1501. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162781 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:51 pm

People who deny the obvious and try to use ad hoc metaphor interpretation, combined with recursive logic are just useless for a rational discussion.

Sadly yes - but to be fair, only if and when they are really fixed in their presupposition and only when it comes to that. Discussions that don't come down to this can be quite rational - and we have to give credit to thisisme for not being totally irrational. Concerning platonism, he has admitted that this can account for objective moral values as well - and not only theism. He seems to be rational where he can - which is a start, and I commend him for this - and even more for the willingness to study the ethical theories of Mill and Kant (and possibly others).
That's at least something.

1502. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162775 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:43 pm

Frankus, Al:

You are correct - but more specifically, it's the ventromedial prefrontal cortex :)

There's a wonderful book:

"Fundamentals of Human Neuropsychology" by Kolb and Whishaw... has tons of such stories and the theories to explain it, including the evidence... also has lots of pictures of CT scans, PET etc (me like pictures) :)

1503. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162774 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:42 pm

it has been shown that any useful system of logic is either inconsistent or incomplete (Godel's Theorem)

This is just a minor thing, but I think this could be phrased better:

"...any sufficiently powerful logical system..."

It's not just predicate logic with identity, it's also peano arithmatics and ZFC etc.

Generally, any system powerful enough to encode its own syntax afaik.

Predicate logic without identity, or even just logic without quantifiers are not sufficiently powerful for Gödel's theorem to apply.

1504. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162771 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:37 pm

Oh, I forgot:

Even if - counterfactually - natural laws needed a lawmaker, the god hypothesis would be nothing more than a "virtus dormitiva" hypothesis... (which it is anyway, in many cases) - entirely without value.

____________

("virtus dormitiva" from the play "Le malade imaginaire" by Molière, a joke. The doctor asks his student "Why does opium make one sleepy?", to which the student answers "Becuase it has a sleepy-making spirit/power".)

1505. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162768 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:31 pm

Hey there - sorry for being late - I wasn't gone, just busy talking on the phone to my girlfriend and writing my response.

I see gr8hands, Al and Steve (et al) have already done a very good job at responding. Some of the arguments they advanced will be found in the text below (not as concise though, great job btw) - some won't, so here goes:

Thanks for the links too - I will certainly try to follow them up, when I have 'time' (I have booked myself a month off in June - should get some reading time out of that :-) Will see if I can get hold of the others you've mentioned too

Excellent. As I said - prepare yourself for some seriously complex thinking, especially in Kant.

Now, for the points of argument - I have to say that the arguments you forward have been shown by me before to be wrong... so I will only go through them again very briefly.

God, as an eternally existent ultimate being must be self defining.

I have already shown this to be logically impossible. Nothing can be self-defining.
I have already laid out the argument, so I will do this just one more time:

Entities are defined by their properties.
If x defines y, they cannot be the same, because of this: formally:

let x, y be variables for individuals, let P be a variable for properties.

P1:FOR ALL x, y: ((FOR ALL P: Px AND Py) AND (NOT EXISTS P: Px AND NOT-Py) AND (NOT EXISTS P: Py AND NOT-Px) <-> x=y

There's just no way around this.

It is furthermore not true that universals (meaning universals in the metaphysical sense - if they exist, I opine that there are no universals in the metaphysical sense) must be self-defining, that would imply action (that of defining). They can just be said to simply exist, no need for anything to define them. But then, universals must not be necessary, so they need no laws that make them necessary. Since god cannot define his own attributes (nothing can, as proved logically above) and since he is nevertheless taken to be necessary - and because necessity requires laws - that means god is dependent on laws logically prior to or higher than him.
But then, as I said - your presuppositions about god do not constitute a philosophical position - they are unwarranted assertions.
If you want to claim that the laws of logic follow from God's nature - and that God's nature is necessary - that is circularity and itself contradicts the laws of logic.

And no, you're still not using "a priori" correctly. Again: a priori and a posteriori mean "known without empirical observation" and "known only through empirical observation" - the terms refer to attributes - the laws of logic aren't attributes. But they are themselves presupposed because of the way our brains are hardwired, and they are thus hardwired through evolution because this reflects or approximates reasonable the way things can be.

