Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis
51. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88605 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 18, 2007 at 3:00 am
Steve99 (post 294 or #88174):
do this and you will get eternal pleasure. Do that and you will burn forever.As I have said many times, I do not believe in these ideas, so I don't see why you keep using them against my position. On the other hand, atheists do believe that life ends at death, which entails that people can get away with doing bad things. Which is obviously dangerous. What I am saying is that theism can and certainly will outgrow the parts that are dangerous (as belief in heavenly reward and punishment is) but atheism can't.
Get rid of the divine authority, and a more reasonable discussion is possible.I have done so many times: Something is objectively ethical not because God authoritatively says so, but because objective reality (and hence God) is so.
I don't mind you disagreeing with me Steve, but it seems to me that you are not really trying to understand what I am saying in the first place.
52. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88603 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 18, 2007 at 2:49 am
Epeeist (post 290 or #88160):
Thanks for the links. Plantinga's claim is so radical that it has caused quite some reaction. Now I have read the second of your links (I will read the other later) but I did not find it very convincing for the following reasons: 1) The author's argument is based on a premise which is not there in the science of natural evolution (namely that natural evolution gave us what he calls "generically pragmatist" minds instead of what he calls "generically Cartesian" minds), and I am generally suspicious when philosophers make scientific claims beyond what is actually there in the science. 2) Plantinga's argument is based on the obviously true premise that what counts in natural evolution is behavior, and not the beliefs and desires that gave rise to that behavior, to which the linked paper responds that our beliefs must nevertheless reflect the truths of our environment because of the way we learn to associate words with objects, or to associate mental states with external behavior. This looks like a smokescreen to me, for it only works as an intuition pump to try to give the impression of a necessary logical link between beliefs and external truths. But maybe I misunderstood that paper; I only read it quickly.Noted theist philosopher Alvin Plantinga in his paper "An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" has forcefully argued that if both naturalism and the theory of natural evolution were true than we would not possess reason.However, you may also want to read http://fitelson.org/plant.pdf and
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/wesley_robbins/contraplantinga.html as well.
Anyway, I think Plantinga's argument against naturalism is overkill, as it sets to show that if naturalism and natural evolution are true then we don't have the cognitive capacity to justify any beliefs at all, including for example mathematical beliefs. I think a weaker claim allows for a simpler and hence stronger argument which attacks naturalism just as radically. I have explained my idea before, but let me develop it formally:
1. If naturalism is true and natural evolution is true then all our cognitive capacities are the result of natural evolution alone. (premise)
2. Through natural evolution we can only possess such cognitive capacities that offer some competitive advantage. (premise)
3. If naturalism is true and natural evolution is true then all our cognitive offer some competitive advantage. (from 1 and 2)
4. If naturalism is true then the cognitive faculty for deciding the truth of ontological propositions offers no competitive advantage. (premise)
5. If naturalism is true and natural evolution is true then we do not possess the cognitive faculty for deciding the truth of ontological propositions. (from 3 and 4)
6. Naturalism is an ontological proposition. (premise)
7. If naturalism is true and natural evolution is true then we do not possess the cognitive faculty for deciding that naturalism is true. (from 6 and 7)
8. To believe that a proposition is true, without possessing the cognitive capacity for deciding that it is true, is irrational. (premise)
9. If naturalism is true and natural evolution is true then to believe that naturalism is true is irrational. (from 7 and 8)
10. If natural evolution is true then if naturalism is true then naturalism is irrational. (equivalent to 9)
11. If natural evolution is true then either naturalism is false or naturalism is irrational. (equivalent to 10)
Some comments: By "naturalism" above, read "scientific naturalism". Premise #1 requires the truth of both naturalism and natural evolution, because if naturalism is false then we may have cognitive capacities that are not necessarily the result of natural evolution. Premise #4 should be clear: we only experience and interact with phenomenal reality, and therefore only true beliefs about phenomenal reality can possibly be of any competitive advantage. (As Dr. Benway insists we can live very well without worrying about objective reality.) To believe in a proposition without justification is irrational, and if we do not have the cognitive capacity for deciding the truth of proposition then we can't justify it, hence premise #8. That #10 is equivalent to #9 should be obvious, but in any case here is the derivation in Boolean logic (where "*" stands for "and", "+" stands for "or", " ' " stand for "not", "->" stands for "implies"):
N*E -> Ir
(N*E)' + Ir
N' + E' + Ir
E' + (N' + Ir)
E -> (N' + Ir)
E -> (N -> Ir)
53. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88524 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 10:30 am
Peacebeuponme (post 289 or #88159):
:-) Well, it's not my idea. And I invite you to think about it. Even Dawkins in TGD recognizes that Christian ethics were beyond their time. Some argue that the idea of equality under the law has its roots in Old Testament's ethics, and the idea of the equality of all people has its roots in New Testament's ethics. New Atheism's books select the most ugly bits of the Old Testament where God supposedly commands the Jews to destroy their enemies. But these stories were obviously concocted in order to find a way to whitewash crimes committed during war, and the very need to whitewash these crimes evidences the Jewish peoples' probably more advanced sense of ethics for their time.It seems to me, Dr Benway, that while the moral Zeitgeist for the last thousands of years has been slowly catching up with theistic ethicsAAAARRGHH! I just can't believe anybody can actually write that!
54. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88521 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 10:10 am
Steve99 (post 287 or #88152):
The 'atheist' worldview includes Hitchens, Dawkins, the Dalai Lama, and (it seems) Mother Theresa.What concerns me here is the reasonableness of New Atheism or more specifically of Dawkins's worldview of scientific naturalism. As I have already clarified I do not care about atheism in general, because indeed there are too many claimed versions of it, including your claim that Buddhism is atheistic despite its belief in rebirth after death and its belief in the existence of "hungry ghosts" and of many gods similar to the ones of ancient Greek mythology.
Suppose you are driving around an unfamiliar town and are lost (call it ethicsville) and are lost. You don't have a map. All you can do, is just try your best. The fact that a map of the town does actually exist somewhere doesn't help if you don't have access to it.But we all do have a map; it's the image of God in which we are created. Actually your analogy of a map is a good one. The problem is that even though we have access to that map it's not easy to read, and it helps to discuss matters with other people (who all are build in the same image) and also to study what other people have said about this map.
We all have an innate sense of ethics as we are all build in the image of God. But how does that help? Bin Laden has an innate sense of ethics. So do you. I hope they are different.No, Bin Laden, you, and I are all built in the same image. But Bin Laden's faith in his own reading of scripture (which is actually a graven image), has dulled his access to divine image inside. And it seems to me that Hitchens's atheistic worldview has dulled his: I observe that both Bin Laden and Hitchens's demonize their enemies and call for their utter destruction by any means necessary. I am sorry to note that Harris comes close to justify the torture of suspected terrorists and even of their families. So something bad happens when people, theists or atheists alike, lose sight of God's image inside.
But those whose worldview does entail that all people are built in God's image will be more likely to search for it both in private and in communion with other people, and will be less likely to stoop as low as to demonize or dehumanize their fellow human beings.
Your theistic reasoning adds precisely nothing as a practical guide to how we should live.I agree with your sense that what really matters is a practical guide to how we should live. Unfortunately ethics is not as simple as writing down a guide. What theism offers is a conceptual ground for discovering how we should live, which is a necessary requisite for reasoning about ethics. And beyond the theoretical advantages, theism is far more ethically empowering than atheism.
55. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88510 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 7:37 am
SmartLX (post 286 or #88151):
A believer can't simultaneously claim the rational support of a god by way of its existence and an atheist's incoherence by way of its nonexistence, as long as both people are in the same universe.Plantinga's argument against naturalism does show that naturalism is false; rather it shows that there can't be justification in reason for believing both in natural evolution and naturalism.
Therefore, even if both sides accepted the dependence of rationality on the existence of a god (which an atheist never would), an atheist then has no reason to entertain the arguments of anyone on the planet, let alone a believer, and can't be convinced of anything.Well if rationality is dependent on the existence of God then we have the following state of affairs: Either there is a God or there isn't. In the former case the atheistic proposition "God does not exists" is false, and the latter case it is unjustified. Does not look good for atheism if you ask me.
Incidentally, what some naturalist philosophers are already discovering is that rationality cannot be accounted for by scientific naturalism. This is a much weaker claim than that rationality depends on the existence of God, but still. I when people realize that scientific naturalism not only implies that no ethical precepts are objective and that they don't possess libertarian free will, but also that they are not rational beings then I suppose most of them will say "enough is enough".
56. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88508 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 7:07 am
Epeeist (post 283 or #88000):
Why should I have specified this? The proposition is true even for the domains of fractional, irrational, and complex numbers. If I wanted to split hairs I would have specified that the proposition is given in base 10 (in base 3 the equivalent proposition would be "2+2=11").Surely you are not saying that the proposition "2+2=4" does not predict that if I put two beans and two beans together and count the result I will get four :-)You proposition says that the sum of the numbers 2 and 2 is 4. It is still fairly sloppy in that you don't specify whether this is in the domain of natural numbers (N) or integers (Z).
Now the second part of your statement says that if you have two beans (we can say "in a cup" without loss of generality) and place two more beans in the cup then there will be four beans in the cup.You forgot to specify that the cup to be used must be empty. Very sloppy :-)
Does it need to be said again - you are guilty of reification.I am certainly guilty of not understanding what you mean.
57. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88503 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 6:40 am
Epeeist (post 272 or #87998):
My approach is, obviously, pragmatic. I am a 100% pragmatical person. I don't see what the point is in thinking or discussing about theoretical stuff that is utterly irrelevant to our own lives. On the other hand I am not sure about Pierce, James and Dewey's ideas; they appear to suggest that truth is not objective and that in some sense we make truth. That's very far from what I mean.All meaningful propositions make predictions that can be evaluated in one's own personal experience, at least in principle. The meaning of claiming a proposition is true is of betting that the predictions it makes are more likely to obtain than not.I think you are making the immediate error of confusing the definition of truth and the criterion for truth, unless of course you are taking the pragmatist approach of Pierce, James and Dewey.
All your examples are logically wrong. Propositions don't "predict" anything.If a proposition does not predict anything what's the use thinking about whether it's true or not?
A proposition is just a declarative statement. I will treat your examples in this light.Well, then you are not really engaging with what I suggest, for I suggest we understand the meaning and truth of proposition based on its predictive content.
No, the proposition "God exists" asserts that God exists, nothing else. If you want to assert that "You will experience life after death" then you will have to provide another proposition.According to my scheme the meaning of a proposition encompasses also what all the propositions it implies predict. Otherwise all existential propositions (e.g. apples exist) would be rendered meaningless.
But this proposition can affect me. What it predicts is that no matter what number I am given I will be able (at least in principle) to compute a larger prime number. Some day maybe my life will depend on my knowing the truth of that proposition. Suppose I am condemned to be hanged, but the king offers me the possibility to save my life if within one day I finish one of the following two tasks: compute a prime number larger than 444 or design a flat map that cannot be painted with four colors.clearly there are better things to do than to think about propositions that cannot affect me in any way whatsoever.Such as "there is no largest prime".
58. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88498 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 5:47 am
Dr Benway (post 260 or #87957):
But I'm not selling materialism. I don't even know what matter is exactly. Waves, particles, strings, tiny curled up extra dimensions - it's not a straight forward thing, this stuff we call "matter."The detailed properties of matter are not important in this context. What counts is this: Do you agree with the proposition "The material universe would exist even if humanity did not"? If you do agree then you believe in the objective existence of matter.
I've been trying to get Dianelos away from the "ontology" stuffThe belief that matter objectively exists is an ontological belief.
59. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88477 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 1:48 am
Goldy (post 258 or #87873):
It's not difficult really: We all agree there is an objective reality out there, in which we all exist, each one of us forming a tiny part. Well that objective reality out there, the whole of it, is not a huge physical mechanism as naturalists think, but rather a very very good person, a conscious being who, as we do, perceives, thinks, wills, loves, creates and enjoys beauty. We form part of reality and hence are that person's children. And that person has designed and sustains for us the experiential environment we find ourselves living in – including, incidentally, of the physical facts and laws. So you see, according to theism reality is a far more interesting place than scientific naturalism has it.Except being a person, God is also perfectly good, the creator of us and the designer of our experiential environment.Not 100% sure what this is meant to be saying.
could you elaborate on what you mean by "good" here?OK. The whole of reality is a living person, right? That's the main idea. Now, as any living person reality is not static but dynamic: it evolves. So "good" does not really describe a static property of reality, but dynamic property of it: goodness is the direction in which reality is evolving. And here's the nub of it: we are co-creators of reality's dynamic evolution [1], indeed that's the deepest reason of creation. God grows through us, as we grow through God. (Incidentally these are not my ideas – you can find them in the better and non-dogmatic writings of the Christian tradition.)
[1] As I have been arguing, ethical goodness describes God's character and is therefore objective, but we, as co-creators of reality's evolution, co-define what is ethically good to a tiny degree :-)
60. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88475 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 17, 2007 at 1:04 am
Phasmagigas (post 256 or #87869:
BUT heres the big one, the big unambiguous appearence of a god (or alien trick) just ISNT going to happen is it?No, I don't think so either. But should it happen the consequent atheist would figure there must be a natural cause for it.
You see for me thats the big problem with god, it allows one to posit anything atall, anything atall without eveidence, god made the rain fall, not fall, dog die, sun shine, butterfly hatch, light bulb blow, ship sink, lose leg, god could even deliberately not answer prayers just so that people pray even more, I can come up with as many goddidits as any believer.Yes, and as some believers say "mysterious are God's ways" – but I think that's all wrong. The God concept has huge explanatory power, which includes the explanation why we experience a physical environment, why we suffer, why we die, what beauty is, what the meaning of life is – and so on. And what's more God is not only to be understood but also and mainly to be experienced: As is the case with any person what first and firstmost matters and what is most meaningful and most pleasurable is the relationship :-)
61. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88393 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 12:57 pm
Goldy (post 249 or #87863:
No, no, nothing like that. Rather it goes like this: In order to understand the actions of any person one must know their prime motivation, what it is they want before all else. What God wants is for us to grow in virtue (i.e. increase personal goodness), and hence has created for us an experiential environment optimized for that goal. Why doesn't God directly give us all that virtue, instead of having us go through all the trouble and suffering and so on we are exposed here? Because either virtue is personally earned, or else is not virtue: personal goodness is either earned or is not personal. A related issue is why life's troubles are distributed so unjustly. The answer I think is that they are not distributed unjustly, for life continues far beyond death, and we shall all continue to experience both joy and pain and agonize over ethical decisions for a long time to come – and on average all people will get about the same deal. Moreover I think the distinction between individual persons is in a sense illusory: we are all in this together and in some fundamental sense the other person's suffering is my suffering also, and the other person's joy is my joy too.Of course God does not actually want these [evil] things.So he's also as constrained by natural "laws" as the rest of us. He is a creation of physics, as it were? Not infallible?
62. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88371 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 9:06 am
Dr Benway (post 234 or #87760:
Agreed.One must reason to one's own satisfaction and not to other peoples' satisfaction.Any proposition that cannot be corroborated deserves less confidence than one that can be corroborated. You know that.
That's why you're here.You are right, but mainly the other way around: I was curious to see if people here would des-corroborate my ideas, i.e. find good counter-arguments I had not thought of before.
I don't see how what you write here connects to what I wrote above. But I found your last sentence striking, for it's very true. If you open the doors to Jesus you open them to Osama also. If you close the doors to Osama you close them to Jesus too. So we all have a choice to make here.an atheist must first have the mental flexibility to temporarily drop their naturalistic intuitionsTranslation: I want to cheat our immigration laws. Please look the other way whilst Jesus sneaks in without a passport. But if the door's open to Jesus it's open to Osama.
63. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88368 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 8:46 am
Dr Benway (post 232 or #87756:
Apparently, Steve99 does. When I say I believe in some proposition because it strikes me as completely obvious, he insists that in order to convince him I must present *evidence*. He appears to be under the impression that evidentialism is a fine idea, and also that to reject evidentialism is tantamount to refusing the need to give evidence for any claim.The idea that one needs evidence for all claims is wrongWho is claiming one needs evidence for all claims?
There are a few we accept a priori as they are necessary for communication.That's an interesting idea I had not heard before :-) But does it work?
I don't see why; solipsists communicate with others just fine.objective reality existsAccepted as necessary for communication.
Correct, so there are some propositions you believe in even though there is no evidence for them and neither are they necessary for communication.the world did not start 5 minutes agoNot necessary for communication.
If no evidence exists to distinguish an old universe from a 5 minute universe, the proposition can be ignored.We might be able to make such a distinction in the future. Maybe we'll be able to construct a time machine and discover that we cannot travel back to any time before November 16, 2007. So that proposition is meaningful, and we all believe it's false even at the absence of any evidence.
(It also can be rejected by appeals to parsimony, part of the inductive method - see below.)I like the idea of parsimony, but then again that's a very subjective criterion don't you think? I mean try to device a set of objective criteria that would allow two people to agree about which of their belief systems is more parsimonious :-)
Actually it's necessary for making predictions, not for communicating them.the inductive method is correctNecessary for communicating predictions to each other.
