Comments by MPhil

Comment #138900 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:47 pm

Zombie! :)

See above :P

Comment #138899 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:46 pm

I disagree. It is like the issue of thermodynamics that Bonzai mentioned. There is stuff to be explained, but entirely in terms of physics. This sounds to me a bit calling a physical chemist who talks about entropy "dualist".

I don't think it is. It is just realizing that the the question is that of reduction, of finding out about (strict) identity. As Bonzai said - a mapping problem. Only that in this case we are mapping talk about mental stuff, which is allegorical unless you're a dualist to talk about physical stuff. It is an extremely hard task - but we are well on the way, as Quine (the contributer) and myself have been saying. The Scholarpedia article testifies to that.

If it is explained entirely in terms of physics - then you are agreeing with me - it would be the reduction of the mental to the physical, and thus creating the ability to translate talk about the "mental" to talk about the "physical", noting that the former is now to be seen as allegorical, the latter as literal.

I have read it (and the Chimerical Colours work of Churchland), but was not convinced.

Then the suggestion of reading "the rediscovery of light" and a few more things by Dennett and Churchland stands. Of course, maybe you will never be convinced.

But please remember: If you are agreeing that any explanation would have to be "entirely in terms of physics" (or in that case, neurophysiology, neural networks etc) - then you cannot assume the existence of a second, nonphysical realm, which asking the question "and how does this explain what it feels like" does. It implies that there is something which it is to experience certain things. If we had a complete knowledge of neurophysiology and still you think the question wouldn't be answered (because you don't accept that there is identity) - what else could there be? Only something different than the physical.

EDIT: This is true ex hypothesi.

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Comment #138891 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:33 pm

... if there actually is something it is like, that is.

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Comment #138889 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:31 pm

There is nothing wrong with explaining away a problem - if it is only a problem based on faulty concepts and/or unwarranted assumptions.

Remember vitalism?

"But why does this make things alive?"

"It doesn't - it is 'being alive'"

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Comment #138888 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:30 pm

I am not cheating, and my argument is not inadequate - as I corrected myself. There is type of physical process (or an ordered n-tuple of processes) that are uniquely identical with lightning. Your statement that my analogy shows how wrong I am is really just a cheap trick.

I am not denying that there are important questions. But your question presupposes that there is no identity. We cannot investigate nomic conenctions where there no separate things. If you think there are separate things here, then by definition, however less you care for the terms - you implicitly assume dualism.

I'm just saying that the important questions are others than you think, namely - which are the physical processes that are identical to consciousness (the mapping problem, as I already stated: the research is called "neural correlates of consciousness"), not "how does one cause the other". The mapping here is to find the proper reduction. That's the question.

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness

But will this take us any further to explaining what the sensation of red is like?

Qualia talk - again, I recommend "Quining Qualia" by Dennett and "The rediscovery of light" and "Chimerical Colours" by Churchland.

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Comment #138880 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:14 pm

I also strongly support MaxD's comment (138873).

On a side note: I prefer talking of puzzles, not mysteries. Puzzles are solvable, mysteries are somehow "beyond reach"... at least I think it's a useful distinction.

I'll be back in 15 minutes.

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Comment #138878 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:12 pm

Of course they are not identical, you can have charge separation and discharge performed in laboratory which doesn't produce lightning and these process can also produce something else, like certain kind of chemical reactions which is not intrinsically related to lightning (i.e these reactions can be produced in other settings)

Well, maybe I was using a bad example. What I meant was - there is a type or class of physical processes that is/are uniquely identical to lightning - and then the meaningless question would be "Why does the type or class of processes that are uniquely identical to lightning produce lightning?".

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Comment #138876 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:08 pm

Steve, Bonzai,

you could just as well say that we only end up with correlation between "charge separation, leader formation and discharge" and lightning.

Bonzai, it seems like you are just presupposing that they cannot be identical, as evidenced by your usage of "produce". The theory is that the mental phenomena aren't produced by, but identical to the physical phenomena.

Otherwise you end up with dualism out of the inconceivability fallacy. If there really are two things, what would the thing in addition to the physical processes be? If it's additional to something physical, and not just identical to the processes, it would have to be something entirely different from the physical - ie a "mental substance" or "mental process", but processes take place in systems ("hardware"), so there would have to be a substance. If it's physical, the processes and states are so, too. If it isn't, they're not. -Dualism.

