucidated this for me) is how naturalism's failures are such that if one tries to find the most economical way to design an ontological worldview that is free of them one naturally arrives at a concept of God that shares all the major tenets of the traditional theistic religions. And what is especially impressive is that these tenets were defined many centuries before naturalism's problems became apparent.

But I digress. As for the different religious ontological views you mention my judgment is that compared to naturalism's views about reality 1) the differences are far less dramatic, 2) the descriptions of reality are far more plausible, and 3) there is at least some tendency to reach agreement. In fact I wish people would learn more QM and learn about how naturalists tried to find ways to describe a physical reality that would produce the quantum phenomena we observe, because this would help dispel the myth that naturalists have pretty much figured out everything, or that naturalism is a basically workable worldview.

813. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51830 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 7:24 am

Dr Benway (803, or #51808):

Who would you rather have stuck with you on a desert isle: a social contract ethicist, or a divine intuition ethicist?

All other parameters being the same I would choose the divine intuition ethicist. Indeed I wonder how well social contract ethics would work on a desert island with only two people on it fighting for their survival. But let me simplify the situation:

If I were stuck on a desert island then, all other personal parameters (such as age, education, intelligence, sex, etc) being the same, I would rather have with me a theist than a naturalist. Why? Because as the two only differ in their understanding of reality the theist would have one more reason to behave well than the naturalist. I would judge that the naturalist who believes that everything ends with death would tend to behave more egoistically or aggressively than the theist who believes that life here is only the beginning and that what one does in this life has relevance for the next.

And, by the way, I would judge the same even if I myself were a naturalist :-)

814. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51791 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 1:26 am

Steve99 (post 791, or #51720):

But if that is true then we have no reason to trust our cognitive faculties on which our discovery of the theory of evolution rests.

What convolutions you go through. Just because we can't perfectly trust our cognitive faculties is no reason to think that evolution does not exist.

Plantinga in his paper very carefully shows that if both naturalism and evolution are true then we should not at all trust our cognitive faculties for discovering truth, including the truth of evolution. His point goes way beyond that we shouldn't "perfectly trust our cognitive faculties" (which is trivially true anyway).

Either naturalism is true and the belief in evolution is not justifiable, or else naturalism is false and belief in evolution may be justifiable.

Nonsense. This is an entirely false dichotomy.

I know that Plantinga's claim is counterintuitive; I mean it's counterintuitive for me too and I don't believe in naturalism. But then again Plantinga didn't just make a big claim: he justified his claim with a carefully constructed argument that he placed in the public domain for people to check. So to just respond "this is nonsense" won't do. In post 784 (#51660) I gave a link to his paper so you can read it yourself and try to find some error in his argument. Or search the web to find out what naturalist philosophers have found is wrong with his argument. I even gave you an example of an extremely important ontological proposition (namely the proposition that the physical universe is real) where natural evolution would not produce in us cognitive faculties for deciding if it's true or not.

Science does not study things with perfect tools. It samples reality.

Neither Plantinga in his paper nor I in this thread have ever said that there is something wrong with science. Rather we have both argued that there is something wrong with naturalism and its understanding of reality. To constantly try to defend science or to show how splendid science is as if anybody was criticizing science strikes me as a very big red herring.

Indeed the issue of science is entirely irrelevant in our discussion about how reality is. Whether the phenomena we observe (and science studies) are produced by God (as theism claims), or by the physical universe (as naturalism claims), or by two schoolchildren running primitive universe simulations in their home computer in a world nothing like our physical universe (which is another possibility) - makes obviously no difference whatsoever for science and its study of physical phenomena. That science and naturalism are somehow connected is just a big myth.

815. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51788 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 25, 2007 at 12:22 am

Dr Benway (790, or #51719):

Just because God doesn't like torture doesn't mean I shouldn't torture. For that to follow, I would have to accept the idea that I ought to do what God wants. Why should I accept that idea?

Because what God wants we do out of our free will is what is best for us. Having said that, it can be misleading to think about what God wants. It's better to think about how God is. God is what instantiates objective goodness and is therefore our model, or, if you prefer, the direction to which we should grow to attain that goodness. Indeed, a plain fact of our condition is that we can grow spiritually in this life, and it's good to have a beacon that shows us the way. Finally, according to Christianity, God by becoming a human being in Jesus was good enough to instantiate a visible and easy to comprehend model to guide us. Christianity in eleven words is "To act like Jesus acted is what's best for you."

816. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51784 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 24, 2007 at 11:59 pm

Steve99 (post 785, or #51661):

No, this is no argument at all.

In post 782 (#51647) you wrote that for something to be objective it is "for anyone to discover, in any universe". I was just pointing out that this is too strong a definition. By that definition you yourself don't objectively exist, and the theorem "1+1=2" is not an objective truth because in an universe that has no countable things nobody will discover it.