Plenty of evidence. For example even though both idealistic theism and scientific naturalism are monistic ontologies, only the latter confronts that hard problem of how a physical system could produce consciousness. The corresponding problem in idealistic theism would be to explain how consciousness produces physical systems, but this problem does not exist because according to idealism physical systems do not objectively exist in the first place so there is no question of how they are produced. (All physical facts and physical rules represent only patterns in conscious experience.) Idealistic theism simply works better than scientific naturalism in too many fronts (actually in all fronts I could think of). It even works better for science, for in idealistic theism the phenomenal is objective, so scientists do not have to worry about what kind of an objective reality produces the phenomenal reality they study. The same does not work for scientific naturalism for obvious reasons.idealistic theism is a better explanation than scientific realismNot necessary for communication. Evidence?
64. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88357 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 6:29 am
Epeeist (post 228 or #87738:
Feed lines? :-)I always found that idea to be a complete truism. After all your example is exactly equivalent to The proposition 'rabbits eat grass' is true if and only it's true that rabbits eat grass. But this does not explain what we mean by "truth".Over the course of this thread I have been giving you feed lines, post 86718 was the most glaringly obvious of these.
And I don't see what post 86718 has to do with the matter at hand, namely what is truth. Anyway here is a quote from that post: "The great physical theories of the 20th century (GR, QM and QFT) provide a convincing view of reality though it is obvious that they are not complete." All physical theories model phenomena, and hence make claims about phenomenal reality. GR is still classical physics, and in classical physics it's easy to fall for the illusion that phenomenal and objective physical reality are the same thing, but QM has radically destroyed that illusion.
65. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88353 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 6:03 am
Epeeist (post 222 or #87708:
Correct. Black holes are singularities in the spacetime continuum, so in order to falsify their existence one would have to search all of spacetime.Well if you examined the entire universe and you didn't see a single black hole, you'd falsify the proposition, "black holes exist (in the universe)." – Dr BenwayUnfortunately you wouldn't. You have to look both back and forward in time as well.
66. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88348 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 5:45 am
Dr Benway (post 214 or #87552):
I made the point about the relative meaning of "objective" before. Something is demonstrated to be "objective" by independent corroboration. The easier something is to corroborate by independent observers, the more objective that thing is. But it's like Dianelos hasn't heard a word. He's still defining "objective" as meaning totally independent of any observer. Which is not a very practical standard.That's indeed the definition of "objective": totally independent from our opinion, and even from our very existence. So, for example, when scientific naturalists claim that the physical universe objectively exists, or that it follows objective physical laws, they mean precisely that the physical universe would exist and follow physical laws even if we were not here observing it.
But the belief that something objectively exists does not imply that we can easily find out about it. See for example the case of physical laws: the fact that it is difficult to discover them and that physics is a work in progress, which might never end by the way, does not imply that physical laws are not completely objective, or that they are objective only up to some degree. It's true that our knowledge about them is not complete and is correct only to some degree, but we must not conflate the relative reliability or precision of our knowledge about something with the objectively of it. In fact, the one knowledge we are absolutely certain about is our subjective experiences, which is the very antithesis of objectivity.
67. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88341 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 5:10 am
Steve99 (post 201 or #87487):
Scientific naturalism claims that the world as described by science is a unity, or in other words that nature is all there is. You appear to believe that scientific naturalism allows for the existence of parallel abstract worlds such as the Platonic ideals, but this is factually wrong. In fact naturalist philosophers respond to the transcendental argument by trying to "naturalize" (i.e. to reduce to scientific facts) all abstract terms. Let me quote from the very recent and state of the art "Naturalism in Question" by Mario De Caro and David MacArthur: "The acceptance of an exclusively scientific conception of nature is what leads to the demand for the various projects of naturalizing the mind and its contents (involving, say, ethical values, colors, and numbers)." Mathematics (which is a common case used in the transcendental argument) does represent a problem for scientific naturalism. In fact there is an entire book which tries to find a way to reduce mathematics to scientific facts, Penelopy Maddy's "Realism in Mathematics". Her solution? That mathematical objects such as numbers are patterns present in the neural firings of the brains of people who know mathematics. So, contrary to what you believe, scientific naturalism does imply that pi objectively exists in the physical universe. (And pi by the way is not an infinite number but an irrational number. Steve, you really should go out and study the issues at hand a little more or at least do some research before responding to my posts a few minutes after I posted them, for it's tiring for me to constantly find myself explaining simple stuff to you. Things are really not as trivial as you think, and I am sorry that Dawkins's TGD confused you into believing that they are.)If that's what you believe then you disagree with scientific naturalism. You see, scientific naturalism claims that everything that objectively exists, exists in the physical universe that (according to scientific naturalism) science studies.No it doesn't. You are just making this up. Scientific naturalism does not claim that Pi (an infinite number, after all) objectively exists in the physical universe. Please look up the meaning of the word 'abstract'.
In this context I would like to point out the fact is that some atheist philosophers are already recognizing that scientific naturalism is not viable and so they are trying to device some kind of "pluralistic naturalism", i.e. a description of some kind of transcendental reality in which mathematics, conscious experiences, ethical values, knowledge, and so on, objectively co-exist with the physical universe. An understanding of reality according to pluralistic naturalism rejects the claim that natural science and/or the scientific method are the ultimate arbiters of all truths. There is still some debate going on, but I think there is already overwhelming evidence that scientific naturalism is a conceptual failure too, quite apart from its practical problems of describing a reality capable of producing quantum phenomena and of producing consciousness.
68. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88333 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 3:53 am
Irate_atheist (post 200 or #87484):
Yes, well, I did not ask for evidence that actions of gravity affect us, but for evidence that the Moon or the Statue of Liberty objectively exist.You have still not offered your evidence that the moon (or even simpler: the Statue of Liberty) objectively exists.OK, we'll stand by and watch as you jump off the top of the statue. Objectively speaking, it's reasonable to assume that we'll walk away, once again having witnessed the effects of gravity in action, and you won't walk away at all.
Obviously there can't be any such evidence, unless one first assumes that the physical universe objectively exists, which is an arbitrary assumption which begs the question. Here is why there can't be such evidence: Assume that reality is how I describe it, namely God directly causing our experiences of the physical universe, without the benefit of an actual objective universe being there. Assume reality is like this. Then, no matter how deeply we study the physical laws present in our experience of the physical universe, no matter how many measurements of the moon's orbit we make, no matter how exactly we measure the weight of the Statue of Liberty, no matter how many people we ask for their opinion, no matter how often we actually bang our heads against the cold metal of the Statue of Liberty – even if all humanity would start doing nothing but collecting objective data about the moon and the Statue of Liberty until all the libraries overflow with that information: it will all not amount to even weak evidence that the moon or the Statue of Liberty objectively exist, because in fact they don't under the assumption made. So unless one assumes that the physical universe objectively exists there can't be any evidence whatsoever for the objective existence of the moon or of the Statue of Liberty. I hope you can see that.
69. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88330 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 3:03 am
Epeeist (post 198 or #87478):
:-) One word does not make an argument no matter how loud it's shouted. You like being cryptic and dropping hints instead of presenting a case – but hey, suit yourself. It seems a common tactic of the atheistic mindset is to try not to expose itself (e.g. atheism is only a lack of belief, atheism is not a belief system, lack of beliefs cannot motivate people to act badly, atheism being a negative proposition does not have the burden of proof, I "don't know" how objective reality is so I don't have to divulge my thoughts about it, etc).
Well, maybe that's a smart tactic; maybe atheists deep down do realize that atheism is rather problematic so it's better to avoid making explicit how they think. I must say though that to their merit many atheists here, including Steve99 and Dr Benway, did not follow that tactic. And to their merit New Atheism authors have gone out and debated theists. It will be interesting to observe if they will continue doing such debates in the future, for at the very least one thing that these debates have clearly evidenced is that theism is not as moronic as they have been insisting in their books. Finally I would like to warmly commend this very website of Dawkins: it's very instructive and open; probably the best place to find out what's happening in this area as well as how atheists think.
70. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88326 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 16, 2007 at 2:33 am
Epeeist (post 196 or #87465):
Actually this is a distinct case of splitting hairs, as most people would agree that bronze is a metal. According to Webster's dictionary a definition of Metal (noun) is: "A mixture containing two or more metallic elements or metallic and nonmetallic elements usually fused together or dissolving into each other when molten".(A metal can be any alloy, and there is an unlimited number of different alloys which sometimes have wildly different properties, and that's why this proposition cannot be falsified even though it's clearly scientific.)A distinct case of equivocation. You said "metal" not "alloy" or "metallic alloy".