If you keep thinking in terms of "produces", and don't even question the underlying assumption, you are (possibly covertly) presupposing dualism, epiphenomenalism (which is also dualistic) or non-reductive materialism (which is impossible).

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Comment #138870 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:01 pm

The one thing we really have to be extremely careful about, because dualism is so deeply engrained in our culture, in our language and therefore in our common sense, is to really investigate whether questions make sense.

Suppose we find more neural correlates of consciousness. Would the question "Yes, but why do they produce consciousness" make sense? Would even "Why are they this and that conscious activity?" make sense?

I propose that these question would be just like asking "Yes, but why does charge separation, leader formation and discharge produce lightning" (or respectively "Why is [...] identical to lightning")

There is a spell to be broken here, to use Dennett's phrase.

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Comment #138865 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 10:52 pm

Yes I certainly do think that is an important question - it is the question why conscious experiences are identical to certain specific physical processes and not others. To answer that we will have to find out which physical processes these are (the 'neural correlates of consciousness' research)

My tentative and coarse answer would be: Because of their specific structure and the functional context in which they occur. A chemical moving in your muscle does not instantiate information in a neural network. Chemical and electrical signals in the brain do.

And we do already have some insights into this. Some experimental data: For example, a firing pattern in the back of your skull when you see something will even have about the geometrical shape of the pattern on your retina - so in this instance, the temporal and spatial pattern of the activity certainly has something to do with it.

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Comment #138859 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 10:35 pm

Addendum:
I think the version I submitted can be seen as the real "hard problem", the hard problem from the materialist standpoint.

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Comment #138857 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 10:33 pm

The question of consciousness and why patterns of activities in some nerve cells generate experiences is a profound one;

[My emphasis]

But that's the thing, isn't it? I think they do not generate consciousness (and experiences), they are identical.

I would say the most important question is "What is consciousness?". (similarly to "what is lightning" concerning the analogy above)

There aren't two things, the one generated by the other, that would imply some version of dualism or epiphenomenalism. The processes in and states of the brain are identical to what some say are generated by them. Therefore, there can be no nomic connection, because there are no two separate things.

The question is, what exactly are these processes, what is their functional structure, how does their physiological structure conform to their logical or emotive structure - how can be reduce talk about "mental things" to talk about physical things.

At least that's the question if you're not a dualist or non-reductive materialist (non-reductive materialism can be proven false btw).

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Comment #138839 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:54 pm

Addendum concerning analytical and synthetic truths:

Since lightning is uniquely identical to these processes, it is true in the strict logical sense that

"Lightning is charge separation, leader formation and discharge"

is an analytical truth.

But the fact that we learned that lightning is uniquely identical to this through empirical science shows that the "analytical a posteriory" exists. This is essentially what Saul Kripke has shown (in "Naming and Necessity")

Although, I am not sure the analytic-synthetic distinction is entirely meaningful... Quine has very forceful arguments against it.

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Comment #138836 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:42 pm

Thank you, Russell, for your reply.

Before I take my break, I'd like to answer it:

I don't think my intention was to gain an edge by name-calling. I really do think that the claim of the existence of a "hard problem" is somewhat like mysticism.

As for zombies and logical possibility, I really don't think that Zombies are possible, for the following reason:

Your argument presupposes the falsity of identity theory both of the classical kind and of the Churchland-variety, and possibly teleofunctionalism as well.

For someone like Churchland, Dennett (and me), this:

But it seems to be no more than a contingent fact about the world that these particular inputs (various brain processes, etc) do causally produce consciousness.

Is essentially identical to saying:

But it seems to be no more than a contingent fact about the world that these particular physical processes (charge separation, leader formation and discharge) do causally produce lightning.

As I am sure you know, identity theory and teleofunctionalism say that these processes do not produce consciousness, but are identical to it.

Where there are no two things, but merely one thing, there can be no variety of possible connections, and it would be an analytical truth.

From the point of view of someone like Churchland, Dennett (and me), stating that the mind is not identical, but merely the product of these processes is already somewhat mystical.

I side with eliminative materialism, or more precisely - somewhere between Dennett and Churchland, because I don't think their views are incommensurable.