Now for universals: I'm sorry, but saying that realism (ante res or in rebus) is the only viable position is just plain false. It's the most unwarranted position of all. It is defeated even by an argument that was advanced by Plato himself - the Third Man argument. Certain varieties of conceptualism and nominalism do fall prey to simply postponing the problem - but not all. Realism on the other hand is immediately defeated by it. Any form of realism.

Then the position is defeated by the argument I have advanced - instantiation is itself a relation and thus must be a universal, and thus must be entirely metaphysical - so the "great line of being" cannot be crossed and universals cannot have a connection with the world.

In rebus realism is easily defeated by showing that it depends on a misuse of the word "in" and collapses into ante res realism when taken seriously.

Finally, everything but conceptualism or nominalism is defeated by occam's razor.

I myself think there is no definitive answer, but we can exclude property nominalism and realism. Trope nominalism is my favourite candidate, but generally I am not sure the question makes sense at all.

When you start talking about Hume - it appears you are not clear what "universal" means. A "universal" in philosophical language refers to a metaphysical entity. Talking of universal laws etc does not presuppose any such thing. (as I have said before) - all that is needed is uniformity. Only when you already presuppose platonism does this require universals - but that would be begging the question.

The problem of induction is of course a serious one - but it threatens every position - including yours. If you cannot know that the future will be like the past, if no amount of certainty exists - then your position is also threatened - everywhere.

But my position does not need absolute knowledge about the future. It works with conditionals, my friend and thus avoids the problem altogether. Also, you seem to have absolutely not understood what I was talking about when I explained consequentialist ethics - evidenced by your remark

wanting societal stability is an 'is' not an 'ought'

Again, conditionals my friend! If we want to have a stable society, we can work out what behaviour is necessary. If we assign value to the former, it also applies to what is necessary to achieve it. Values are made, not discovered. You are still inside your box of criticizing an argument that denies your premises for not sharing your premises... not applicable.
Furthermore - what will be necessary for a stable society will also include reasonable extrapolations on the plasticity of society and changing facts.
But that is a pragmatic problem that any theory has to face that does not have the impertinence to claim that one code of behaviour is all good in every situation, every society, at any time - not knowing what will come.

Moving on, I did say that internal coherence is important, but not sufficient.... you might want to reread my last post.

You simply assert that the Bible is neither without any evidence to prove it. If you want to go down that route then you need to provide the evidence. A real internal critique not just 'it doesn't make sense to me'.

Right, that's why I said that this is an entirely different discussion. But you will forgive me for not going into that for the following reason:
I - and many many others - have done so in the past. Showing clear internal incoherence as well as inconsistency with known facts. Wanna know what we got? Concerning the first: ad hoc reinterpretations to avoid the obvious contradiction that would make even Derrida ashamed. Twisting phrases so far away from the meaning they obviously express for the sole reason that they "cannot be allowed to contradict each other". Concerning the second: claims to metaphor. Strangely, the metaphors and reinterpretations are only ever found once inconsistencies or incoherency with known fact is discovered.

Thus I hope you will forgive me for not going there again - someone whose presupposition is that the Bible is correct is not open to evidence - and would not be able to admit to being wrong even if he was. So there's no point.


Finally, concerning ethics - as I said, all that is needed to criticise others is a shared goal (like a stable society, survival) when they act so that they violate this interest which they themselves explicitly or implicitly have - or when they are members of a society but do not share its goals - they can be criticized from that because of the rational interests of society.
Furthermore, there is uniformity in humans - all are initially capable of emotions and of empathy for example - and have the same basic drives.

Deliberately assigning to some consequence or some standard moral value is not the naturalistic fallacy because there is no inference, no deriving an ought from an is - there is deliberate assignment of value - a world of difference. After all, that is what ethics is - assigning value to something - specific behaviour for example.

It would be far too much work to make explicit the case for contractualism for example - Scanlon has written a long book about it - so I direct you that way for this.
The form (not the content in any way) of the argument is however somewhat similar to that of Mill. Suffice it to say it is entirely tenable.

Furthermore, it is entirely possible to critize the behaviour ethics of others for non-ethical reasons as well.