While the latter two are not falsifiable, the former is.Right, and that was my point: Contrary to what many people think not all scientific propositions are falsifiable.
71. Eugenie Scott on Intelligent Design and Young Earth Creationism
Comment #88288 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 7:20 pm
I think Eugenie Scott's presentation was excellent, certainly much more informative than any other of the presentations I have watched. I also think her organization is doing a great job keeping stealth-religion out of American schools, and it was gratifying to see that the court system in the US is working quite efficiently and indeed contrary to what may be the wishes of the majority in the country. Still I have two questions:
1. Isn't intelligent design a scientific hypothesis? I mean no matter the hidden (or not so hidden) motivations of the people who push for the teaching of ID at schools, isn't ID itself on its own merits a scientific hypothesis? After all some phenomena are explained by the intelligence design hypothesis, e.g. the Stonehedge. So why exactly does the same hypothesis become unscientific when applied to phenomena related to biology?
Let me qualify my question by stating my own position as clearly as I can: Darwin's theory of natural evolution is clearly one of the greatest scientific discoveries of all time, one whose truth is as well justified as any other scientific theory's. Indeed Darwin's idea may yet prove useful far beyond the context of the origin of the species: it is already been used (via meme theory) to explain phenomena related to human intelligence and culture, is being used in artificial intelligence, and may still prove to play an important part in explaining the origin of life, i.e. how the first biological replicator came to be (my own pet theory is that that the first replicator may be the result of a scaffolding which evolved through Darwinian mechanisms but whose chemistry was such that no signs of it survived; it left no fossils behind). Secondly, even though to me it seems that ID is a scientific hypothesis, it has only managed to become very weak science because:
a) it does not explain anything,
b) to my knowledge all of the examples put forward as cases of irreducible complexity after the first replicator have already been solved,
c) even if some cases of irreducible complexity were found that prove more difficult to solve within Darwinism, this would not invalidate Darwinism's power to explain the overall evolution of the species,
d) the burden of proof for ID lies squarely on those who suggest it, and taken into account the vast range of possibilities and combinations of possibilities that blind physical processes offer it's very hard to see how the proponents of ID could ever come close to offering strong arguments for their case (in short, it's not enough for IDrs to challenge Darwinists to explain how X could have evolved through blind physical processes).
What's more, even if ID were much more solid science than it now is, it does not follow that it should be taught at schools, until such time that it really becomes a scientific theory of comparable power to Darwinism, a very improbable state of affairs which at best lies far in the future. So there is absolutely no question that ID should not be taught as schools, and indeed in all other advanced societies the US phenomenon of the ID movement is watched with derision. But having said all that, it bothers me when Darwinists claim that ID is not a scientific hypothesis, for it strikes me as a dogmatic stance and as the very antithesis of the scientific ethos. ID, it seems to me, clearly is a scientific hypothesis, albeit a failed one at this point in time.
2. My second question is related to the first one. While watching Scott's speech in Youtube I noticed they had there another video there with her debating somebody called Stephen Meyer (see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnVnN9JLpq0&feature=related ) Now, the journalist who guided the debate made a really terrible job, so it's not a very instructive video, but my question concerns something Scott says at some point: "Intelligent design makes the claim that there are things out there in nature that are unexplainable by natural cause, therefore they were created or designed by an intelligent agent (and nobody is fooled about who that is [or something to that effect – ed note]). Now how can you call that science when your basic organizable principle is 'we can't explain this by natural cause'? What science does is explain things through natural cause, and the whole idea of intelligent design just completely flies in the face of that." But what kind of argument is this? Suppose, for discussion's sake, that somebody manages to prove beyond all reasonable doubt and on purely scientific grounds that the evolution of the species, or else that the origin of life on Earth, cannot have been the result of blind physical processes. What then? Would Scott brand this result unscientific because, well, basically because she does not like the result? And what's this about an intelligent designer not being a natural cause? Doesn't science teach that intelligence is a natural phenomenon? For all we know some extraterrestrial civilization designed the first replicators and planted them on Earth as some kind of experiment, or perhaps in order to populate the cosmos with life, or for some other reason, who knows. I mean this is a possibility entirely compatible with ID. So why would this be a non-natural cause? Now it is plausible that at least 99% of those who push ID believe that the designer in question is God, but the scientific thing to do is evaluate a scientific hypothesis on its merits and not on the motivations or hidden agenda of those who expound it. So, it seems to me, to argue that ID is not scientific because it postulates a non natural cause is wrong on multiple levels.
72. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88218 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 11:41 am
Steve99 (post 190 or #87393):
I really don't see how the realization that scientific knowledge offers no advantage to scientific naturalism when one compares it to idealistic theism somehow works in favor of your position Steve. After all virtually all atheists believe as an article of faith that theism and science are fundamentally opposed. Actually my claim is that science offers idealistic theism an advantage, as evidenced by the fact that the scientific discoveries (particularly in physics) in the last 100 years have forced naturalists to drop one after the other many of their most strongly believed intuitions about how objective reality is, have created some sore spots as how to account for the apparent fine-tuning of the fundamental constants, and have resulted in the development of an ever increasing number of desperately incompatible naturalistic description of reality, not to mention come perilously close to rendering scientific naturalism incoherent in all its guises. I don't wish to reopen that latter can of worms, as that claim is too strong for comfort even for me, but if the reader wants to see what I mean, post #75753 is a possible starting point about this issue.Yes and, as I said already, by the same measure idealistic theism too predicts that the orbits of planets can be calculated only using current theories of gravity, and no additional fact will need to be invoked, such as the objective existence of gravity, or of the physical universe for that matter.Great. So this proves my point. There is no evidence that distinguishes idealistic theism from scientific naturalism. So in that case, I go for the simpler solution. The one without added 'God'.
As for the simplicity card you are playing, two things: Simplicity is not the final word; even if scientific naturalism were simpler than idealistic theism there are many other advantages of the latter. But scientific naturalism is not simpler than idealistic theism. First of all, as I have repeatedly explained, it's not like "idealistic theism = scientific naturalism + God". In fact, both scientific naturalism and idealistic theism are monistic theories of reality, i.e. theories that postulate that ultimately reality consists of only one kind of thing. Scientific naturalism postulates that ultimately reality consists of matter following mechanical laws, whereas idealistic theism postulates that ultimately reality consists of conscious experience following personal will. And when one compares idealistic theism to even the simplest possible descriptions of a physical reality as understood by scientific naturalism, it turns out that the former is much simpler than the latter (see the rough but rather conclusive calculations in the latter part of post #55061). So maybe it's a good thing that simplicity is not the last word :-)
Incidentally, Steve, I see that you often respond to a post of mine only a few minutes after I posted it. Why such a hurry? Don't you think it would be better and take some time and think before responding?
73. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88204 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 10:27 am
Steve99 (post 188 or #87391):
I am not trying to show flaws in all naturalistic theories. I am not comparing atheism in general with naturalism in general because each of these two basic ontological commitments covers too many different theories of reality, and indeed some of the better naturalistic theories may well work better than some of the worse theistic theories. So I am specifically comparing idealistic theism, which is my ontological belief system, with scientific naturalism, which is Dawkins's, and which moreover is amply documented in the various books he has written and in his many public appearances. And in this context I have pointed out (in post #87018) that scientific naturalism presents some problems which do not exist in idealistic theism. So, frankly, when I am criticizing Dawkins's worldview of scientific naturalism your continuous attempts to drag into the discussion other worldviews, such as Chalmer's dualism or even religious ontologies such a Buddhism's, are, again, red herrings. Let's stick to the issue of which theory is more reasonable, idealistic theism or scientific realism. Unless that is you wish to describe what your own ontological belief system is (something you have never done, keeping the agnostic stance of "I don't know") in which case, if you wish, we might compare your theory about reality to idealistic theism. But until then I would like to keep our discussion focused on whether idealistic theism or scientific naturalism is more reasonable, without diversions.I was discussing worldviews that posit that fundamental reality is physical, which is not what Chalmers is proposing. Rather he is proposing a dualistic ontology in which both physical matter and conscious experience are fundamental. So that's a different case.I know it is a different case. That is my point. You are trying to show flaws in a naturalistic viewpoint in order to justify a theistic viewpoint.
I strongly disagree and I am surprised you would claim that. What people say is not evidence of what is objectively true. After all, by definition, something is objectively true if it is independent of what people believe. Actually, what people say is not even very strong evidence about what they believe.And what other people say is the proof of what's objective?No, it is evidence for what's objective.