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Comment #138833 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:23 pm

Okay, now I feel I've flexed my intellectual muscles enough - I need a short break, some brainless entertainment.

I think I'm going to play a few sessions of "Frontlines: Fuel of War"... be back in a short while (somewhere between half an hour and one hour I guess).

______________

EDIT:

That the function of consciousness/conceptualization is dependent on a certain arrangement and complexity of matter, and until that condition is met it cannot emerge.

Functional complexity, yes. Actually certain abilities (symbol manipulation, development, manipulation and behavioural expression of concepts etc) - which in turn require a certain functional complexity. Which of course also means that I think AI is possible, even artificial personality.

Altough, I must say I think Dennett has good point: "Artificial Intelligence" is a bad term. It is genuine intelligence we want, and I think is possible, not merely an artificial imitation.

See you later then.

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Comment #138831 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:19 pm

I understand your meaning to be, conceptualization is to our brain as gills are to a fish to breath underwater. Conceptualization is a function necessarily bourne from the formation of a brain, or at least one with the sufficient working complexity.

Add to that "and developing in the right environment" and I think you're right. But that was not the reason I mentioned it. I was saying that conceptualization is a constitutive feature of consciousness, and thus has to be present (among other things) for the thing in question to be called 'conscious'.

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Comment #138827 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:17 pm

Let's say an antique, simple lock gets assigned the number one - for the most low-level representation without behaviour governing mechanisms.

A thermostate then might get assigned level 10, as it has (for the sake of argument again) the lowest level of "sensory input plus representation plus behaviour governing mechanisms".

A single celled organism then might get level 11 (or even level 10 as well, as it basically has no more ability than a thermostate, but instead of regulating temperature, it regulates movement in a binary way: away from 'toxic' and towards nutritious)

A plant then might be level 70 or even 100, a sphex about 500-1000, a chimp probably about 1.000.000-10.000.000, and a rational human being with full linguistic ability (which as I said seems to make the most difference, as it is adding a lot of entirely new levels of complexity and abilities) might get about a trillion.

Now these numbers are just off the top of my head, but they are just meant to demonstrate what I think the evidence shows.

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Comment #138824 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:09 pm

Lorien,

while I am the first to agree with your edit, there are limits. A plant is definitely not conscious, neither is an amoeba. They are far more similar to thermostates (which also have sensory input, representation and behaviour governing mechanisms based on that input and it's inherent structure) than to people. Anything resembling what we call consciousness would have to have conceptualization - and very few species even have the potential for that. Ravens extremely rudimentary, dolphins and chimps to a higher degree, but grammatical language really seems to be the deciding factor.

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Comment #138821 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:05 pm

I'm sorry if you didn't enjoy yourself Brian - I for one found our exchange of ideas and opinions very entertaining and fulfilling.

It's always a pleasure discussing things with you.

Tschuess!

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Comment #138820 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 8:03 pm

Lorien,

while I assume you were joking, I still want to say that this idea is somewhat ludicrous. Neither locks, nor amoebae nor bacteria nor plants or even sphex have anything remotely resembling what we call consciousness. Representation is there, yes. Locks have it, amoebae have more and even behaviour governing representation, higher organisms have more, but it doesn't deserve to be called conscious without evidence for conceptualization.

Representation is how intentionality works, what we call intentionality is simply high level representation based on conceptualization (which is a specific form of synaptic-weight vector-coding representation of stimuli). But the farther down you go down in complexity of systems, the less it resembles what we call intentionality, - and consciousness, until the resemblance to what we call intentionality and consciousness gets so low that it doesn't deserve to be called that.

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Comment #138817 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:57 pm

Well, I don't know if birds are entirely unconscious. Some ravens for example show the ability for (very low level) conceptualization, or something functionally equivalent. Then of course there's dolphins and chimps... and then us. As I said, probably not an on or off thing.
Still, 'sphexishness' is always there to differing degrees,

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Comment #138814 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:54 pm

It seems quite teleological to say we evolved consciousness so that we may develop technology and artifacts.

And that's not what I said at all. Consciousness isn't an all or nothing, on or off thing. The 'complexification' of neural systems through evolution produced better fitness all the way long, and thus got selected for... until it reaches a level of meta-level feedback monitoring and manipulation that we arrive at higher and higher levels of consciousness. The higher, the better the fitness. The only unique thing about humans is that we can shape our environment to a level far far above any other species.