So, finally:
An entity defining its own attributes is impossible. Full stop. No way around that. Logical impossibility. You have been shown the proof - now if you do not want to be irrational, you have to abandon the belief that this is possible and actual. (not to mention that unless you can show how god and his supposed attributes are necessary, your belief in that is irrational - same goes for the authority of the bible)

Concerning laws, we can assume universality (which does not require metaphysics, only uniformity) pragmatically - we do and it works. This is an entirely reasonable extrapolation for past and present. Furthermore, if spacetime is fixed, this would make the problem of induction meaningless. But even if that isn't so - we all, always make the pragmatically necessary assumption that the future will be like the past - so you shoot yourself in the foot if you want to make that a point of critique. If it was - all your planning, everything you think and do concerning the future would also fall prey to the problem of induction. As I said - the future resembling the past in certain aspects is a pragmatically necessary assumption which can be justified retroactively.

Realism concerning universals is defeated by various arguments.
This and the points above show your position concerning laws of nature and logic to be fallacious.

I think that covers all: God, necessity, laws, universals, ethics... yep.

1506. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162227 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 12:02 pm

I still say Kant was the best read from a Moral perspective. Although I zoned out from time to time and woke up 5 pages later.... but I got the important stuff out.

I know what you mean - about zoning out while reading Kant... sometimes it just too complicated.

While I don't buy into his idealism at all - he is absolutely brilliant.

I agreed more with Mill, and finally most with Mackie - so from that perspective they were the "better" reads for me.

But I found Kant absolutely fascinating, well laid out and from the perspective of knowing about the history of moral theories the most important.

Concerning the paragraph about muslims as an example - I think you are presupposing a certain moral position (and I agree with these judgements), but I don't think that's the point. Independent of the actual values claimed by certain varieties of theism, I was arguing that the mere idea of theistic morality is flawed and unsubstantiated. And the claims that only the truth of theism can account for objective moral values or even make morality possible altogether is entirely impertinent, blatantly wrong.

You're points concern a slightly different issue - but I think you're certainly right.

1507. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162225 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 11:50 am

Or maybe you will want to read the wiki entries on them first:

Utilitarianism:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism

Kant:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groundwork_of_the_Metaphysic_of_Morals

The "Categorical Imperative":
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative

1508. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162223 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 11:43 am

thisisme,

I'm sorry, but it seems you're not getting the points of my arguments... let me try again:

First - Justification of Christian moral objectivity
I believe that God is abolute, thus the values which are part of his character are also absolute. I believe that the laws of God's nature, the laws of logic, the laws of morality, are *defined* by his nature. They don't make his nature necessary, they are necessary because they are his unchanging nature.

As Quetz stated, this is an assertion without evidence, but that's not my point.
The question whether moral values are absolute is the question whether they could not have been different, and are unchangeable in principle. Thus the concept of "absolute" is fishy, and means only "complete" and "without restrictions"... which isn't relevant here. What's relevent is necessity and contingency/dependence.

If the values are "part of his nature" then they are contingent on his nature, and not necessary. The question now is whether god's nature is necessary. Only if this is the case are the moral values "absolute" - necessary in the sense that they are not relative. But if god is necessarily the way he is that means that there must be laws which are thus - since they are required for god to be necessary and necessarily the way he is - prior to or higher than god.
If god's nature is not necessarily the way it is, then the moral values are relative to his non-necessary nature, and thus not necessary - not absolute. God could have been different, then moral values would have been different... and you're only "following orders".. you have no absolute yardstick of morality, just a relative one. This is simple logic.

And you don't seem to understand the point that nothing can determine its own nature - an entity is defined by its attributes. The laws of logic cannot be created by god if they are part of his nature. That would be logically circular.

where are we going to get any absolute rules from? You can't go out and pick up a Law of Logic (or morality) from the supermarket, or any other part of the universe.

Wrong. There are fundamental universalities in a completely material universe - the laws of physics for example. Some are basic - simply there - no lawgiver needed... others arise, emerge.

There is a fundamental universality in the general ways things can behave - and how minds can work. These are the laws of logic - they are universal, absolute (complete, without restriction) - but do not require anything more than a material universe - all that is needed is universality.