Objectively true things require no substance to exist in. The infinity of primes is an objectively true fact, yet there is no space in our universe for an infinite number of primes.

If objectively true things require no substance to exist in then how could we possibly know about them? After all, all we know is based on some experience (or evidence), correct? And that experience has been produced by some "substance", correct? So if something were out there without some substance to exist in, it could not affect our experience, and therefore we wouldn't have any evidence for it, and therefore we would not know about it.

My argument is that mathematical truths exist as properties of material things. Therefore naturalism has no problem accounting for the objective truth of mathematics.

817. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51783 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 24, 2007 at 11:37 pm

Dr Benway (post 789, or #51716):

According to St. John, God disagrees with your position regarding torture being "objectively" wrong.

Here I have been discussing the truth about the objective existence of God and not St. John's opinion about why Jesus suffered so much. To do so would be a distraction. Having said that I don't think that in any way, shape or color did St John come close to condoning gratuitous torture.

818. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51780 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 24, 2007 at 11:06 pm

Dr Benway (post 788, or #51713):

Ethical principles arise out of the need to form cooperative relationships. They're like promises or social contracts. Humans develop general rules of thumb forbidding stealing, killing, bogarting the TV remote, etc., in order to live peacefully together.

Whatever. That doesn't answer which actions are objectively good or objectively bad, and you'll recall that for me objective goodness and objective badness are meaningful concepts at least in the context of some actions such as "selflessly helping those in pain" or "gratuitously torturing others".

But the rules can be broken under exceptional circumstances. We allow a positive defense like, "Yes, I broke the law. But a reasonable person in my situation would have done the same thing."

I agree, and that's one reason why people disagree so much about ethical rules: it all depends on the circumstances. In most cases I think it also depends on the person. It's rather complex. I explained my views on this matter at the end of post 770, or #51313

In short, I don't see how anything supernatural is required to provide a foundation for a system of ethical principles.

It isn't required. In fact in another post I made clear that naturalists can think coherently about ethics and live ethical lives (they do miss theism's moral empowerment, but that's far from an all-or-nothing thing). What naturalists cannot coherently do is think about objective ethics, but as you make clear for at least some naturalists the concept of objective goodness is meaningless.

It seems to me that you're using the word "objective" as an intensifier.

No, on the contrary I made clear that an objectively good action remains objectively good even if everybody strongly believes it's a bad action. That's the whole point of the concept of "objectiveness".

819. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51660 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 24, 2007 at 1:52 am

Alovrin (post 777, or #51401):

Hey go have a read here anyone, DG you as well.
http://www.naturalism.org/plantinga.htm

Thanks for the link. I quote from it:

Somehow, we aren't particularly bothered by the rationalist argument that merely physical creatures can't track truth, since we want, justifiably, we think, a story about how supernatural creatures do better.

I don't find that justifiable at all. When Plantinga offers an argument that naturalism and evolution are incompatible then you try to find errors in that argument. The argument engages naturalism on its terms and shows that if naturalism is true then we can't have any reason to believe that evolution is true. So to bring in the issue of how "supernatural creatures" do any better is simply a red herring and evidences the weakness or uneasiness of the naturalist position vis-a-vis Plantinga's argument.

Now Plantinga's argument is counterintuitive, and in what follows the naturalism.org article simply pumps our intuitions as well as pointing out how good a scientific theory evolution is. But Plantinga's original paper is very precise on this point and argues why adaptive behavior and truth seeking behavior can and probably do deviate. Actually the article in naturalism.org is pretty mediocre I think, and contains such nonsense statements as "The empiricist in us trumps the rationalist" as if there were any contradiction or opposition between empiricism and rationalism. Not to mention blatant examples of the naturalistic fallacy as when it says "That many people nevertheless believe in god suggests that the belief is driven by non-cognitive, such as fear of death, the desire to reunite with loved ones in the hereafter, needs for affiliation and community, etc." with the clear implication that therefore belief in God is unreasonable.

Anyway make up your own mind. You can find Plantinga's original paper here: http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/an_evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism.pdf It's not an easy read. My take on it is as follows:

If evolution is true then our cognitive faculties evolved because of their success in furthering our genes' reproduction and not because of their success in distinguishing between true and false proposition. So far so good. Now intuitively one would think that the two are related, i.e. that only by helping us distinguish correctly between true and false propositions can our cognitive faculties be successful in getting us to reproduce. Plantinga uses some nifty probabilistic arguments to show that this intuitive implication does not obtain. I find it hard to swallow his arguments myself, but I note that no philosopher of note has pointed out some clear mistake in Plantinga's paper.