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Comment #138807 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:49 pm

Philosophical Zombies are a ploy, a hoax. Chalmers is a mystic concerning consciousness, as I said.

All the data suggests that the same reality can only be described by two alternatives:

-There are no zombies, it's a obscured conceptual inconsistency. If all the inner and outer behaviour is the same, you have to be conscious

or

-We are all Zombies, consciousness as envisioned by the "zombieists' does not exist. It's nothing else than being a zombie.

The views are in fact only two different ways of saying the same thing.

Really, zombies are bogus. All evidence suggests that your mind is the (function of) your brain, so the function and behaviour couldn't be the same without consciousness. Zombies are impossible.

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Comment #138805 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:45 pm

I don't think it's the product of this multi-level feedback monitoring and manipulation, rather it's the process(ing) itself.

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Comment #138802 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:43 pm

The evolutionary advantage seems to be incredible adaptability, which we have demonstrated. Through consciousness and reason, we can increase lifespan, make cultural artefacts (buildings, medical instruments, drugs etc) that can increase the fitness immensely, or even lift us above having to be fit to pass on our genes, because we have an unprecedented degree of influence on our environment, in fact, a city dweller lives in a almost completely artificial environment, which protects us from the 'forces of nature' to a very large extent. Intentional highly complex collaboration is essential for that, and that requires a highly complex language, which in turn is impossible without consciousness.

At least these are my thoughts on the matter, and I think it's a very tenable view.

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Comment #138797 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:36 pm

Lorien,

I think basically, consciousness is the stacking up of feedback monitoring and manipulation of signals and signal processing to highly complex degree.

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Comment #138791 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:32 pm

Noam Chomsky also has some interesting ideas, although some newer findings question both Chomsky's "universal grammar" idea and the grammatic-centered parts of Pinker's work. I'm not sure how accurate these findings are, however.

Anyways, I think grammar is the most interesting part of language, as the grammatic structure of our idiolect is what shows and determines what we can think.

Imagine a language without adverbs - such people could not think about qualitative or gradual modifications of actions, they could have no concept of that. Only through adverbs can we do that. Without them, you would need another verb for every different qualitative difference or degree of every action - if you do this at all. yet you could not conceive of that as being essentially the same action, only different in that way - since that is the function of adverbs.

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Comment #138789 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:29 pm

Steven Pinker is definitely a good choice, but not the only one. While I don't dispute his data, I think his interpretation is underdetermined by it. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying he's wrong - simply that there are other views that fit the data.

Lorien,

It does make sense - of course the specific details of the feedback structure are again determined both by genetic coding and external stimuli.

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Comment #138785 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:27 pm

Sharon,

while I would have to search my memory and the internet to produce some interesting suggestions, I think the basic idea is again conditioning to behavioural responses.

The brain is evolved to mimic behaviour - even to empathise (mirror neurons). When language is an integral part of your stimuli, this shapes synaptic connections and weights, so that these signals get processed in a certain way. And here's where operant conditioning comes in:

Normal language learning works through reinforcement - if you produce the behaviour desired by those who condition you, you get rewarded - and you tend to adopt rewarding behaviour. So the synaptic weights and connections that increase the efficiency of your verbal behaviour (since that is what is being conditioned for) develop and get strengthened.

I have also read the story of that girl, truly tragic. Didn't read that she was 'highly intelligent' though, merely apt at certain things, while completely socially incompetent. Also, the doctor who took care of her did some things (don't remember what though) that were highly questionable.
And her linguistic abilities generally remained at a very low level - showing that the brain's plasticity is kept throughout life, but that some things have to be conditioned in early childhood for the brain to properly master them. The plasticity is highest then.

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Comment #138777 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:19 pm

Might I suggest that the brain itself, the stuff it's made of, is also it's environment just as much as the trees and the grass.

I'm not quite sure how to interpret that. If you 'simply' mean that neuronal feedback also plays a factor in the setting of weights, that's indeed true... but any other interpretation doesn't seem to make sense to me. The stuff it's made of, ie it's chemical composition isn't quire the environment. But the neural feedback definitely shapes the weights and connections, so under that reading I agree.

