51. Atheism's Wrong Turn

Comment #95497 by smithyboy on December 8, 2007 at 12:51 pm

Well said Northern Bright. I would add that, contrary to what Skipjack says, it seems likely that the first human settlements came before religion, so it is possible to have society without religion. That said, religion does seem to have been the 'glue' of many societies. Nevertheless Skipjack, we have other and better glues we can use now, and since religion has a number of detrimental effects, why not replace it if we can?

52. The Pagan Christ

Comment #95482 by smithyboy on December 8, 2007 at 12:33 pm

ADH
Your evidence for the resurrection:

A. 'evidence to do with the failure of the many enemies of the, at that point embryonic, Christian faith to produce a body'.

I've underlined just 2 assumptions (there are more), both of which are highly problematic.

[Edit - woops! Forgot that underlining doesn't carry over from Word to HTML. Underlined were 'the failure', and 'the many enemies']

There is another unspoken assumption, which is even more problematic, namely that the narrative you have relied on from the gospels is indeed reliable. You are making an historical argument, so you have to be able to assert to a high degree of probability (particularly bearing in mind what you are trying to prove) that the 'facts' you are asserting are indeed fact. So:

1. Many enemies: if we accept the idea (which is not certain, but I agree probable) that before his death Jesus and his followers were seen by the religious leaders in the region as something of a threat, it by no means follows that in the days following his death they saw him as a threat. It is much more likely that the authorities believed his execution had dealt with the problem and it did not return to their consciousness until much later when the movement began to gain significant numbers.
2. Failure to produce a body: there is no evidence of this one way or the other. You assume that if somebody had produced a body the movement would have lost impetus. But you cannot know this. They didn't have TV or any kind of mass media in those days to display a body, and so on and so on. In any case, there are plenty of examples of movements which succeed 'despite the evidence'.

B. 'Post-mortem appearances': as 'supposed events' these are of the same order as the resurrection itself and don't provide evidence for it. You might say there is some evidence that people believed they saw him after his death, but then we must ask how good that evidence is and what it might mean.

C. 'Enormous change over the disciples': we simply don't know this, unless you are arguing that (judged historically, as opposed to taken on faith) the Gospels and the Book of Acts provide factual evidence. But of course if the Gospels and Acts do provide factual evidence then you don't need to make the argument you have made because they assert the resurrection as fact. In fact, we only know for sure that a religious movement did come into being, and we know little or nothing about the inner psychology of people in the days after Jesus's death.

53. The Pagan Christ

Comment #95395 by smithyboy on December 8, 2007 at 9:15 am

Wonderist
I agree that Paul didn't speak of Jesus much in historical terms, and also that he saw him more as a spiritual being than a normal human. The point I was making though was that, whatever else he believed, he definitely did believe a man called Jesus had lived and died. Indeed, arguably Jesus's death (and subsequent resurrection) is Paul's central motif. I did not say that this therefore proves that Jesus was a historical person. I said that Paul's belief is something that needs to be explained and perhaps the most likely explanation is that Jesus was indeed a historical person. And I referred to Paul because his are the earliest writings we have and therefore need to be accounted for when we are doing history. Similarly, I referred to the Gospels because they are evidence of other people at an early stage also (and separately from Paul) believing Jesus existed in history. I did not say, as you imply, that the Gospels provide direct contemporary evidence.

Elise97
Your reconstruction, ie Christians creating a myth first and then adding a 'back story' of a historical man later is one possible version of history. But in my view it doesn't make as good sense of all the evidence as a version which starts with Jesus as a real human and goes on to show how the mythological aspects got added on in the subsequent years. It is simply a historical question though as to which is more probable, and according to both versions the Christianity which came into being was based on myth.

54. The Pagan Christ

Comment #95240 by smithyboy on December 7, 2007 at 4:52 pm

Sara
OK. I'll do my best. What I probably should have said is its late and I'm not feeling at my brightest, rather than it would take a lot of space. Anyway, here goes (but I will be brief as I can). The question as I would frame it is, Why is it more likely than not that a man who Christians refer to as Jesus did exist as a historical person?