Perhaps you are confused and conflate the idea of corroboration with the idea of what people say. That a claim can be independently corroborated is indeed evidence that it is objective. That a claim can be independently corroborated means that you can personally find out by seeing with your own eyes as it where.But what other people say is the very antithesis of objectivity: something is supposed to be objectively true independently of peoples' opinion.Indeed. And we get hints about what is objective by finding out what people say that is consistent, so indicating what is independent of viewpoint. It isn't proof - it is evidence.
Right. And I justified these beliefs partially on propositions I find obviously true, such as that some ethical precepts are objectively true. But you rejected my accepting propositions just because I find them obvious, and challenged me "to prove" them. So, in post #87476 I in turned challenged you to prove something you strongly believe in, such as that the Statue of Liberty objectively exists. Your answer was that people consistently say that the Statue of Liberty objectively exists, which is not quite true as, for example, I don't believe that it objectively exists and openly say so. And even if literally all people believed that that the Statue of Liberty objectively exists it would not amount even to good evidence, as there are a lot of cases where what all people believed turned out to be wrong – as you yourself in other contexts like to point out.Finally what proof do you have that other people objectively exist in the first place?All these questions! But you are the one making the claims, not me. You claim that God exists, is perfectly good and so on.
If you had studied a little philosophy you wouldn't walk so easily into this kind of conceptual minefields Steve. The kind of philosophy one gets from reading TGD or similar books is very naive as you'll find out if you read some academic philosophy; books on naturalism written by atheist philosophers are especially illuminating. The issues are really not as simple as Dawkins paints them, and I suppose Dawkins too is getting some education by taking part or watching debates with more knowledgeable theists than the typical fundamentalist simpleton he apparently imagines represents all theism has to offer. To believe in God is clearly not comparable to believing in fairies, as Dawkins thinks. And contrary to what many an atheist believes there is plenty of evidence for the existence of God, as evidenced by the very same TGD which makes a heroic and cocksure effort to respond to part of that evidence.
Are you SERIOUSLY saying that you should be allowed to get away with claiming that, without having to provide evidence, because 'we can't prove anything'?Ah, but it seems to me here you are grossly misrepresenting me. What's happening is rather like this:
This is really resorting to playground logic...
"God exists"
"Show me"
"I don't need to because you can't prove anything ... Nyahh!"
- Idealistic theism works better than scientific naturalism as a theory of reality.
- Show me.
- Here.
- No there's a bit there that is based on what you think is obvious so it doesn't count.
- Here's some more.
- No, prove it.
- Well, I can't prove it, but it is good evidence.
- No, because you are not convincing us.
- Here's some more evidence.
- No, you simply don't understand science, neither math, nor logic.
- Here's some more.
- No, you believe in the resurrection of Jesus which shows that no matter what you say you are just another creationist, and creationists have it all wrong.
- Here's some more.
- Doesn't work; Buddhism is atheistic too.
You think Steve I am here trying to convince you or anybody else; in fact I am here in part to see how atheists would respond to my arguments. And so far I am underwhelmed. It seems that unless an atheist confronts an uneducated fundamentalist they can't make a good case, and sometimes stoop down to ad hominem (and I am not implying that you did so).
It's true that it is difficult to find out what objectively exists. That's why the better method is to compare one to one different beliefs systems about what objectively exists. That's much easier, and indeed I find that when one compares idealistic theism with scientific realism the evidence is overwhelming in favor of the former. I think one of the reasons this method works so well is because it right away strips the popular kind of atheism that Dawkins epitomizes from two of its main talking points which manage to confuse so many people: that all theistic theories of reality are incompatible with science, and that all theistic theories of reality must be based on the Bible.There is nothing that comes close to proving that the moon objectively exists Steve. There isn't even a good probabilistic argument that the moon objectively exists. But I can understand that people who take their philosophy from reading TGD are unaware of that.Sorry, this doesn't work in your favour. If you claim that there is a problem with knowing what objectively exists, then you are in no position to claim that objective ethics exists.
Also, you need to stop being so bitchy about what you believe is in TGD, as you have clearly shown you have misread it. As in the examples of claiming that Dawkins is against all ideas of a Creator (only unevolved ones), and claiming that complex things can't "just be" (they can, but that is no evidence for a more complex creator).The TGD explicitly sets out to prove that the probability of *all* creator Gods is very low. But you are right that Dawkins's very weak "Ultimate 747" argument works only against the concept of an unevolved God. (That his argument is very weak is widely recognized, and I have noticed that no atheists use this argument in their recent debates with theists). Finally, I fail to understand your last sentence above. You appear to be saying that complex things can "just be", but for some unspecified reason a complex God cannot "just be".
If you were simply an idealistic theist, I might have some slight sympathy for your views.In the context of this debate I don't wish for your sympathy, slight or not. What I wish for are some stronger counterarguments.
The problem is, you have to add all that extra magic [of Jesus's resurretin].Forget about my belief in Jesus's resurrection, that's a red herring. This particular and tentative belief of mine, i.e. that the closest disciples of Jesus did have some remarkably realistic experiences of Jesus after his crucifixion, has nothing to do with my main claim that idealistic theism works better than scientific realism. The correct understanding of how reality is goes far beyond what a few particular people exactly experienced two thousand years ago in ancient Palestine. The correct understanding of how reality is – that is something extraterrestrials who know nothing about the Earth, not to mention about Jesus, may right now be debating too.
74. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88178 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 4:35 am
Steve99 (post 186 or #87378):
Oh, that's only a red herring as I have already pointed out several times. See for example this post, or this post, or this post where I explain why your oft repeated point that I believe in the resurrection of Jesus is a red herring.both scientific naturalism and idealistic theism agree with phenomenal realityNot according to you. You claim that phenomenal reality includes the resurrection of Jesus.
75. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88172 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 3:25 am
Steve99 (post 184 or #87357):
It's naive to ask people for "proof" simply because there cannot be any proofs for ontological claims. Strictly speaking not even mathematical proofs are really proofs, because they all use as a premise unproven axioms and production rules. So when many an atheist keeps asking like a broken record "prove it, prove it" they are only evidencing how clueless they are about epistemology.Sure, and that's why it's so naive to ask people for "proof".Not when religious views have consequences, such as the mutilation of women.
As for religious beliefs sometimes having bad consequences it's true, but these pale when compared to some of the consequences of atheistic belief systems, so your argument is not only irrelevant but is also misguided.
76. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88168 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 2:55 am
BMMcArdle (post 182 or #87293):
OK, here are the answers to your new set of questions even though, frankly, I don't see their relevance:
How old were you when you were baptised?I don't know. Probably less than two.
What faith were you baptised into?If by "faith" you mean "denomination" then it's the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Eastern Orthodox Church is very similar to the Roman Catholic Church as far as dogmas go, but it's quite different from it as far as knowledge based on tradition goes, in matters of organization and authority, and in matters of practical life. If you are interested in learning something about Eastern Orthodoxy a very good book is "The Orthodox Way" by Kallistos Ware, who, by the way, is an interesting fellow: he is British, a bishop of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and a professor at Oxford University.
Do you follow the creeds?No, not by far. I even find it difficult imagining myself actually following the creeds of Christianity. On the other hand these creeds have certainly influenced the way I live. Let me explain: To follow Christianity's creeds means to follow the path of Jesus Christ. I don't really do that. But at least I don't walk away from that path either. My Christian belief has helped me avoid doing some wrong things I would otherwise have probably done.
[Do you] take part in the rituals of that faith?Rarely. I go to church maybe a couple of times per year. But when I do I greatly enjoy it, so, come to think of it, I should be going more often.
77. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88161 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 2:19 am
Dr Benway (post 181 or #87290):
Correct: according to my worldview the wave property of light is part of science's modeling of phenomenal reality. Contrasted to that, according to Russell's worldview the wave property of light is part of science's modeling of objective reality. But both Russell (as evidenced by his quote above) and I affirm the distinction between phenomenal and objective reality....but let me point out that even famous naturalist philosopher Bertrand Russell taught that it's important not to conflate them. In his "The Problems of Philosophy" (page 29 of the Oxford University Press paperback edition) he wrote: "When it is said that light is waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of our sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses".Just to clarify: the wave property of light we observe with our instruments is, according to you, also phenomenal.
78. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88155 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 2:01 am
Tommcc (post 172 or #87270):
Isn't atheism simply a rejection of theism and supernatural forces, as an explaination of the existance of the universe? This being the case, we can proceed to explain the power of reason in evolutionary terms ( i will leave that to mr RD).Noted theist philosopher Alvin Plantinga in his paper "An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" has forcefully argued that if both naturalism and the theory of natural evolution were true than we would not possess reason. I have explained his idea in this post where you can find some links to outside sources too. I have commented with more detail here. There's an entire book about Plantinga's argument: "Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" edited by James K. Beilby.
79. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #88147 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 15, 2007 at 12:20 am
Dr Benway (post 171 or #87266):
Dianelos alone cannot determine what is right and what is wrong.If ethics were not objective then it would not be possible anyway to *determine* what is right and what is wrong, precisely because there would be no grounds on which to make such a determination. You apparently think that in an atheist reality discussing with others offers or can substitute such a ground, but I think this does not work in practice, for various reasons: 1) When I have the power I need not discuss with other people before acting in ways that affect them, and in an atheist reality the ethical precept that one should discuss with other people when one's actions affect them is groundless in the first place, 2) In many cases my actions affect things that cannot discuss anything with me, say animals or even inanimate matter, and the idea that I should discuss with other people even those actions of mine that do not directly affect them is even more tenuous in an atheistic reality. 3) In those cases where an agreement is reached through discussion, the ethical precept that one should keep an agreement even when to break it is to one's advantage is, again, groundless – so agreements would not be kept anyway.
It seems you are under the impression that a theistic understanding of reality would move people towards ethical dogmatism and away from discussing ethics with each other. But this is true only for Biblical literalism and then in only those cases where Biblical literalism is actually believed and not just announced which is most often the case. But, once again, to conflate theism with Biblical literalism is an obvious and gross strawman. In fact and on the contrary, a theistic understanding of reality motivates people to discuss with each other about ethics. Why? First of all, because by entailing that ethics is objective as it describes God's character, theism offers a conceptual ground that makes thinking and discussing about ethics intelligible. And most importantly because according to theism we are all made in the image of God so the most direct way to discover what is right is to realize how that image of God within us is. And for doing that it's an excellent idea to discuss with people because everybody (including atheists) are made in the image of God so their opinion about innate ethics counts as much as mine. Perhaps you don't realize how theism increases the respect one has for other people. You know of Christ's new commandment (and actually new *direction* is the better translation of the original "entoli" – see John 13:34 in http://www.scripture4all.org/OnlineInterlinear/NTpdf/joh13.pdf ) or of his Sermon on the Mount where he teaches us to love even our enemies because God loves everybody and we should try to become as perfect as God is, see Matthew 5:43-48. According to theism every time you embrace a fellow human being you are actually embracing a spark of God, a being greatly loved by God and made in God's very image. Think of it: theism makes every single human being a receptacle of divine grace.
Now compare this to atheism's understanding. Where exactly is the logic that compels an atheist to discuss with other people? Imagine that George W Bush and his entire cabinet were all atheists, and that they are considering the response to the 9/11 attack. Do you really think anyone would actually come close to suggesting they discussed the matter with the Taliban? As Hitchens puts it in his debate with McGrath: if somebody is killing your friends and threatening to kill you the right response is not the bizarre Christian idea of loving your enemies and of not returning evil, but rather to go out and destroy them. Enemies who do such things are not even worth to be considered humans, Hitchens says. You may find Hitchens distasteful but I fail to see where his ethical stance violates the atheistic worldview (whereas George W Bush's ethical stance does violate the Christian worldview). It seems to me, Dr Benway, that while the moral Zeitgeist for the last thousands of years has been slowly catching up with theistic ethics, atheist logic would drive it back to pre Old Testament ethics of "two eyes for one eye". I mean, why not? If atheism is true why exactly should one not exact two eyes for an eye, if doing so helps destroy our enemies and win ourselves better security? In general: in an atheist reality why should we care about the means if they help us reach the goal we want?
Now I can imagine that the typical atheist reading what I write above would not recognize themselves in it and might well feel irritated by it. But the fact that atheists do not really let atheist logic dominate their ethical reasoning is one more consequence of the fact that we are all built in the image of God and have therefore an innate sense of ethics. The presence of God inside of us is so strong that it dominates the ethical reasoning even of most atheists who know all about the sociobiological explanation of ethical beliefs (see for example what Dawkins writes in his very interesting "Atheists for Jesus" article). Elsewhere Dawkins says that there is a place we all get our morality from but insists that place is not the Bible – and I agree with him on both counts. The place we get our morality from is the image of God within us. The Kingdom of God we reach if we follow his path is within us – says Jesus in the Gospels. And it is by looking within us and considering the whole of our experience as human beings that one can realize the presence of God and understand the meaning of theism.
80. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87996 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 14, 2007 at 3:56 am
Epeeist (post 266 or #87987):
There must be something desperate wrong in how I understand your comment here. Surely you are not saying that the proposition "2+2=4" does not predict that if I put two beans and two beans together and count the result I will get four :-)The proposition "2+2=4" predicts that if I put two beans and two beans together and count the result I will get four.I will get through the rest later. However this is desperately wrong.
81. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87988 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 14, 2007 at 2:45 am
Goldy,
I am a Greek Greek, even though I was born in Brazil and have spent most of my life in various countries outside of Greece. But for the last 5 years I live here in Volos where I hope to spend the rest of my days with my wife and daughter.
82. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87981 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 14, 2007 at 1:29 am
Epeeist (post 126 or #86866):
could you also tell us what you mean by "truth"?So here are my thoughts about what "truth" means. First of all "truth" is a property of propositions, indeed to claim proposition "P" is identical to claiming "P is true". So here is my definition of truth:
All meaningful propositions make predictions that can be evaluated in one's own personal experience, at least in principle. The meaning of claiming a proposition is true is of betting that the predictions it makes are more likely to obtain than not.
Now the first statement above may seem questionable, so let's use some examples to get the general sense of it: The proposition "today is Wednesday" predicts that if I now ask somebody what day of the week it is they will answer "Wednesday", or that if I check my computer it will display the same. The proposition "tomorrow it will rain" predicts that if tomorrow I leave home without an umbrella I will get wet. The proposition Ms B is a good doctor predicts that if I use her services I'll get better results than if I use the services of the average doctor. The proposition "2+2=4" predicts that if I put two beans and two beans together and count the result I will get four. The proposition "there are an infinite number of primes" predicts that no matter what number you give me I will be able to compute a primer number larger than that. Indeed all mathematical propositions X, no matter how abstract, at the very least predict what I will experience if I push symbols on paper following particular rules. Ethical propositions "you should do X" mean that it pays to do X, i.e. that if you do X you will ultimately not regret it but be happy with your decision. Any scientific proposition X (say: X="the natural evolution of the species happened") predicts that those whose model of the physical phenomena we experience incorporates X will be able to make better predictions about physical phenomena than those who don't. The proposition "God exists" predicts, among many other things, that you will continue experiencing after death. The meaning of the definition of truth I claimed above it that if you adopt that definition you'll find that you will be able to think or to discuss about true propositions more efficiently.
A few comments:
1. The meaning of a proposition covers *all* predictions of that proposition. So, for example, "God exists" not only predicts that we shall survive death, but also predicts all that is predicted by my beliefs related to God, including the propositions "God is a person", "God is perfect in all respects", "God has created us and designed our experiential environment", "ethics is objective because it objectively describes the character of God" etc. For example "God is a person" predicts that it is possible that I shall one day dialogue with God as I do with any other person, maybe ask God about His/er motivations for having done some things, etc. "God is perfect in all respects" predicts that if I knew all relevant factors I would never resent any action by God, and indeed would never be able to suggest a better course of action. And so on.
2. The meaning of a proposition is contingent on the person who makes that proposition. So for a fundamentalist Christian the proposition "God exists" may predict that if before dying they do not believe in a particular set of dogmas they will experience eternal suffering in hell. But that's not my meaning of the same proposition.
3. The meaning of a proposition evolves with time. So, for example, what scientists as a group meant by the proposition "electrons exist" in 1900 is different than what they mean today, simply because the generally accepted predictions entailed in that proposition has changed since then.
4. The truth value of a proposition can be relative in the sense that instead of claiming "P is true" I can also claim "P is true with probability 0.8" meaning that I am willing to bet 4:1 (or better) that the prediction of P will obtain. Similarly if I say "I am absolutely certain that P is true, i.e. P is true with probability 1" it means that I am willing to bet everything I have against one penny.