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Comment #138774 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:16 pm

I think the problem with a lot of religious thought is in that it creates a disfunctional feedback loop onto reality.

I pretty much agree. Religious thought hijacks standard thought functions.

Agreed. And that's just in addition to the religious beliefs coming from a not reliably truth-producing mechanism (indoctrination or non-indoctrinated delusion).

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Comment #138771 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:14 pm

Addendum to my last post:

The sensory inputs which together with our genes determine the exact structure of our brains is largely uniform and systematic. And it is furthermore not merely nonintentional - ever since civilisation and especially language arose, a large proportion of the sensory inputs that structure your brain intentionally condition for specific outcomes: You are being taught things. And even the nonintentional stimuli (as for example when you just mimic behaviour of other humans without them specifically wanting you to) conditions for things like language, reason, artistic behaviour etc.

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Comment #138762 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:07 pm

Why 'non-specifically' aren't genes and genetic code conditioned specifically by the environment in which they exist? If one says non-specifically at a certain level then isn't that implying some sort of 'ghost in the machine'?

Well, that's not what I meant.
What I meant was that the DNA by far doesn't contain enough information to code for every synapse and every synaptic weight, even if all of the genetic code was only coding for that.
The DNA codes for the ability to make synaptic connections and to weigh the synapses, but it's the environmental (the sensory) input that determines what connections are made and what their weights are.
The synapses and their weights are the structure of our brain, and thereby also the structure of our mind, since they are identical.

No magic, no ghost in the machine.

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Comment #138758 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:04 pm

It's just how you came by that belief and whether it's supported by chains of evidence or taken as an article of faith that matters.

That's one epistemological theory.

For the diversity of views (non of which are unproblematic), see the wonderful reader (filled with original papers by all the greats) "Knowledge: Readings in contemporary epistemology":

http://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Contemporary-Epistemology-Sven-Bernecker/dp/019875261X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1204685784&sr=8-1

I personally think that the belief must have been arrived at by a sufficiently reliable mechanism (but many things can count as that, even mechanisms we don't understand).

Furthermore, while I think that we can actually have knowledge, meaning justified true beliefs (wherein 'justified' is the concept to be specified), but we can never know that we have, ie never have second order knowledge.

The reader I linked is truly amazing.

I had read a few works of classical philosophy dealing with epistemology, but I couldn't have imagined what an immensely problematic, diverse and deep field it is, - very technical, too.

Reading that book was exhilarating and enlightening, but it did put me in my place.

You read the first paper in there and think "Yes, that sounds reasonable, a good position, seems to be true."
Then you read the second paper, criticising the first and proposing another view, and you go "Oh! He's right, the position defended by the first paper is wrong. This one looks much better."...
And it just goes on like that, and all the time you get more and more enlightened about knowledge.

Wonderful!

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Comment #138748 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:48 pm

By the way - I do wonder if David read my posts... and what a person thinks of these posts who honestly believes that an immaterial deity has moved particles (contrary to the conservation of energy) in a way so that a specific amount of currency would find its way to him.

I guess it's an entirely different world.

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Comment #138745 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:41 pm

Brian,

I think we don't really have a substantial disagreement, merely some semantic confusion and talking past each other.

Can we agree on that? :)

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Comment #138742 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:39 pm

Brian, seems we're using 'reason' in a different way - to me, the brain unconsciously implementing a successful survival strategy adapted to the sensory input by relying on its conditioning is in way unconscious 'reason'.

I don't deny that the structure of the brain has evolved, by goodness! I merely state that the synaptic connections and weights are determined by conditioning rather than genetic coding. However their potential to non-specifically do this is genetically coded.

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Comment #138738 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:35 pm

On a side note:

There is a dispute between Dennett (et al) and Churchland (et al): Denentt thinks the brain is a hardware that needs software to run, while Churchland thinks that the synapses and their weights are all that is needed. And the science backs up Churchland. Neural networks themselves need no software - the information is in the way the hardware transduces signals, neural networks (no software) can recognize faces, distinguish gender, parse language, sort out spam mail, even "fill" the blanks in a partially obscured picture of a face with which it was trained.

The links (synapses) and their training (conditioning, the adjusting of synaptic weight) is everything in neural networks.