You can name certain things that it is pretty uncontroversial did exist historically. Perhaps the most important of these are people who themselves believed that Jesus existed in history. Perhaps the earliest first hand evidence we have of such a person is the writings of Paul. The earliest of his writings may have been from around AD50, so perhaps around 20 or so years after Jesus died (if indeed he existed in the first place). In order to have become as influential as he was by then, he must have been around for quite a while, and indeed the Book of Acts indicates he joined the movement soon after Jesus's death. While Paul's ideas might have been rather flaky, he certainly believed Jesus had lived and died. He doesn't claim to have met Jesus before his death, but he does seem to have knowledge of and met people who had. It seems the most simple and straightforward explanation of this, though obviously not the only one, is that Jesus did indeed exist.

Then there is other evidence which arises separately from Paul. For example, careful comparison of the Gospels of Luke, Matthew and Mark strongly suggests they were based on an underlying collection of sayings of Jesus, which was lost but is referred to as Q. Mark was probably written around AD60. So the collection of sayings, Q, was probably circulating quite some time prior to that. There is no evidence Paul knew of Q (he doesn't 'quote' Jesus), so there was probably quite a separate bunch of believers with a different tradition, but who nevertheless had as a central core to their belief the idea that a man called Jesus existed and handed down various sayings. Then you have the Gospels of Luke, Matthew, Mark and John. They are later (ranging from Mark at AD60 to John perhaps after AD100), but they nevertheless make the case that Jesus was a historical person.

I suppose what I am saying is that the most likely explanation of the above is that there was a historical Jesus. On the other hand, I'm not aware of any positive evidence to say he did not exist. Nor am I aware of any particularly plausible mechanisms whereby the above came about without him existing.

Hope that is enough for the moment Sara.

55. The Pagan Christ

Comment #95225 by smithyboy on December 7, 2007 at 4:01 pm

ADH
Yes, I think the historical case for the resurrection is bad. By that I mean that a modern historian can give an extremely plausible account of all the evidence you, a believer in the resurrection, might point to, and can conclude that the resurrection did not happen. Somebody like Tom Wright (also a modern historian – I'm not trying to cast aspersions), on the other hand, can write a plausible reconstruction of how things must have happened based on the assumption that the resurrection did happen.

Take a more recent example: one historian could give a reconstruction of the OJ Simpson killing on the basis that OJ did it, while another could make a reconstruction on the basis that he didn't. I suspect that the former would be more plausible. And I suspect that the latter would just have more and more elaborate twists etc. Done well though, it might seem plausible, particularly if you are already predisposed to trust OJ.

What I read Tom Wright as doing is starting with various assumptions (including that the resurrection happened) and concluding that you can tell a plausible story around it. In my view, this is not the same thing as making a historical case 'for the resurrection'. 'Who Moved the Stone?' by contrast, does make a historical case for it, and in doing so shows how weak that case is.

And the point is that starting with the assumption of the resurrection is unwarranted, from a historical point of view. It is of the same order as writing a history of Mormonism based on the assumption that god really did give Joseph Smith the golden spectacles (or whatever it was, I can't quite remember now) – and I expect, by the way, that at least one Mormon historian will have done this.

You didn't mention the scientific arguments against the resurrection, so I'm assuming you accept that science says it couldn't have happened, but god did it any way.

On the philosophical arguments, well there are many. David Hume's view that something as extraordinary as this needs extraordinary support before we believe it seems pretty telling to me. But I was thinking also of the 'internal' difficulties with the resurrection that make it absurd. The resurrection was of a body. So where did that body go? It isn't in the universe, I presume (or do you envisage Jesus residing on some planet somewhere?), but it can't be 'outside' of the universe, since it is made of the very stuff of the universe, etc etc.