Furthermore - there is methodological and pragmatic necessity.
The question mustn't even be whether the laws of logic are absolute (they are univeral - by virtue of the way things can be - ontology - and by virtue of the way minds can work)... the thing is that concepts of arguments, of justification - in fact anything to do with communication, discussion etc presupposes the laws of logic. And thus I can critizize anyone who engages in argument for not conforming to these standards - since they are presupposed by engaging in an argument.

But when we criticise the logic or morality of others we are a priori assuming the existance of an ultimate standard by which we can judge them.

Wrong again - at least partially. First, you're not using "a priori" right. A priori refers to conditions of knowledge - a truth is known a priori if no information about the outside world is required to know it.
Anyway - no, we can criticize the behaviour of others from any ethical position. If I think that utility is the standard of morality, then I am justified in criticizing others for not conforming to that standard. Furthermore - there is intersubjectivity - and necessary moral imperatives given a certain consequence we agree on.
So if someone wants to live in a stable society, and stability of society necessitates certain behaviour, and yet that person does not conform to this, I am justified to critize him for failing to meet a moral standard.

All you are doing is judging from within your moral 'theory' - and that can be done from any other moral theory.

I do have to say - it will not do to discuss ethics without basic knowledge of ethical theories, I'm sorry.

Any ethical theory gives the person holding it justification for critizing the behaviour of other where it doesn't conform. Absolute justification would mean that it could be known that one ethical theory is "true"... but I deny that there is such a thing as non-relative, necessary moral truths. We have - as I have shown - no justification for assuming that there are.

Anyway - all that is needed is necessity given certain shared goals. All that is needed is intersubjectivity. Meaning - if we want the human race to survive, that implies certain moral values and imperatives - for example not to let a global thermonuclear war to happen.
If we agree that human beings are capable of emotions and empathy, and that suffering is something that should be avoided- certain moral imperatives follow.

All the above answers the following, and shows that it is wrong:

In an atheist universe where does this come from? Where is the ultimate law of logic that we reference when we say that P AND NOT-P -> TRUE is a logical contradiction? We're sure it is a contradiction, but only because we assume the unchanging laws of logic. Where is the ultimate law of morality that we reference when we say that it's wrong for film-producers to lie? I've never heard a satisfactory atheistic explanation for the existance of universal laws, nor a reasoned attempt to live our lives without assuming them
Second - justification of moral objectivity
Here we're getting to the heart of the issue. Do we really live as if there's no moral objectivity? If there is no objectivity, why do we criticise others? This is the point I've come back to time and again and not had answered. This was my original point - *if* there is no moral objectivity, why does RD criticise someone for lying? How can we say that anything is wrong for anyone else? How can we say that anything was wrong in the past, or will be in the future, or is wrong in a different society?.

This is where I *am* going to bring in scripture. That's the basis of my worldview, my presupposition.

Then you're not really evaluation your reasoning. Especially since that is a presupposition that is very very much open to rational criticism. It involves so many huge assumptions - and they need to be justified if you do not want to be irrational.
The bible contains contradictions - both in historical accounts, in perscribed moral values and contradictions with known facts.
That's not philosophical glasses - that's not philosophical at all. It is an unwarranted assumption - and it has to be open for evaluation.

The only way to compare them is how well they make sense.

If you mean by "make sense" internal coherence - then no. If you mean "feels right to me, satisfies my needs", then no.
If you mean "how well they conform to established fact, to analytical and a priori known truths as well as their coherence" then yes... and I'm sorry to that's where scripture fails abysmally.
Neither is it internally coherent(and thus doesn't conform to analytical and a priori known truthts), nor does it conform to established, intersubjectively accessible facts.

But that's a different discussion.

is the only view I've found that makes sense of the need for moral objectivity, hence by the impossibility of all contrary views proposed I assume its truth.

But that's entirely beside the point. Your feeling that moral objectivity is necessary is irrelevant. It isn't - and your need for it has no bearing on the matter. If you are going to be dogmatic about that, there is no discussion - and you're not really seeking out other possibilites.

Furthermore - as I have already told you - not only theism assumes objective moral values. Since they are supposed to be metaphysical entities, they don't need a causal explanation - you can just posit their existence (whether warranted or not). If all you want is objective moral values, then you might as well be a platonist atheist.