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Comment #138731 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:31 pm

The cost to benefit ratio is what's important in evolution's terms

I know, but the penalty for being wrong is usually far higher than the penalty for a false positive.
This is why generally, being right (again: about something consequential) is more effective, and thus we can, do and indeed must rely on reason (whether consciously or unconsciously).

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Comment #138730 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:28 pm

MPhil. I agree. One thing though. If you don't have the hardware, you can't run the software. To have a morality, you need certain brain functions. These must have evolved.

I was not disputing that, at least not under some specific reading:

But not all brain functions evolve per se - the information in our DNA lacks several orders of magnitude to account for all the synapses and synaptic weights (which in neural networks is the functional structure, no software needed - it alone is sufficient). Ask a developmental biologist, or a neuroscientist - the synapses and synaptic weights form throughout life, most in early childhood. They biological potential of doing is in a certain way is genetically determined, but the specific synapses and synaptic weights are conditioned, not genetically determined. Of course the uniformity and systematicity of inputs (some universal, some culturally dependant, environmentally dependant or even locally dependant) effects the large uniformity of minds.

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Comment #138727 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:23 pm

Well, yes, but the problem is, if irrationality, or indeed simply holding false beliefs about anything consequential can be evolutionary beneficial and stable, we have less reason to assume that our faculties of discerning what we take to be truths are reliable.

As I said (alongside others, most notably on here Steve Zara), being wrong about anything consequential leads to death very often in nature.

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Comment #138724 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:21 pm

And on the subject of morality - the evolutionary perspective, including game theory and ESS is highly interesting, but not the only one.

I think research into its basis on empathy qua mirror neuron activity is highly interesting as well.

Not to mention the ethical and metaethical theories - emotivism, prescriptivism, error theory (to which I subscribe - John Leslie Mackie has me entirely convinced, see "Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong"), cognitivism... and on the object, or first level - utilitarianism, contractualism, virtue ethics, prima facie duty ethics etc... - the entire side of "which approach can we rationally justify". Immensly important if you ask me, especially since through our reason and the part of culture dependent on it we can at least to some extent move outside of narrow evolutionary determinism concerning ethics.

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Comment #138721 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:15 pm

I don't think any healthy human can be an uber-rationalist. Sometimes the best adaptive strategy is to be irrational

We really have to be careful here, or we open up the door to Plantinga's argument against the reliability of reason in a materialistic world.

I think being irrational about something consequential would nearly always be detrimental to survival.

And in the subject of memes and religion: I think for the angle from which Dennett looks at religion, the phenomena he wants to raise awareness of, the meme analogy fits. The morphology and dynamics of religion don't contradict that view, because it is viewpoint-specific.

At least that's my opinion.

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Comment #138663 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 5:03 pm

David Robertson,

you might want to look at the following comments of mine:

http://richarddawkins.net/articleComments,2285,Fleabytes,Paula-Kirby,page50#136661

and

http://richarddawkins.net/articleComments,2285,Fleabytes,Paula-Kirby,page62#138081

-Mike

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Comment #138556 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 2:06 pm

Oh, and Al-rawandi...

it's "Immanuel" :)

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Comment #138550 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 2:01 pm

Yes, I know about the problems of a 'mind' being a fine-tuner... it's impossible if you ask me.

What I was trying to say was that the problem of fine-tuning (or maybe just supposed problem) at first weighs in on the issue of a deist god... but then the problems arise and the hypothesis can be discarded.

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Comment #138533 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:34 pm

Well, the only evidence for a deist god could be conceptual necessity or likelihood - I see the latter, but only as stemming from lack of knowledge and misunderstanding... and possibly the fine tuning of the constants. The former - only from false concepts.

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Comment #138452 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:06 am

And now you get one guess as to what determining whether a concept is meaningful is...

*Jeopardy melody*

"Is it part of philosophy, Alex?"

Correct!

G'Night.

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Comment #138189 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 3:35 am

Geraint,

see here

(and the entire page including some of its links)

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Comment #138187 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 3:30 am

Thanks, Steve.

Sounds like a better idea that way, but I still doubt I'm up to maintaining a blog. A few articles, all right - but I doubt I could post something of value every day - or even every other day. I'll have to sleep on it I think.