56. The Pagan Christ

Comment #95203 by smithyboy on December 7, 2007 at 2:58 pm

On the matter of the historical existence of Jesus as a human being, I would say the evidence is strong. I have a degree in biblical studies and a PhD, so I was pretty well immersed in the scholarship about this for quite a time. (I am an atheist now, just to declare my interest.) The consensus of historians is that he did exist (though there are dissenters, obviously). I could set out the main evidence in support, but it would take a fair bit of space. Suffice it to say that there are certain definite early historical happenings, such as a number of 'followers' and a number of writings, which it is unlikely would have come about (and in the way they did and as early as they did) if there was not a historical Jesus.

ADH,
You take the sort of thought through position I was attracted to when I was a Christian. But it does, nevertheless, amount to special pleading in the crucial places. The 'internal coherence of Jesus's words' is pretty much in the eye of the beholder and depends in any case on a presupposition that the Bible is revelation rather than a historical accident. The Jesus characterised in John's Gospel may well be internally coherent within that writing, but he has a different character from the Jesus of Mark, Matthew and Luke, for example, and different again from the gospels which didn't make the cut. When it comes to his 'miracles' you have to step back from the historical arguments that you were previously prepared to discuss and just assert them. In terms of historical scholarship, the miracles he supposedly performed are almost certainly later accretions, added on as part of the upgrading of the man towards godhood. Similarly with the supposedly fulfilled prophecies (though this was more the upgrading towards messiahship than godhood). You mention the resurrection last. But this tends to be the main plank in Christian belief, in my experience. Because of course if you can believe he was resurrected you can believe all the rest. (Which point St Paul agreed with.) Unfortunately, if you look at it in the cold light of day, and despite books like 'Who Moved the Stone?', the historical case for the resurrection is bad and the scientific and philosophical arguments against it are worse.

57. Daniel Dennett Debates Dinesh D'Souza

Comment #95166 by smithyboy on December 7, 2007 at 1:29 pm

Great discussion.

Steve99:

the physical constants appear as if they were fine tuned for complexity and life. That is an uncontroversial statement.

Accepted.

The question for me, not being a scientist, was whether it is a valid move (or perhaps compelling would be a better word) to go from a description of how something may 'appear' to a logical (and indeed philosophical) argument, particularly when the 'appearance' is based on probabilities. Many posts ago on this thread I gave the example of a woman who dreams of her sister one night and the next day she gets a phone call from her. Rightly or wrongly, she thinks it highly improbable that this happened by chance, so she ascribes the dream to something supernatural. My point was that it really does 'appear' to her that there was a supernatural cause. Similarly, it really does appear to we humans, as you say, as if the physical constants were fine tuned. But it doesn't necessarily follow that an argument based on this appearance is valid. Reading through your posts, I'm still not sure whether you are saying that the argument is valid or just that the problem (ie why the constants are what they are) is a proper one for investigation (which I think everybody accepts). In Post 24 you did seem to say that the argument has validity; albeit you went on to say that the conclusion to the argument suggested by some – that god exists – is itself not acceptable because it implies something yet more improbable.

For myself, I still think there are two reasonable approaches. First, the scientific one, which is to investigate why the constants are what they are. Second, the philosophical one, which is to examine the validity or otherwise of arguments based on the 'appearance of things'. This second approach can surely include criticism of how people are using assertions about probability in their philosophical or theological arguments. Saying this, I am certainly not saying, by the way that scientists can't (indeed they must) use probability in their science. But when a scientist shifts from science to a statement like 'extreme probability means the physical constants appear as if they were fine tuned for complexity and life', it seems to me they have shifted from science to philosophy.