Plantinga's paper is very technical but let me try to elucidate his point by using an example. Let's take one of the most important propositions one can make about reality, namely "The physical universe is part of reality". Now for evolution to guide our reproductive success the production of a cognitive capacity for finding out whether that proposition is true or false has no use at all. Why not? Because correctly knowing whether the physical universe is real or not is entirely irrelevant from the point of view of our selfish genes. It suffices that we don't doubt that the physical universe our brain models is real. Whether the physical universe is real or is only an appearance created by a reality that is entirely different than the physical universe makes no difference at all, correct? But if evolution would not produce a brain capable of finding out whether the physical universe is real or not (because doing so is entirely superfluous), neither, obviously, would it produce a brain capable of finding out whether anything in the physical universe is real or not.

This is a powerful argument, and I think that naturalist philosophers' response to it has been very quiet indeed. Anyway let's be careful about what the argument says: It does not say that evolution is wrong, in other words that evolution does not correctly explain the phenomena we observe concerning the complexity of the species. It says that evolution in conjunction with naturalism is wrong – the two conflict with each other. Why? Because according to naturalism all facts of our condition including our cognitive faculties have been produced by evolution. But if that is true then we have no reason to trust our cognitive faculties on which our discovery of the theory of evolution rests. So we have a logical conflict here. Either naturalism is true and the belief in evolution is not justifiable, or else naturalism is false and belief in evolution may be justifiable. But one cannot coherently claim both that naturalism is true and that that there is a good justification for believing in the theory of evolution. Strictly speaking Plantinga's argument shows that if naturalism is true there can be no justification for any of our beliefs. And observe that Plantinga's argument nowhere uses any presuppositions of theism; it attacks naturalism on its own grounds.

In conclusion Plantinga's argument about naturalism and evolution (though probably not Plantinga's worldview) is exactly consistent with what I have been arguing here, namely that there is nothing wrong with science but there is something wrong with naturalism's view of reality.

You can find an audio file where Plantinga himself gives a lecture about his argument here: http://www.hisdefense.org/OnlineLectures/tabid/136/Default.aspx It's kind of light-hearted but an interesting listen anyway.

820. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51647 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:57 pm

Steve99 (post 776, or #51372):

Objective facts are not founded on a physical universe

If they are truly objective, they are there for anyone to discover, in any universe, and in any context, be it supernatural or natural.

I am not sure I follow. By that measure the existence of poster Steve99 is not "an objective fact".

As for mathematical theorems, such as "1+1=2", they are not objectively true either, because there may be universes where no countable things exist, and where therefore numbers are meaningless concepts.

821. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51646 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:50 pm

Dr Benway (post 775, or #51243):

For God so loved the world, that He tortured His only begotten Son...

Well the dogma of atonement does not make much sense to me either. So, what's your point? If your point is that there are many wrong theistic propositions then I agree.

There is one way though that the idea of atonement makes sense to me, but it goes the other way around: Jesus atoning not for our sins but for our suffering (in other words atoning not for moral evil but for natural evil). See post 488 (#49065) about this.

822. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51644 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:39 pm

Apemanblues (post 774, or #51335):

For torture to exist there needs to be at least one mind. A mind of some kind, no matter how rudimentary, needs to exist to feel pain (otherwise it's not torture) and to make a value judgement on it (ouch, ouch, this hurts, it feels wrong). Nowhere in the universe, independent of mind, can torture be 'wrong', because torture cannot exist independent of mind. A rock cannot torture another rock.

I agree that for torture to exist a mind must exist. Actually two minds must exist: one that decides to torture and another that experiences the pain of torture. From this fact though it doesn't follow that whether torture is good or wrong must be subjective opinion. Torture requires at least two minds but the world may be so that torture is wrong independently of what these two minds (or any other minds) think.

823. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51641 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:21 pm

Benjamin Michael (769, or #51277):

Certain behavioral values (or morals) tend to be universal amongst our species because they evolved and with good explanation. This is 100% compatible with naturalism.

Right, but the question here is whether such morals are actually true. We can understand the evolution of all morals on naturalistic grounds, but we all agree that some ethical precepts are true and others are false (we disagree though about which :-) So the question is how to find out which are true and which are false. And for this naturalism appears not to be incapable of giving one the necessary epistemological tools. One way out is to claim that no such thing as good or bad morals objectively exist. So, for example, according to this view gratuitous torture is wrong only because of peoples' opinion. But this is a view that I (and many other people) find entirely unpalatable. And as I know of theistic worldviews that don't require me to swallow such unpalatable things, and moreover only offer advantages as compared to naturalism, I find it reasonable to prefer them over naturalism.

(Incidentally, in the context of naturalism and ethics look up "naturalistic fallacy". It's the fallacious idea that naturalism can deal with ethics because it can explain how moral views evolve.)

824. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51639 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 23, 2007 at 11:03 pm

Dr Benway (post 772, or #51329):

A statement is true when it corresponds to some bit of the real world. If I say, "I've a fiver in my pocket," that's not true (you'll have to take my word), because there's nothing in my pocket, actually, at the moment.

"Ought" statements are not about the world as it is, but as it ought to be. These statements do not correspond to a bit of reality, but to a bit of potential reality.