Finally, let's take a step back and appraise the above definition of truth. I think it has two clear advantages: 1) It is simple. 2) It forces people to explain in a non-abstract way what they mean when the say something; particularly philosophers sometimes seem to get themselves lost in word games, and this definition would help bring philosophical discourse back to earth. By the way, the above definition makes an implicit assumption: that we who discuss about the truth of propositions share an experiential environment which is sufficiently similar for that definition to work. But this is surely a very reasonable assumption to make: all reasonable people believe that we are all conscious beings, sharing the same human condition, experiencing the same physical environment (i.e. this physical universe around us and possessing a similar physical body), experiencing things like pain, joy, love, beauty etc in basically the same manner, etc.[1]
But the key question is: does this definition work for all propositions? Do all meaningful propositions make predictions? Well, I think they must for the following reason: Suppose a proposition does not make any prediction that can affect my experience, if only very indirectly, if only in principle. Then, clearly, I don't have any reason whatsoever to care about whether this proposition is true. But if there is no reason to care about the truth of a proposition, then this proposition is for all practical purposes devoid of meaning for me – clearly there are better things to do than to think about propositions that cannot affect me in any way whatsoever. Take, for example, the proposition: "There is an invisible and insubstantial dragon living in my garage". Whether true or false it makes no difference whatsoever in my current or future experience, and hence is meaningless. (Anyway, if you can suggest a proposition that is clearly meaningful but does not make any prediction then please do so.)
It is not always easy to state the predictions (or at least one prediction) of the propositions one claims. Here are some tough cases of propositions I myself have claimed: "Some ethical precepts are objective", "The physical universe does not objectively exist". But the clear implication of the definition of truth I suggest here is this: If one cannot explain what a proposition one claims predicts then one has no business claiming it when discussing with other people. So if I claim proposition P but am unable to explain what it predicts then you have the right to respond: first find out what P predicts and then come back to claim that P is true.
[1] But one should be careful not to think this assumption holds absolutely. Very clearly we do not all experience life in exactly the same way. So for example if you don't speak Greek you will experience the sounds of spoken Greek very differently from how I experience them. People who study music experience listening to the same sounds of music differently than the rest of us. Physicists experience looking at the equations of general relativity very differently than non-physicists. In general, understanding has the power to transform one's experiences in the corresponding part of life. And as God is the explanation of the whole of our experience of life, the understanding of God can transform the whole of one's experience. Perhaps there are people (e.g. the mystics) whose understanding of God is so deep and therefore their experience of life is transformed so much that the assumption of my theory of truth we are discussing here breaks down. In other words it may be the case that some peoples' experience of life is transformed so much by their understanding of God that it becomes difficult or even impossible to communicate with them about truth (i.e. to understand what they mean by the propositions they claim), for the simple reason that their and our experience of life has grown too far apart.
83. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87866 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 12:24 pm
Bonzai (post 166 or #87211):
What the hell does it mean by "God is the whole of reality"?It means that the large scale structure of reality is a person, a conscious being. I think it's reasonable to call that person "God" because that person has many of the properties of God as described by traditional monotheism: Except being a person, God is also perfectly good, the creator of us and the designer of our experiential environment. (Which does not imply that every bit of our experiential environment is caused by God, as some theists believe: A significant part is caused by our fellow human beings, and another significant part is caused by chance.)
If that is the case why don't we just talk about "the whole of reality" instead and how does it follow that "the whole of reality" has a personal interest in us?Good persons have a personal interest in other persons, especially in their own children :-)
84. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87862 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 12:13 pm
Steve99 (post 163 or #87203):
I don't know how you mean that. Surely you are not suggesting that we must honestly ask somebody in need whether what they prefer, us to help them or to torture them, before deciding what's ethically best? Or that we must honestly discuss with other people whether to help people in need or to torture people in need is the right thing to do?You, on the contrary, believe that it's only a matter of subjective opinion to believe that it's better to help somebody in need instead of torturing them.No, I don't believe that. I believe that there is something intermediate between subjective and absolutely objective. It is called honesty. It means we just don't know, and we have to work together to find out what is the best way forward. You need more honesty.
Incidentally there are no graduations between "subjective" and "objective". Perhaps you interpreting these concepts to refer to how confident one is about something one believes. But that's not what subjective and objective mean. "Subjective" characterizes those propositions that refer only to peoples' opinion. "Objective" characterizes those propositions that refer to something that is independently of peoples' opinion. There is not middle ground between them. But of course objective propositions can be false. For example "mount Olympus is the highest mountain on Earth" is both an objective and a false proposition.
I choose the former. Now suppose that God says "to use violence against other people is wrong in all cases" and I say "to use violence against other people is not wrong in all cases". These are both objective ethical propositions, because all ethical propositions refer to how objective reality (and hence God) actually is. The difference of course is that people cannot be certain about how God objectively is, so the ethical precepts they claim may be wrong. God, on the contrary, doesn't express an opinion but simply states how S/He is and therefore is always right. It's a simple idea; please let me know if don't explain it well.Yes, but God is not just any conscious person that is part of reality; God is the whole of reality, and reality is what represents what is objective independently from your or mine opinion.
That doesn't work. A person is subjective, and has subjective opinions. You can either choose a Personal God, or you can choose a Spinozan God, who is nothing more than the instantiation of the laws of the universe. If you choose the former, then God's opinions are subjective, and subject to debate. If you choose the latter, then God has no opinion, and you have to find some other justification for 'objective ethics'. Which do you choose?
85. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87852 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 11:36 am
Goldy (post 161 or #87201):
Of course God does not actually want these things. I think what you are asking is rather this: If God has designed life as we experience it (what philosophers call "the phenomenal world") then why did God allow for suffering and illness and bad people in it? I think the correct answer is this: Because God designed life as we experience in order to optimize the ethical challenges in it. Or, in other words, in order to give us the kind of experience that is the best for us to grow in virtue.God is the whole of reality, and reality is what represents what is objective independently from your or mine opinion. But it's interesting you brought this up. God is both a person and the whole of reality. It sometimes seems to me that the Western monotheistic religions put more emphasis on the former, and the Eastern non-theistic religions more emphasis on the latter.If God is the whole of reality, then why the differences? Why does God want discord and war? Fighting, death, maiming, etc?
86. Onward Christian teachers?
Comment #87833 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 10:00 am
I agree with the general idea of Grayling's last paragraph but would like to point out something I find incongruent in it: On the one hand he suggests that religions should be taught at school as sociological and historical phenomena and on the other hand he suggests that children should make up their own minds about the claims made by each. But sociological and historical phenomena do not make claims; such phenomena are facts of human history. Religions make ontological claims (i.e. claims about how reality fundamentally is) as does atheism, but in order to understand these claims they should be taught as ontological theories. I full heartedly agree then that the ontological claims of both atheism and of the various major religions should be taught at school when children have the sufficient maturity to be able to think critically about them, and that they should be left alone to make their own choices. At the very least the formal teaching of the most important ontological ideas would help people avoid a naive understanding of the issues, and also help people move away from any kind of extremism.
87. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87827 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 9:23 am
Dr Benway (post 158 or #87181):
I've been thinking about your suggestion, and I think I like it very much. Let me elaborate. I think what you are saying is this:It's kind of difficult to pretend that [we are all talking about the phenomenal world]. After all when Dawkins in TGD claims that there is no God he is not making a claim about phenomenal reality, but about reality...It's as easy as falling off an idealistic horse, which, strangely, is just as easy as falling off a materialistic horse. Go on, give it a go for one week. A little experiment in mental flexibility won't kill ya.
Look, it's true that the distinction between objective and phenomenal reality is a traditional one in philosophy, but what sense does this distinction really make pragmatically speaking? The reality we experience is, by definition, the phenomenal one. We live in phenomenal reality. All we shall ever experience is phenomenal reality; even if theists are right and there is an afterlife, it will be a phenomenal afterlife (pun not intended :-) Anything we can possibly know or discuss about must be based on our common phenomenal experiences, and the usefulness of any knowledge we may possibly gain is circumscribed by how our actions guided by that knowledge will affect our shared phenomenal world. So whether objective reality actually exists or not is for all practical purposes irrelevant, as we only have access and are only influenced by the phenomenal world.
Now, if that's what you're saying, let me explain why I like it. First of all it makes eminent sense. Secondly, it exactly reflects what idealism says: The phenomenal world is the world of conscious experience we all share, and according to idealism that's all there is to reality. Does this mean that according to idealism objective reality does not exist? Not at all. Idealism rather says that objective reality, i.e. reality that is independent of us, is phenomenal reality in all its extension. (Obviously there is much phenomenal reality beyond what each one of us directly experiences; indeed we do not directly experience each other's phenomenal world.)