58. Daniel Dennett Debates Dinesh D'Souza

Comment #94817 by smithyboy on December 6, 2007 at 4:48 pm

Steve99, on fine-tuning:

You are saying that we shouldn't dismiss the fine-tuning argument, but then describe it as a real problem which will be answered, most likely (you think) in a non-theist manner. I accept that the reason (or reasons) why the values of the constants are what they are is a problem that we can try to solve. But this problem is not the same thing as the fine-tuning argument, which refers to the problem within its propositions. If the fine-tuning argument can't be dismissed, which you suggest may be the case, then it has validity and therefore its conclusion has validity, viz there is (or very probably is) a fine-tuner. I think that is why Riley, and myself much earlier in the thread, tried to suggest that the argument itself may not be valid. It's perhaps just semantics, and we appear actually to be heading to the same goal but from different directions, but surely it is proper for us to criticise the form of the argument itself, while accepting there is a problem to be solved.

Getting speculative now: Taking the argument itself, it asserts that it is 'extremely improbable' that the constants should be what they are. But why should such a statement mean anything more than what it says in itself, ie that the particular values are improbable? It is extremely improbable that the H20 molecules in a glass of water at a particular instant in time be configured as they are, but that improbability does not tell us anything metaphysical as it were. If they all were at one instant to move to the centre of the glass, say, and leave the edges dry, that would have the same 'extreme improbability' as any other configuration. So if it were to happen could you say that it 'meant' anything or indeed proved anything, other than that something improbable had happened?

59. Banishing the Green-Eyed Monster

Comment #94012 by smithyboy on December 4, 2007 at 3:22 pm

I've felt a number of different ways about this article: first reaction was that the overall suggestion was disturbing and perhaps not too well reasoned, then that I should nevertheless take seriously the idea that the morals in correction perhaps aren't 'correct', then what was RD's underlying motivation in writing it? etc etc. I'm still thinking about all that. But I do think it is important to retain a sense of perspective. RD should be free to write about what he wants and how he wants, presumably subject to a number of constraints.

I suppose what those constraints are is what much of this debate has been about. Perhaps we would all agree that he shouldn't write something racist, for example. But in my view we should avoid trying to impose any sort of constraint that is based on particular atheist claims on him. Christians might make claims on their leaders and muslims on theirs, but unless and until RD tries to set up a group defined by its atheism and claims to be its leader and people decide to join such a group, I don't think they should tell him what he should or shouldn't write. Of course, by the same token, they should be free to disagree with his arguments as strongly as they wish and even say it was a tactical mistake. But (acknowledging that we might feel this way to some extent) try not to get upset that he has 'let us down'. We shouldn't elevate him to that sort of role in the first place.

60. Daniel Dennett Debates Dinesh D'Souza

Comment #92875 by smithyboy on December 1, 2007 at 4:21 pm

Steve99 and Russell Blackford
I agree that the fine-tuning argument does seem quite strong. But I tend to think that that is because it is like other after-the-fact statistical arguments. In other words, it's a bit like the woman who dreamt of her sister last night and, what do you know, her sister just phoned her! After the fact, it seems amazing to her, and surely didn't happen just by chance, so she ascribes her dream to something supernatural. Similarly, we look at the physical constants and it seems amazing that the way they are should be as they are, but I am wary of giving this 'seeming amazing' more importance that we should.

I know I haven't set this out too well, but what I am trying to get at is that I think we need to be very careful about arguments based on some form of 'it couldn't have happened by chance'. As RD and others have pointed out, we haven't evolved as beings who are able to evaluate the meaning of probability very well, and it seems to me that acquiring meaning from probability (or improbability) is precisely what the fine-tuning argument tries to do. Indeed, that is what most people did in respect of life on earth before Darwin came along, and they arrived at a Creator.

61. Why debate dogma?

Comment #92712 by smithyboy on December 1, 2007 at 9:30 am

ADH
I've heard plenty of your sort of Christian propaganda claiming that Christianity has defined and defended human personhood and preserved human dignity. I'd say myself that it has made a few contributions to that effect (though 'male heterosexual personhood and dignity' would be more accurate) but not that many, and plenty of contributions have come from elsewhere. But in any case, have you not heard of Dr Benway's world-famous Bathwater No Mo! product. Give it a try: throw out the bathwater and keep the personhood and dignity.