Yes, I think I understand you. Or at least if I understand you correctly your position is as follows:

== putting on my naturalist hat:

According to naturalism reality consists of the physical universe and nothing else. Everything that objectively exists is part of that universe or is a property of it. An objective proposition then is only meaningful when it refers to an objective part of the physical universe or an objective property of it. For example the electrical charge of the electron, or the speed of light, or the mass of the moon, are all objective properties, and one can suggest (and test for truthfulness) meaningful propositions that contain such concepts.

Now actions are objective facts, and therefore propositions about human actions are meaningful and are either objectively true or false. In our culture we moreover speak of a particular property of actions, which we call "goodness" or "badness". These properties do not belong to an action itself, but to somebody's subjective evaluation of an action. So these properties are subjective properties. Similarly, Cindy Crawford objectively exists, but Cindy Crawford's beauty is a subjective evaluation of her and is not an objective property of Cindy Crawford. So to say "Cindy Crawford is objectively beautiful" is a meaningless proposition, and therefore neither true nor false. Meaningful objective propositions would be "I find Cindy Crawford beautiful", or "85% of men and 82% of women find Cindy Crawford beautiful" etc.

As there is nothing objectively good or bad in an action, to build objective ethical propositions and ask if they are true or not is nonsense, because all objective ethical propositions are meaningless so they are neither true nor false. Some objective ethical propositions, such as "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong", may strike us as obviously meaningful and true, but this is only because of our emotional reaction to visualizing such an action. When we look at other less emotionally charged propositions such as "eating chocolate while not hungry is objectively wrong" it becomes quite clear that no objective morality exists. The plain fact that large groups of people deeply disagree about some ethical questions (e.g. about female circumcision) further evidences that there is nothing objective in the ethical properties of actions.

Naturalism can explain (at least in principle) why virtually every human being finds it intuitively obvious that gratuitous torture is wrong, but there may be civilizations out there where virtually everybody finds it very questionable whether gratuitous torture is wrong, or even where everybody finds it obvious that gratuitous torture is good. Now we don't as yet exactly understand the properties of the evolution of civilization, and the above may turn out to be false. That is, it may turn out that no civilization can evolve in which gratuitous torture is not considered obviously and objectively wrong by virtually everybody. But even if that were the case it would still not imply that actions have objective ethical properties. Why not? After all, isn't the fact that any intelligent being in the cosmos can independently discover the same mathematical truths – isn't this fact sufficient evidence that mathematics is objective? Well, no ethical proposition is objective even if it turned out that all intelligent beings in the universe would independently agree on it, because naturalism can explain that state of affairs without assuming any such objective property of actions. Actions, after all, are complex causal events driven by the sophisticated information processing organs that all intelligent beings in the universe have; and these causal events are governed by physical laws; and physical laws do not have any "goodness" or "badness" properties.

== taking off my naturalist hat

Would you agree with the above? If you don't agree with some particular, could you point out which?

Incidentally in this context there exists a fallacy that goes like this: If an idea is entirely subjective then there is nothing objectively real that corresponds to it, but rather it's all an illusion. To think so is a fallacy. Let me explain:

== putting on my naturalist hat

Now the fact there is nothing objectively wrong in gratuitous torture does not imply that those who see something objectively wrong in gratuitous torture are "imagining things" or that "it's all a figment of their imagination". This can easily be seen in the case of beauty. Let's assume that 85% of men find Cindy Crawford beautiful in independent tests. If Cindy Crawford's beauty is "a figment of the imagination" then how do they manage to give such a highly correlated result? In other words, if there weren't something objectively there in Cindy Crawford (the particular proportions of her face, the particular curvature of her hips, or whatever) that men's brains interpret as beautiful then one would get a 50%-50% result. But one doesn't get such a neutral result, so there must be something objectively beautiful in Cindy Crawford but only in relation to men's brains. In other words, Cindy Crawford's beauty is not an objective property of Cindy Crawford, but is an objective property of a system that combines Cindy Crawford and men's brains. Similarly actions of gratuitous torture have no objective ethical property, but the conjunction of such actions and human brains do have objective ethical properties, because there must be something objectively there in actions of gratuitous torture that most human brains are so sensitive about. (Strictly speaking mathematical theorems are not objective properties of particular physical systems either, but rather objective properties of the conjunction of these systems and intelligent information processing systems.)

== taking off my naturalist hat

Now in the context of our discussion about my reasons for thinking that theism works better than naturalism, the above is more or less irrelevant. It shows that naturalism's incompatibility with the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture need not be reason to reject naturalism from the point of view of a naturalist. Fair enough; I never claimed the contrary.

On the other hand the same is good reason for me to reject naturalism because for me the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong" (i.e. is wrong by itself and not because of peoples' subjective opinion) is eminently meaningful. So from my point of view if according to naturalism this proposition is nonsense then so much the worse for naturalism. And as I explained in post 333 (and in a shorter form in post 470) I have many more reasons than just the problem of objective morality for finding that theism works better than naturalism.