But that is beside the point. There is no evidence of any kind, no justification for believing objective moral values to exist or even be possible.

Third - do we need to believe in objective morality to be moral?
No we certainly don't. I've said already that atheists may be just as moral as theists. The difference is that I can make that judgement. I have a measuring stick which I can line up against Atheist A and Theist B and compare them. Without objective moral values you don't. Unless you want to borrow mine.

As I have explained above, that's not true. You don't need an absolute measuring stick to judge - you just need one. Intersubjectivity and consequences which are explicitly or implicitly agreed upon are all that is needed.

Your position is equivalent to saying we can't measure length because we have no yardstick for infinity.

You are making awefully dogmatic claims about what moral theories can do and what they cant without having a knowledge about ethics and the various theories.

As epeeist says - you have to think outside your box. Go ahead and study some of the great moral theories and metaethical theories - Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Mackie etc.

In summary objective moral values are needed,

Both untrue and beside the point. If they were needed for something to be justified doesn't mean they exist - maybe it just isn't justified. But they aren't - as I have shown above.

and my worldview can account for them.

Not quite true - as shown above - theistic morality is either not "absolute" because the values are contingent on the nature of god, or unneeded because if god's nature is necessary then there have to be laws which make his being the way he is necessary and then the values do not in the end come from god, but from what makes his nature the way it is (supposed to be).

But even if, it would be by far not the only theory that can account for objective moral values.

Take Mill for example - who argues that the principle of utility is absolute without invoking any metaphysics. Thus he says there is an absolute standard of morality, namely that of utility - and that this can be proven to be absolute - universal.

I think there might be universal moral imperatives - universal because of the way we are "wired", because the behaviour in accordance with them is evolutionary stable. But that does not require any metaphysical entities. But even if that wasn't so, the following would still be wrong:

I just don't think your philosophy can provide a basis for making moral judgements.

Any ethical theory does that - it's just that you - from within your theory think it insufficient. But that is just "thinking inside the box".

Really, do go ahead and read some ethics... it's not necessarily atheistic.
The point is that it's got nothing to do with that - many of these authors were theists... but they thought independently about morality, about what morality is rational and coherent with the facts about life and living... and that's what you should be doing if you don't simply want to be "following orders".

"why should this and that be done" - "because it's written in this book and this book is authoritative" is no philosophy at all. It's (sorry) blind following.

As I said - many moral philosophers were and are theists - and still thought and think independently about ethics. Only that way can you approach the subject rationally - which seems to be what you want to do.

I really do suggest you study some ethical theories before making bold claims about ethics:

These two are probably the most important since the classical greek philosophers:

John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism (free online here: http://fair-use.org/john-stuart-mill/utilitarianism/ )

Kant - Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ( free pdf here: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/kantgw.pdf )


Both assume universal morality - the latter as metaphysical, the former not.
In comparison to any real ethical theory - theistic morality is utterly simplistic. So it is hard work to think about a foundation of morality - but it's really worth it.

Once you have gained some experience in thinking rationally about ethics and metaethics - you might want to move on to the more daring Mackie, who argues (as do I) that there are no metaphysically objective moral values - but that ethics doesn't need them anyway.

Also do get some experience in ethics before you open a discussion on the forum... it is really helpful. After all, you're thinking about a subject of philosophy here - so it would be wise to learn something about it first. To learn how to think rationally about the subject.

Good luck - and enjoy.. these texts are fantastic, highly intellectual, were absolutely groundbreaking and are two of the absolutely greatest works (whether you agree with them or not - I don't agree with either) in ethics ever written!

1509. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162051 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 4:23 am

I'm extremely interested in thisisme's response to my answer to him... not expecting much, though... without wanting to toot my own horn - I've studied this stuff and had discussions with some very bright people about this... and have yet to see any argument that positively shows that Mackie is wrong about the lack of justification for assuming the existence of metaphysically objective, intrinsic values.

1510. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162029 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 2:42 am

ADDITION:

the problem of

POSSIBLE: p AND NOT-p

is not the only one when it comes to god's nature, necessity and laws:

why are logical tautologies necessarily true? Because of the axioms and inference rules of logic.

Necessity requires laws.