62. Why debate dogma?

Comment #92676 by smithyboy on December 1, 2007 at 7:27 am

Keith
No, I don't suppose many people would describe themselves as weak-minded, and I wasn't intending to imply this. What I wanted to say was that people who tend to be confident in their views and to hold strongly to them are likely simply to dig in even deeper if subjected to ridicule. On the other hand, perhaps those who are less confident will be persuaded by ridicule. But I'm less concerned with the latter in any case, because they are not the opinion-formers. Having said all that, I should say that I see nothing wrong at all with trying to expose an idea as ridiculous or even trying to show a person that they are being ridiculous. And if they are offended by this, then so be it.

63. Poll finds more Americans believe in devil than Darwin

Comment #92499 by smithyboy on November 30, 2007 at 4:14 pm

Phasmagigas
I think one reason otherwise intelligent scientists can deny evolution in favour of creationism is that they also believe in a Necker (is that the right spelling? Can't remember after a couple of beers) Cube argument. Ie they think that in theory the world can be looked at in at least two ways, neither of which from one person's own perspective can be said to be correct, since both appear equally right. They think it will look one way with faith and one way without. That I think is how they rationalise their belief in creationism to themselves. At the same time, I do think that the more they get to know about evolution the more cognitive dissonance they will feel. The discomfort from that dissonance fights against all the emotional and other reasons they have to hang onto their faith, and you would hope eventually they will give in and change their minds. But for that I suppose Dawkins et al (and us) will need to keep plugging away.

64. Why debate dogma?

Comment #92468 by smithyboy on November 30, 2007 at 2:58 pm

Sidfaiwu asks Steve99 about the value of polite debate with religious people, and others seem to be suggesting only ridicule is worthwhile. My own experience as a previously 'religious type' is that well-made reasonable arguments did have an effect on me and eventually I changed my mind and became an atheist. I spent a long time weighing up the arguments and was not swayed in any way by ridicule. Indeed I suspect ridicule might make 'strong-minded' types like me just dig in deeper. So I would encourage Steve99 in his approach. Perhaps the ridicule suggested by others helps in other ways, but I am not so sure. Perhaps it just makes the 'riduculers' feel better and the 'ridiculous' worse, and reinforces an us-versus-them mentality on both sides. If it does the latter then I am not keen because I don't see this as a war between atheists and the 'religites'; a war which the atheists need to to win. I would prefer to see us as all part of one group seeking to move toward the truth together. (Sorry if that sounds corny.)

65. This Friday: Debate between Dan Dennett and Dinesh D'Souza

Comment #91572 by smithyboy on November 28, 2007 at 3:09 pm

Dr Benway
Good summary. I still think the debates have value though. Atheists in the audience will see through D'Souza, but thoughtful Christians will be at least be given pause by Dennett and some of them may eventually 'see the light' as a result.

66. Are the 'New Atheists' avoiding the 'real arguments'?

Comment #90883 by smithyboy on November 26, 2007 at 3:11 pm

27b-6
Thanks for your comments. If you haven't got time to continue the debate, then fair enough, but I've appreciated your points.

Hopefully, if there is a second edition, Dawkins will take the chance to make corrections. In my view, that will only strengthen an already-strong argument.

You ask whether, hand on heart, I think the doctrine of original sin is 'in the same league' as some other doctrines which you say are central to Christianity. That way of putting the question presumes Christian doctrine is a collection of propositions and theories which has a centre of some sort; a centre which presumably is 'the truth' or at least approximating toward the truth. Which of course is the way that an insider such as yourself might see it. But to me the important questions (horribly abbreviated) are, say, which beliefs are most numerous and most influential. And I would say that belief in atonement from original sin is very numerous and highly influential, and so pretty central in this sense at least. Clearly there are Christians who are uncomfortable with it (though a lot of these remain within churches that propagate it) and others who openly repudiate it, but I suspect they are a minority. I do agree, though, that Dawkins would have been less open to criticism if he had not made quite such a strong claim (ie that it is 'the central doctrine').