Finally I note that not all naturalists find it possible or reasonable to accept that all objective ethical propositions are meaningless. So there are naturalists who think that there must be a way to place objective goodness and badness squarely in the naturalist worldview. For example Roger Penrose, one of the most famous mathematicians of today, hypothesizes that consciousness exists as an objective property of the lowest level of reality, the Planck scale (about 10e-33 cm), the level at which space-time geometry is no longer smooth but quantized. Qualia (i.e. the basic elements of conscious existence) are embedded as patterns in this fundamental granularity of the spacetime geometry that makes up the universe. Systems that are organized in such a way that the necessary patterns obtain are conscious systems. In this way Penrose tries to account for consciousness on naturalistic grounds (which is the first big naturalistic problem I mentioned in post 333). Now, interestingly enough, Penrose also hypothesizes that the abstract objects of mathematics, as well as ethics and esthetics are embedded there. In other words according to Penrose's hypothesis, mathematical, ethical and esthetical truths are all objective and instantiated in patterns that exist in the Planck scale of physical reality.

825. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51331 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 11:32 am

Steve99 (post 762, or #51226):

This is the second installment of my comments. You wrote:

Having [objective truths] no requirement for any material or supernatural substance for their foundation, and being true for any sentient being in any situation - be they Gods or humans - they don't conflict with naturalism (or any other theory of reality).

Your argument then is that in the same way that objective mathematical propositions do not conflict with naturalism, objective ethical propositions need not conflict with naturalism either.

I think it's a good idea to think about naturalism and math. You claim that naturalism does not conflict with math, so let's see if that's true. If what the concept of "number 7" refers to objectively exists then the question is where does it exist? Bonzai in post 760 hints that numbers may exist in "some abstract Platonic universe". Similarly a naturalist who believes that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong may say that there exists another objective realm of ethics. A naturalist can do that and claim that no supernatural being such as God is asserted, which is true. On the other hand this is case of saying "the surgery was successful, but the patient died". After all "supernaturalism" does not entail witches or ghosts or gods. It entails that nothing objectively real beyond nature exists. And a naturalism that asserts not only the objective reality of the physical universe, but also the objective reality of mathematical realm, and so on, is not naturalism anymore. (Similarly, when Chalmers asserts that consciousness is a fundamental principle of the universe just like matter is, that was considered by others, correctly in my view, as denying monistic materialism and asserting dualism. And when Dennett denies the very properties that make consciousness consciousness it was pointed out by others, correctly in my view, that he was denying the existence of consciousness).

Having said that, I do agree with you that the objectivity of mathematical objects does not contradict naturalism. Let me put on my naturalist hat and explain why:

=== putting on my naturalist hat

According to naturalism reality basically consists of the physical universe we observe: physical space and time with complex configurations of material particles and energy in it. Naturalism moreover accepts the objective existence of mathematical objects such as what is referred by the concept of "number 7" (which for shortness we shall call "7" in what follows). Superficially one could argue that "7" cannot be part of the physical universe. After all objects such as "7" or "circle" are supposed to be perfect and exist timelessly and outside of physical space, and are therefore quite dissimilar to physical things. But this argument is based on a particularly naive version of naturalism (that for good measure is called "naive materialism") according to which only physical things objectively exist.

According to naturalism all that exists supervenes on the physical, or can be explained on purely physical grounds. That all math can be explained on physical grounds may at first sound surprising, but observe that even the most sophisticated and abstract math describes facts that obtain when one pushes symbols following particular rules on a piece of physical paper, so all math describes a concrete property of the physical universe.

Let's see the case of the objective existence of "7" and of "circle": A plain fact of the physical universe is that it contains elements that are countable. So the number "7" objectively exists in all parts of the physical universe where there are seven countable things. In other words the existence of "7" resides in the feasibility of a particular physical event (namely counting) that is possible only because the physical universe is objectively as it is. Similarly the existence of "circle" resides in the feasibility of a particular physical event (say estimating how much paint fits in a cylindrical can) that is possible only because of the physical universe is objectively as it is. So all mathematical objects (including mathematical theorems) are nothing more than properties of the physical universe as it objectively is, and knowing math is useful precisely because all mathematical propositions describe objective properties of the physical universe. There is no need then to assert that they exist in some other realm of reality beyond the physical universe.

One can suggest some arguments against the above explanation. For example it's true that there is a natural number, let's call it "omega", that is so large that it can't be represented even using all entropy of the physical universe (according to our current understanding the physical universe is limited). One could then claim that "omega" and all natural numbers larger than it do not describe any property of the physical universe. That's all correct, but then again propositions about such numbers cannot by definition ever affect our conscious experience, cannot therefore be tested one way or the other, and are therefore meaningless (according to logical positivism). And of course meaningless propositions (such as "omega objectively exists") are not even false and cannot conflict with naturalism.