An entity determining its own nature is impossible. Entities are defined by their attributes, so if there is an entity, it must already have attributes - and thus cannot create them itself, because 'itself' already implies having attributes.

But that's all idle - since the clam that god's nature is necessary would require a logical proof to be taken seriously - mind you with no contingencies in any of the premisses...

good luck I say :)

God - as Steve put it rightly - has a serious bootstrapping problem.

1511. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162023 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 2:28 am

all right, thisisme:

First: theistic morality doesn't belong to moral objectivism.

The values are dependent on god, so they are not absolute but contingent. Unless of course you want to say that all of god's "nature", his "character" is necessary - in which case god has no free will and all of his commandments are dependent on the laws that make his nature necessary. Necessity requires laws to make some necessary - at least those of logic... but the laws of logic won't suffice, they even make god impossible (trinity is obviously logically contradictory and omnipotence is covertly. etc).

So in that case the moral commandments are in the end dependent on the laws that make god necessary and thus you might as well cut out the middle man.

If moral values are absolute, then they are logically prior to or higher than god - and you don't need god. If they are dependent on god but god itself is not dependent on anything, then they are not absolute and not objective. Universal may be, but not objective and absolute.

Saying god made the laws of logic won't do either, because that would imply that they could have been different, which implies the statement:

POSSIBLE: p AND NOT-p

which is a logical contradiction, thus rendering the entirety of the beliefs of anyone who even implicitly believes this meaningless via ex falso quodlibet.

Second:

Objective, intrinsic moral values would be
1) something so extremely strange, so different from anything we know that we cannot imagine how they could possibly work. They are supposed to be metaphysical, but somehow connected to actions, intensions, judgements etc as giving them a certain quality (of being morally right or wrong). No one has ever advanced any concept about how this should be possible. They are supposed to be universals, and the things (actions, intentions, judgements etc) to which they apply are supposed to instantiate the universals. But instantiation is also a relation - and as such (if you accept universals) a universal and thus metaphysical. This means that the "Great Line of Being" (Jubien) cannot be crossed.

Fact is invoking anything metaphysical to explain anything is a cheap trick, a cop out. Not a real explanation because it doesn't provide a mechanism by which this should be possible.

2)Metaphysically objective values are epistemologically not knowable. If there were such things - by which faculty could they be known? They cannot be seen, heard, felt (tactile), smelled, not proven by rationality - so how should be know of them?

Bringing in scripture won't help. Because even if the bible were true, you wouldn't know that these are metaphysically objective values, you would just believe it because you believe the authority of scripture - in which case that would have to be demonstrated first.

3) Metaphysically objective moral values are not at all needed to explain anything in the world. In fact, everything we see is much more coherent with the theory that there are no such values, that values are intersubjective, social constructs.

Thrid:
They are not needed to be moral. It's incredibly simplistic and black-and-white thinking of theists that 1)objective moral values need a god (ask Plato, they don't) and 2) they are required for morality.

Philosophical Ethics is the study you want - not theology. There you can learn about all kinds of ethical theories and metaethical theories. The concept of ethical justification exists in all of them.

You may not like a theory - and think it is insufficient because there are no metaphysical moral values. But that is -strictly speaking- your problem. They are not needed for ethical justification.

Any consequentialist ethical theory is consistent with materialism. Utilitarianism for example, or contractualism (which I endorse - see for example "What we owe to each other" by T.M. Scanlon).
There is ethical justification in all ethical theories. And you not being satisfied with any such theory is not an argument against it.

So, fact is that everything we know points towards the conclusion that there are no metaphysically objective moral values and that even if there were, we couldn't know. Theistic morality is either subjectivist, in which case moral values are not absolute and that's bad luck for you - or it is superfluous because if moral values are absolute, no god is needed.
Also, ethical justification is possible without absolute moral values - in any consequentialist theory for example.

1512. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161991 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 1:18 am

I always feel sad when a person abandons rationality... nothing personal.

1513. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161989 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 1:17 am

We await the inevitable gloating comment on this site from David Robertson.

I think Robertson does have the capability to be emotionally a nice person - especially to people with whom he agrees... so the gloating will be submerged in understanding for RM and possibly some pity for those who can't see the "truth".