On how it compares to the other examples you gave, I'm not sure why you put the New Testament Canon in there as a central doctrine (perhaps because it acts as a gatekeeper?). But yes, something like the resurrection is of a higher order in many Christians' minds than any particular theory of atonement. The point I would want to make is that more complicated doctrines get built from a combination of these basic 'axioms' and various philosophical assumptions, historical accidents and so on, until you get absurdities like the ones Dawkins points out.

On your own views (hope you don't mind me making some criticism), you seem prepared to reject original sin, but perhaps not the doctrine of the trinity? But it is still literally absurd, or at least illogical (three-in-one, etc). And you seem committed to Christ as both god and human. This again is contrary to the laws of logic. In this context, I don't see much validity in your discussion of omnipotence. If you are going to defend god's omnipotence by applying the laws of logic, surely they apply equally to the trinity and Christ's nature?

67. Are the 'New Atheists' avoiding the 'real arguments'?

Comment #90362 by smithyboy on November 24, 2007 at 5:06 pm

27b-6, comment # 90306:

I'm also a theology graduate (well, BA Hons in Biblical Studies, if that counts, followed by a PhD), and I agree that you can pick holes in some of the detail of Dawkins's theological arguments in The God Delusion. But I nevertheless think that his overall view is pretty fair when it comes to what a very large number of Christians believe. There is no doubt that more 'sophisticated' Christian thinkers have a great variety of belief, but there is also no doubt that they are not representative of the (Christian) man and woman in the street. Unfortunately I don't have any statistics to back me up, but I'm fairly sure that a poll in UK and in US would show the majority of Christians do believe atonement for original sin is central.

In a way, your own detailed responses on St Paul's views etc illustrate your difficulty. While I understand your points, because of my theological background, the majority of people will not, and that includes the majority of Christians. Yet it is Christianity as a belief 'of the people' that Dawkins is dealing with, not the belief of the theologians.

By the way Gordy, Hebrews is indeed anonymous, as 27b-6 says, but what is interesting is that it probably only got included in the Bible because the early church thought it was written by Paul. The church believed for a very long time that it was authored by him, and it was only relatively modern scholarship which recognised that its language and style were so different from his actual writings that it was probably by someone else.

68. The Transcendental Argument for God

Comment #89406 by smithyboy on November 20, 2007 at 3:31 pm

Dianelos, Comment #89348

In other words, I am (say) god's little toe and at the same time am no part of god. - smithyboy

Of course you are part of God, you are God's little toe as you put it. - Dianelos

You affirm the first part of the quote but don't mention the second part. The trouble is, you need both to be true and that contradicts a fundamental rule of logic, namely that something cannot both be and not be. A little toe cannot be both part of a body and not part of a body. A seed cannot be both part of a tree and not part of a tree. Before the fruit falls, it is part of the tree, and after it is not. Mystical language about the image of the whole and growing together etc don't alter this.

If you say that your view does not require that I (and you and indeed nature as a whole) be separate from god, well I can only say that 'your' language tells the lie. 'You', 'I' and 'god' are mere illusions and 'you' have nothing to say, on 'your' view, for all are one. But you do keep talking, and in doing so, you constantly affirm me as separate from you and god. May I suggest the 'logical' conclusion would be for you go the route of many other mystics before you and vow silence (written as well as verbal, if I may be so bold).

69. The Transcendental Argument for God

Comment #89054 by smithyboy on November 19, 2007 at 3:41 pm

Dianelos, comment 88921
Thanks for the clarification that 'panentheism' is quite close to what you are propounding. May I therefore request that you stop calling your worldview 'idealistic theism'. Perhaps 'something quite close to idealistic panentheism' would do it, though I admit it is not quite as snappy and does point up some of your difficulties.