=== taking off my naturalist hat

So, in short, I agree with you that the objective truth of math does not contradict naturalism. But I don't see a similar way to describe objective goodness as a property of the physical universe, and therefore cannot see a way to make the objective existence of goodness compatible with naturalism. The reason is that I cannot imagine a way to describe objective goodness as contrasted to objective evil as a property of the physical universe, the way I can describe all meaningful mathematical objects and theorems as properties of the physical universe as understood by naturalism. And to my knowledge no other philosopher has managed to do that either. Indeed that's the crux of Hume's "is-ought" problem that Dr Benway mentions in post 765: "Given our knowledge of the way the world 'is,' how can we know the way the world 'ought to be'?"

826. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51313 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 9:58 am

Steve99 (post 766, or #51235)

Unfortunately you don't give a straight answer about whether you think what is referred by the concept "number 7" is part of reality or not. But I take it you believe it is.

The real problem is what you mean by "reality".

After all if it weren't how could other intelligent beings possibly discover its objective existence? (Not to mention that to claim that X objectively exists but is not part of reality is incoherent, as one normally understands reality as the set of all that objectively exists, correct?)

No, I don't think I would agree with that. We normally think of reality as based on time and space or at least physical existence.

Naturalism and theism are alternative ontological views about reality. I know that according to naturalism reality basically consists of what is physical, but you can't define that reality is that, because doing so is equivalent to declaring that naturalism is true by definition – which is of course begging the question. After all according to theism reality consists of God and His/Her creation, and it wouldn't do if I defined reality as being God and His/Her creation, correct? So we need a definition of reality that is independent of the alternative worldviews, and then evaluate which worldview works better in describing reality.

Now I suppose we all have an intuitive understanding of what reality is: Reality is what is really there, whatever you or I or anybody else may think. Therefore I think a pretty good definition of reality is that it is the set of all things that objectively exist.

An equivalent definition is that reality is what causes our consciousness and conscious experiences. At the very least it's pretty clear that whatever it is that causes our consciousness and conscious experiences is part of reality. Is it reasonable to assume that there may be parts of reality that cannot even in principle affect our conscious experience? I think the question is academic at best, because if there were such parts they would be fundamentally unknowable to us anyway. Thus the two definitions are equivalent as far as our knowledge about reality goes.

Please feel free to propose a better definition of reality if you like. As long as it isn't something like "reality is what naturalism says is real" :-)

First, let's leave out the supposed connection between truth and reality.

I am surprised by that statement. After all, the concepts of truth and of reality are intimately connected, aren't they? One normally says proposition X is true because it correctly describes reality.

There are some philosophical currents (post-modernism, post-structuralism, etc) that hold that all truth is subjective, and that all our knowledge of reality is nothing more than a matter of consensus reached between disagreeing factions. I think that's nonsense, and I suppose most naturalists (knowledgeable in hard scientific facts, such as the speed of light) would agree with me. There is nothing subjective in our knowledge of the speed of light, and no consensus needs to be reached about its value.

The problem with the supposed objectivity of ethical propositions is that we don't know of any logical foundation for proving them

You mean that naturalism doesn't have a way to test for the truth of an objective ethical proposition. But then again naturalism doesn't have a way to test for the objective existence of electrons either, not to mention the objective existence of the moon. At the very least this discussion has evidenced that naturalism is far less solid or clear-cut or functional than naturalists usually think.

Also, let's not forget that I don't claim objectively for all ethical propositions – that's a separate and complex issue. In other words I don't claim that in all situations where one has two alternative courses of action one action is objectively better than the other. - Actually let me tell you what I think about that: In my worldview objective goodness is instantiated by God. Also according with my worldview personal actions transform a person. When confronted with two different courses of action the action that transforms the person closer to God is better than the other one. So far it looks all objective, but there may be situations where which action moves one closer to God depends on one's own state as a person. In other words for two different people in the same ethically challenging situation confronting the same alternative actions, different actions may be better precisely because the two people are different. But then ethical precepts need not always be objective in the sense that they depend in part on the individual person - not withstanding the fact that all ethics is rooted in the objective reality of God. An example here is the famous case of Maria Magdalene using precious perfume to wash Jesus's feet, and Judas objecting that they should have sold the perfume and helped the poor. Judas's ethical argument is correct for most people in most situations, but not for Maria Magdalene in her situation. That such non-objectivity of the goodness of actions is possible is one more reason why we should not judge others or their actions, but only judge what we should do if we ever found ourselves in the place of others.

827. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51255 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 5:10 am

Dr Benway (post 765, or #51234):

"Objectively wrong" is nonsense. "Wrong" means "something one ought not do."

"Torture is wrong" means "one ought not torture."