So why have I been making so much about the distinction between objective and phenomenal reality and have been criticizing people for conflating them? The meta-explanation for that is this: The way we think or speak is contingent on the model of reality we use. The model of reality that scientific naturalists use is one where the distinction between objective and phenomenal reality not only is present but is fundamental. Scientific realists believe that objective reality is a physical/mechanical universe which somehow produces our phenomenal experience of that universe as well as of all the subjective aspects of our experiential life. So in order to show why that model of reality is full of holes and paradoxes I must use the respective objective/phenomenal kind of language, indeed the naturalistic kind of language. You can't discuss a particular ontological worldview without using its language. So far so good. Now in order to facilitate communication (speaking about fundamental reality is difficult as it is) I kind of adopted this kind of language when speaking about my own worldview also. In other words what I have been saying here is this: Look, you scientific naturalists believe that there is a physical/mechanical reality out there that produces our experience of life. First of all here are the problems that this model of reality entails. Secondly consider that even though your model tries to directly reflect scientific knowledge it is in fact not the only model that is compatible with science. Other models of reality are equally compatible with current or future scientific knowledge, for example the model that objective reality is the Matrix like we saw in the movie, or that objective reality is a universe we know nothing about in which a computer simulates the universe present in the phenomenal world we experience, or that objective reality is a transcendental God who (similarly to that computer) directly produces the phenomenal world we experience. What I did not say is that according to the latter model objective reality is identical to the phenomenal world, and so we need not distinguish between the two anymore. So, according to idealism, we do have direct access to objective reality after all, even though we can only experience a small part of it right now. Even though idealism does not entail theism, my thesis is that the small part of reality we do experience in this life is sufficiently complex to allow us to deduce the large structure of all reality, which it turns out is a perfectly good person. And that's idealistic theism, or maybe more precisely, an panentheistic version of idealistic theism. I know such a model of reality is difficult to visualize, but I find it works beautifully well.
88. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87803 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 7:37 am
Phasmagigas (post 153 or #87167):
Indeed I find it probable that modern atheism will play a positive role by helping bring religion's many flaws to the surface which will force religious people to deal with them and clean up their house as it wereim not sure that would happen
imagine a deist god unambiguously made its prescence known to the whole planet (sky turned green, amputees all healed simultaneosly and all your old battered toys in the closet were suddenly brand spanking new, better than anything on ebay) , it says 'the atheists are wrong, i am here and set the universe in motion, however the creationists are wrong too, I didnt even know if life would start i just set the constants and sat back for 15 billion of your years and watched things unfurl, im very happy with my experiment and I made some wonderful creatures but alas humans are not special, they do think more than most other creatures so i felt it was time to reveal all as arguments over me cause much misery'
anyway you get the idea. the atheists would most likey say 'incredible, tell us what we dont know' (thats what i'd say), the creationists would say 'nonsense, you are not our god, or this is a trick, we did not come from monkeys.......wheres our bibles'.
Interesting idea.
We are pattern searching and pattern believing beasts, so I am not sure how people would react if something that dramatic took place in the phenomenal world. Some might react as you say. But some atheists might reason that the best explanation to fit their experience is that some extraterrestrial and far more advanced civilization is playing games with us. I try to think how I would react; I think (or at least wish) I would react in this latter way too.
As a theist I believe that we all shall experience some such significant shift in our experience when we die. But, who knows, maybe that shift will not be that radical. As an idealistic theist I also believe that we shall not survive death in any bodily sense, so it's possible that after death not only phenomenal reality will change but also our cognitive capacity. So even if there were a way to read somewhere what we would experience after death we are now probably not cognitively equipped to understand how it will be like in the afterlife.
Anyway, that's not what I meant above. I simply meant that the current loud and in-your-face new atheism phenomenon will pressure organized theism deal with the problems it clearly has. As Lennox said in his debate with Dawkins, many of new atheism's criticisms of religion are correct.
89. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87750 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 3:10 am
Steve99 (post 152 or #87165):
The idea that one needs evidence for all claims is wrong, and it's easy to show why: Suppose you claim A and I ask for your evidence, so you present B, for which I also ask for your evidence, and so on. Either you will end up using a circular argument, i.e. giving evidence E for claim C, but then using C as evidence for E, which is clearly irrational. Or else you'll arrive at some proposition Z for which no more evidence can be given and which must be accepted as self-evident. (Examples of widely accepted self-evident beliefs include "objective reality exists", "the world did not start 5 minutes ago", "the inductive method is correct". In a parallel discussion I am claiming that you can't even present evidence that the moon objectively exists unless you accept as self-evident that the physical universe objectively exists. ) So the evidentialism you are propounding is wrong because it either leads to circularity or else is self-negating. I know that it is common for atheists to think that they don't believe in anything without evidence, but this is an obvious self-delusion.Now my claim is that the existence of God is the better explanation for the whole of our experience of life, and therefore I predict that humanity as a whole will move towards that realization in the future.But that is the problem, isn't it? You can claim all you like, but we really do need evidence for claims. Simply stating the same thing again and again, no matter how sincerely you believe it achieves nothing.
What I am propounding and what I think is accepted by most philosophers as a valid epistemological principle is "inference to the best explanation" (which some people call "abductive reasoning"). In other words I accept that explanation E is the correct explanation for X when I judge that E is a better explanation than any other explanation E1, E2, etc. that have been put forward. And part of my argument is that idealistic theism is a better explanation than scientific realism for the whole of my experience of life. Indeed the class of transcendental arguments that started this thread is but one reason for that.
All the claims you have made in attempting to show that the existence of God is a better explanation have been refuted - if not to your satisfaction, then at least to the satisfaction of most people here.That's perfectly OK. One must reason to one's own satisfaction and not to other peoples' satisfaction. It's a fact that the kind of scientific naturalism that Dawkins expounds is full of growing holes and paradoxes (which are holes and paradoxes of that particular paradigm of reality and not of science I hasten to add once more). Not to mention scientific naturalism fails to account for much of what we mean when we speak of our experience of life. But if you nevertheless judge that scientific naturalism is a better explanation for our experience of life than idealistic theism – then be my guest. It's really quite OK with me.
You have tried to use personal opinions about absurdity and obviousness as justifications for truth.I have used my personal judgment about absurdity and obviousness as part of my justification for what I believe is true, yes. I suppose you do the same when you reject solipsism. And all people use fix their set of self-evident beliefs, on which the rest of their belief system rests, by using their own sense about absurdity and obviousness – but apparently many are not aware of that. Now of course our self-evident beliefs should not be dogmatic, and we should be willing to discard some of them if good reason is forthcoming, but unless or until that happens the only justification we can give for the set of self-evident beliefs we do currently hold is our sense of absurdity and obviousness.
You have tried to use the existence of consciousness as evidence for theism, even though it has been shown that even some of the most prominent dualists don't accept that viewI agree with you that dualism is a better explanation than scientific naturalism. It does avoid some of the worse problems of scientific naturalism, and, I am happy to point out, comes a step closer towards idealism.
I think we have an urgent problem, which means we can't wait. This is religious people actually undertaking immoral behaviour right now, and threatening worse. We have riots and assaults because of cartoons. We have support for mutilation of young girls because of religious belief. We have people dying of AIDS because a major world religion proclaims condoms immoral.Not to mention overpopulation because of the same reason. I agree with everything you write above. Religion is indeed being misused. And not only religion, by the way. Science too is being misused, say for the production of weapons of mass destruction, or for the destruction of the environment.
90. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87731 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 1:49 am
Epeeist (post 151 or #87164):
I always found that idea to be a complete truism. After all your example is exactly equivalent to The proposition 'rabbits eat grass' is true if and only it's true that rabbits eat grass. But this does not explain what we mean by "truth".Let me think a little how to put in writing what I think about this important issue. Meanwhile, if you wish, it would be interesting if you explained what you mean by "truth".Oh, I think to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true just about covers it. [snip] For example 'Rabbits eat grass' is true iff rabbits eat grass.
Being a pragmatical person I think one must explain how one checks for the truth value of a proposition, i.e. define truth epistemologically. For example some believe that one checks the truth value of a mathematical proposition by checking the respective mathematical proof, but this does not work because within the context of formal mathematics a mathematical proposition is just a string of characters that can be produced following some production rules; for example within the context of formal mathematics by "2+2=4" we only mean that that string can indeed be produced following a particular set of rules. But that's not what people mean when they say "2+2=4" and indeed people knew that this mathematical proposition is true long before formal mathematics. In fact one can easily device a formal system that proves "2+2=2" but this would not make that proposition (in the sense people understand it) true. So the very step for explaining what truth means, is to explain what the meaning of a proposition is.
I am still thinking about his issue; please give me a little more time.
91. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #87725 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 13, 2007 at 1:26 am
Steve99 (post 148 or #87132):
Much (OK, most) of what Dianelos writes are like those math puzzles that after a long series of equations, show that 1 = 2 or something similar. It all looks so convincing, but you just know that somewhere in there is a division by zero carefully hidden - a logical mistake.:-) W