The trouble with panentheism (well, one of a number of troubles) is that it literally does not make sense. It says nature is part of god, but not the whole of god, in that god is more than nature. But at the same time it requires nature to be distinct from god. In other words, I am (say) god's little toe and at the same time am no part of god. This clearly denies logic. Until you are prepared to give up a view which at its heart is illogical, I think you should stop claiming logic (and indeed reason) in any way supports your views or falsifies others' views.

In case you say you have never claimed nature is distinct from god (I don't know because I haven't trawled through all your posts), it seems to be an absolute requirement of your views that I am distinct from god: he is going to ensure I receive justice for what I do, he guarantees an 'objective reality' which I can have recourse to, I am not divine, etc etc.

70. The Transcendental Argument for God

Comment #88650 by smithyboy on November 18, 2007 at 9:53 am

Dianelos Georgoudis, in your comment 88603 you set out a logical argument summarising your view as to why scientific naturalism is wrong. Does this mean that if it could be shown that that argument is wrong you will give up your criticism? It ought to mean that, but somehow I doubt it. Nevertheless, please commit yourself on this and then I will try to show which of the steps in the argument are incorrect. (Or indeed, given that time has passed and others are likely to have done this already, please admit that the argument you set out is false and agree that your critique of scientific naturalism is false. We can but hope!)

71. The Transcendental Argument for God

Comment #88513 by smithyboy on November 17, 2007 at 8:09 am

DG, your comment #88477:

We all agree there is an objective reality out there, in which we all exist, each one of us forming a tiny part. Well that objective reality out there, the whole of it, is not a huge physical mechanism as naturalists think, but rather a very very good person, a conscious being who, as we do, perceives, thinks, wills, loves, creates and enjoys beauty. We form part of reality and hence are that person's children. And that person has designed and sustains for us the experiential environment we find ourselves living in – including, incidentally, of the physical facts and laws.

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy says that "the term 'pantheist' designates one who holds both that everything there is constitutes a unity and that this unity is divine". So you are propounding pantheism, not theism.

Classic theism defines 'god' as utterly different from the universe of which we are part. It makes sense not to be a classic theist these days, because science enables us to understand the universe without resort to an external agent (ie god). But instead of 'letting go of god' you, with the other pantheists, drag the divine into the universe by claiming that every part of the universe is divine. But of course the problem is that if everything is divine, the term loses all meaning.

It is just one small step from pantheism to atheism. All you need to do is ditch the divine language and stop mystifying everything. Once you have stopped mystifying everything, your talk of "an objective reality out there" might be a little more acceptable to somebody like me. But until then I don't think you ought to claim "we all agree" on "an objective reality" when you clearly load it with ideas I don't accept.

72. I didn't know the FLEA CIRCUS was back in town!

Comment #85366 by smithyboy on November 5, 2007 at 3:11 pm

I appreciate there will be good reason for banning Calvin/Wee Flea, but ideally it would be best for everybody to be allowed to have their say. So can somebody tell me what trolling is? (Sorry if this has been covered before, but I'm pretty new to the site (which I think is great, by the way)).

Calvin/Wee Flea: (if you are still there) you obviously are intelligent and like to follow through the logic of what you believe. Unfortunately the logic always goes round in a circle and you have to take at least one leap of faith to make the whole edifice work. My guess is you have realised that and you justify your leap of faith (partly at least) by asserting everybody else, even the atheists, take their own leaps also. Trouble is, the edifice you believe in doesn't make sense on its own terms (the god of love hates homosexuals etc) and doesn't tie up with things you know (or suspect) to be true from other sources (that all living creatures came about by evolution, etc). I would encourage you to try stepping outside of the edifice for a while and setting the intellect free. I did, and life has been much better ever since. You'll also find you were wrong and atheism does not require a leap of faith of the kind required by religion.

73. A Rational Universe Implies a Creator, Science points towards Theism

Comment #82674 by smithyboy on October 27, 2007 at 7:38 am

A rational universe implies a creator

This argument is based on a straightforward substitution of one meaning of 'rational universe' with another. (1) The scientist has a working hypothesis that the universe can be understood by the use of reason. In this sense only it is 'a rational universe'. This is an epistemological claim. (2) The theist/deist on the other hand uses the phrase 'rational universe' to imply something (though that something is rather ill-defined) about the universe's nature or being, about its fabric. It is an ontological claim.