This is a command. It's similar to "pick up that glass." It is not a fact about the world. It is neither true nor false.

Well, ethical precepts are not commands per se, but represent a value judgment about some actions. Actions are real things – we all agree on that, right? Well, at least some actions are ethically good, and some are ethically bad. So ethical goodness and evil are properties of real things (namely our actions) and therefore they too are real and represent facts about the world. So: I ought to do this action because this action is ethically good; I ought not do this action because this action is ethically bad.

Finally I am disturbed by what you write above. Do you really mean to say that all ethical precepts, including such precepts as "you should not gratuitously torture children" is neither true nor false? I can't believe you mean that.

Some call this "is-ought" problem "Hume's guillotine."

My understanding of the "is-ought" problem is that one can't justify ethical precepts (i.e. "ought" propositions) on facts about nature (i.e. "is" propositions). I agree that's a problem, but it's only a problem for naturalism (and Hume was a naturalist). In idealistic theism reality consists of personhood, and here the "ought" becomes the "is", namely God's character. As I wrote way back in the description of the God hypothesis, God instantiates what is objectively good. So here ethics is understood as follows: Those acts are good which make you more similar to how God is. (This presupposes the realization that one's actions transform oneself, but if you think about it this is exactly how it is in our condition. You know the saying "you are what you eat"; actually the deeper truth is "you are what you do".)

828. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51230 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 2:40 am

Steve99 (post 762, or #51226):

Very good. I understand you are saying that objective truths have the property that any intelligent being could discover them. So mathematical truths are objectively true for this reason, and what is referred by the concept "number 7" exists objectively for the same reason.

Unfortunately you don't give a straight answer about whether you think what is referred by the concept "number 7" is part of reality or not. But I take it you believe it is. After all if it weren't how could other intelligent beings possibly discover its objective existence? (Not to mention that to claim that X objectively exists but is not part of reality is incoherent, as one normally understands reality as the set of all that objectively exists, correct?)

If we are agreed so far let's go back to the issue of the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture. By the same measure it is reasonable to believe that that the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture is part of reality itself, and therefore the truth of that ethical proposition can be discovered by any intelligent being independently from us.

From where I stand it all fits beautifully together.

Having no requirement for any material or supernatural substance for their foundation, and being true for any sentient being in any situation - be they Gods or humans - they don't conflict with naturalism (or any other theory of reality).

That's interesting. Let me think about it.

829. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51229 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 2:19 am

Bonzai (post 760, or #51220):

As I explained in post 571 all reasonable people rely on intuitions.

Intuition is only a suggestion and a broad hint for a possible answer,--or a question. Reasonable people don't stop with intuition, they will follow it up with systematic rational investigations, which you obviously don't. You can't really say you discover or know anything if you stop at intuition. It is intuitively obvious that the earth is flat.

But I did not stop with my intuition that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. On the contrary I partially justified on it my rejection of naturalism. And it played a role in my conceptualizing an alternative theistic worldview, which I tested against naturalism on various levels and found it to work better in each case.

I mean I agree with you. It's not reasonable to only rely on intuitions and just stop there. But my claim was that, contrary to what apparently many naturalists believe, all reasonable people have intuitions, strongly believe in them, and indeed act on them. See for example Einstein's intuition that no spooky actions at a distance are possible, his extremely strong confidence in this intuition of his (for which he could offer no justification at all except that it was obviously true), and how his intuition led to his work on the EPR paradox, which in turn led to the Bell theorem, and ultimately to maybe the most dramatic experimental verification of quantum mechanics and indeed the falsification of Einstein's intuition.

Similarly both theists and naturalists act on their intuition that an external objective reality beyond their personal experiences must exist, and therefore try to understand how that reality is.

830. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51223 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 2:01 am

stuartM02 (post 753, or #51055):

If reality is not objectively real, then DG's child in question is not objectively being tortured at all as apparently it is just their experiential environment.

I never claimed that "reality is not objectively real"; I only claimed that "the physical universe is not objectively real" – that's an entirely different proposition. In fact reality is objectively real by definition. But whether the physical universe is objectively real or not is a question to be answered (haven't you seen The Matrix movie and how what appears to be not necessarily is the real world?)

My own understanding of reality is that it consists of persons, i.e. conscious beings. So the child and her pain are both objectively real.

831. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51216 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 1:38 am

Steve99 (post 754, or #51078):

This is the second installment of my comments to the 754 post. You wrote:

We say "X is objectively true" when we claim that X is true independently of peoples' opinion.

But that is not the manner in which you are using the word. As quoted above, you say that you are basing your beliefs on intuitions. Intuitions are subjective. Objectivity is not based on subjective intuition.