The theist simply gets the scientist to 'agree' that it is a rational universe without specifying the two different meanings, and then lays out the following argument: The universe's rational nature (ie its fabric) reflects and is caused and upheld by the rational nature of God (whatever that may mean, given that an omniscient being already knows all conclusions and therefore never has to reason toward them). The universe's supposed rational nature (in the ontological sense) only is so because it is given by God.

The response is twofold: (1) point out the substitution of meaning described above; (2) make clear that believing we may be able to understand some phenomenon by use of reason does not mean the phenomenon must be rational in its nature. Belief that we can understand black holes, for example, does not make black holes rational entities. In fact, the only 'things' which it is strictly correct to describe as being rational in their nature are the rules of logic and mathematics.

The point is illustrated by the claim that humans are rational beings. This, properly understood, is simply a claim that (some of the time) we use our brains to reason things out. But it is often misunderstood to be saying something more, ie that our very nature is 'rational'. This misunderstanding is often said to support the notion that we are made in the image of God.

74. You can't be moral without God!

Comment #82095 by smithyboy on October 25, 2007 at 4:58 pm

My experience is that the heart of the matter for theists and deists is a perceived need for a final arbiter who stands outside, makes judgement and imposes appropriate consequences. This is a central theme running though all the monotheistic religions. Not only that, but most of us also seem to have an emotional urge for fairness that leads to the same conclusion. (I can't quite think at the moment what the precise evolutionary explanation is for that emotion. No doubt someone else can supply it.) The monotheistic God satisfies this need and, consequently, my Christian friends almost always raise this as the first objection to my atheism. And as Dan Dennett says (see his acceptance speech at the AAI conference), there is also a powerful fear that publicly acknowledging it might not be true would lead to the breakdown of society.

Obviously, the enormous desirability of a metaphysical Judge does not make it true, and I suspect my Christian friends know this. Nevertheless, the need for it to be true makes the reasoned arguments in its favour seem more attractive to them.

The reasoned (though not in my view reasonable) argument they usually give in favour actually follows from the above. They point out that as a matter of fact I (an atheist) do behave morally. They then state that without a final arbiter, a metaphysical Judge, it makes no rational sense to do so. The point being that without a final Judge, if I am cunning enough, I can do immoral things that will improve my lot and still get away with it. It follows, they think, that my tendency to be moral rather than immoral contradicts my atheism.

This reasoning is flawed, but the emotions etc referred to above tend to prevent the theist and deist from recognising it. The flaw, as many have pointed out, is that there are plenty of reasons, emotions and probably other factors (such as expected consequences) influencing me to behave in a moral way. Each action I take has its various causes, and so it simply does not follow that when I choose to do something that is not selfish, the reason I do so is ultimately some sort of awareness or belief in a final arbiter. The reason that I (and I suspect a vast majority of others) act as I do is emphatically not that it will score me extra points when I stand before the Judgement Seat. Indeed, again as many have pointed out, if I am doing something to 'score points' then in fact I am being the opposite of unselfish and the action thereby ultimately is immoral.

75. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80948 by smithyboy on October 23, 2007 at 3:47 pm

Diacanu; Comment 80908:
Well said Diacanu, at least in the majority. However, I think it might be a mistake to extend a description of how morality tends to have operated in history over into the atheist-theist debate. Just because we have evolved with an in-group out-group way of looking at things doesn't mean it is always helpful to give in to it. Why not see religionists as members of our group, but who are currently somewhat deluded, say? Or if that is too patronising, see them as co-seekers after truth etc. That seems to be the sort of contribution bluejway wants to make. If we make religionists 'them', the usual negatives will tend to follow, including loss opportunities for 'the other side' to see reason.