As I have explained "X is objectively true" means that X is true independently of peoples' opinion. (For example all propositions about reality are meant objectively, because reality is as it is no matter what peoples' opinion about it are; on the contrary according to naturalism no scientific proposition is meant objectively because they are all provisional and depend on current scientific understanding.) But how I or anybody else justifies their belief in some objective proposition (whether on subjective intuition, or whatever) is entirely irrelevant to what "objective" means. And if you don't agree with how I justify my belief in objective propositions this does not imply I use "objective" with some other meaning :-)

Incidentally it's important not to confuse what a proposition is with what a proposition means. So for example the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong" is an opinion of mine. But what the proposition says is that gratuitous torture is wrong independently of opinions, including what my opinion currently is or may be in the future.

No, you did not explain how naturalism conflicts with your proposition of objective morality. You are not using the term 'conflicts' correctly. I have, again and again, shown you how objective facts need not come from naturalism. The infinite number of primes is an objective fact - anyone can discover it. But you can take apart the whole universe atom by atom and not find that fact written anywhere. But no-one would claim that the fact of the infinite number of primes 'conflicts' with naturalism.

Similarly, there could be objective morality (although I think this idea is wrong), yet this need have no foundation in nature, and need not conflict with naturalism.

What you are trying to do is look for a physical foundation for abstractions you have defined. Your search is hopeless and pointless.

As I explained before, your reasoning here is flawed because you are falling in a philosophical trap. You are 'reifying' (assuming to be real) things that are abstract and need no substance to exist in. You are like someone forever trying to find the end of a rainbow - your search doesn't even make sense.

First of all, let's not confuse concepts with what these concepts refer to. For example the concept of fairies and the concept of the perpetuum mobile clearly exist, but what these concepts refer to clearly does not.

You introduce the case of numbers and I think that's a good idea. But instead of taking as an example the existence of an infinite number of primes, I suggest we simplify this and discuss the existence of a particular number, say the number pi – or, why not, even simpler, the existence of the number 7.

Now, according to your understanding, how does naturalism deal with the existence of the number 7? According to naturalism does what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to objectively exist or not? You also introduce "reification". So, I wonder, according to your understanding, does naturalism consider that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to is a part of reality or not?

I ask these questions because reading your argument above I am not sure what your point is. It seems to me you are saying that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to does not form part of reality. But if it does not form part of reality then neither does it objectively exist. On the other hand you speak of the objective facts of mathematics, so I get the impression you believe that what the abstract concept "number 7" refers to does objectively exist. Isn't there a contradiction here?

Or maybe you have a good argument and I misunderstand it. Please clarify.

832. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51206 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 12:34 am

Krogercomplete (post 755, or #51119):

We are going in circles here.

DG: Here is a list of my presuppositions and here is a worldview that fits all of them.

Everyone else: These presuppositions are either wrong or based on unreliable, subjective data.

What presuppositions of mine do you think are either wrong or based on unreliable, subjective data?

To my knowledge I only used one presupposition, namely that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. Don't you agree with this presupposition?

Finally it's simply not true that my argument is "theism is the only worldview that fits my presuppositions". My argument is: Here is the theistic worldview I have, here is naturalism's worldview, and here are the reasons why I find the first works better than the second. I gave many reasons and many one to one comparisons. It's true that one of the reasons I gave is that naturalism contradicts my intuitive belief that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. Clearly, as I do believe that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong, this is a perfectly valid reason. On the contrary, a naturalist is obliged to believe that gratuitous torture is not objectively wrong, but is considered wrong just because of peoples' opinion - which is a position I think no humane person can feel comfortable with.

833. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51203 by Dianelos Georgoudis on June 22, 2007 at 12:07 am

Steve99 (post 754, or #51078):

That is not an explanation of why you have a high level of confidence. Indeed, it suggests you should, as a reasonable fellow, have a low level of confidence in it. Anyone reasonable knows that intuition is unreliable.

As I explained in post 571 all reasonable people rely on intuitions. Here is a small sample of my intuitions:
1. There exists an external objective reality that causes my conscious experiences.
2. The inductive method is reasonable.
3. Other minds exist (in other words I am not the only conscious being in the world).
4. The world did not come into existence 10 minutes ago.

Now, is there any of the above propositions you disagree with? I trust you agree with all of them.

Can you justify any of the above propositions? I trust you can't.

If you agree with these propositions but can't justify your belief in them then they are intuitions.

Is there any of the above intuitions you have a low level of confidence in? I trust there isn't, e.g. I trust you have a high level of confidence that an external objective reality exists.

So in conclusion we all rely on intuitions and have a high level of confidence in several of them. This is a fact. Let's face it.

Now in my justification of why I think idealistic theism is more reasonable than naturalism I used one intuition of mine I have much confidence in, namely:

5. Gratuitous torture is objectively wrong.

I am curious: Do you agree or do you disagree with intuition #5?

In any case my justification of why theism works better than naturalism does not depend on that intuition; it only becomes stronger because of it. But, as I explained in post 749, even removing this particular intuition (and therefore this particular reason to reject naturalism) ideal