What it came down to was: Well, it suddenly made sense to me and fulfills my desires... so it's true. Existence claims, claims to interference, to historical events - claims that violate the laws of physics and the laws of logic. Evidence? This is beyond evidence... asking for it is impertinent - it's a "higher truth"... Therefore: Materialism is wrong and rationality doesn't apply...

...it's all I could do to keep from crying.

1514. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161983 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 12:58 am

Well thank you Quetz... reading that post of RM's just ruined my day.

I will have to ask him if he can put up the music again - I still need to download the one his son wrote for me - it was brilliant...

...I'm really sad right now.

1515. School bars same-sex partners at formals

Comment #161959 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 9:25 pm

Maybe this is not such a bad thing - maybe it will get more people to acknowledge the BS and intolerance that religion is spewing.

I think the likely consequence is less people in confessionally bound schools - not less tolerance :)

1516. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161953 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 9:11 pm

Karda,

But actually, there are already proposed mechanisms within our current understanding of physics for time travel. Try again.

You're missing the point. This is about the epistemic probability of the statement to possibility, but to a specific instance of actuality, ie - there will be a culture that will find a method to (for example) keep open wormholes through negative energy/material with negative density and find a way to determine spacetime trajectory of the possible travel, and to find a way to actually travel etc etc.

The epistemic probability is very very low indeed - and as such any of your beliefs that depends on this is unjustified.

Steve,
thanks, I think I understand what you mean now :)

1517. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161939 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 9:00 pm

Correction: not only existence claims, but any claims about states of affairs or the existence of entities.

also.... what Steve said :)

1518. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161937 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:57 pm

Karda,

We went through this before, Steve. First of all you are in a poor position to make assertions about what will be technically possible a billion years from now.

Yes we did go through this before - and I will repeat myself:

We can speculate what future science might be, and might be capable of. But unless these are strict logical inferences from our current knowledge, they have no certainty whatsoever, and the epistemic probability will be extremely low.

This means that when you use them to justify existence claims, this is unwarranted, and the existence claim - if it is dependent partly or wholly on a speculation that has extremely low epistemic probability, then also has extremely low epistemic probability. It is unwarranted.

1519. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161932 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:49 pm

#161917 by Steve:

I agree, but I am increasingly sceptical that the brain really is intrinsically complex. That complexity is effectively programming. Quite simple hardware can contain complex software.

I'm not quite sure what you mean by intrinsic complexity...

I think we have to distinguish complexity and functional complexity. The brain of a newborn human is at first developing far more synapses than needed, and as such has more complexity than at some later stages. But it's not functional complexity then. From all these synapses through training of the neural net (learning), the synaptic bias gets 'tuned'. Synapses that receive next to no synaptic bias vanish, and those (synapses of collections of synaptic pathways) that have the functional complexity to transduce information in the appropriate way (I guess that's what you meant by "Software") get strengthened. So the functional complexity increases for while through a decrease in mere structural complexity and increase in complexity of distributed synaptic bias.

1520. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161924 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:38 pm

Oh well - Bonzai was faster, and much more concise :)

1521. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161923 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:37 pm

Steve

but what I objected to is any implication that our knowledge was somehow relative to us. This seemed very much like a post-modern attitude.

I don't think that's entirely correct. Our knowledge and especially our understanding of this knowledge is relative - the information that's out there is not. If we wanted to say that our knowledge is not relative, we would have to have second order knowledge, which is impossible.

But as I said, the information out there is not relative and is accessible (denying that would be post-modernism) - but we can never be 100% certain that we have got it completely right (even if we should have).

If for anything (other than our own existence and matters of logic) we have enough justification of saying that we truly know it - it is science. But I think we only have the highest incomplete justification of anything here, not complete justification.
The problem of induction, the need to get around gettier examples, the reliance on our senses, the theory-ladenness of perception... these are the things that make the justification less than complete.

Also, science has the knowledge that its claims are provisional in that we can never say "this is so", but "given the available data, this is currently the best theory explaining it".

This is true recursively also for some of the data itself, because it is gotten from instruments that when we simply read off them we also make huge implicit assumptions about the correctness of theories (namely those that say that this instrument picks out such and such)...

But "given the available data, this is currently the best theory we have to explain it" - nothing but science can even begin to approach that kind of justification for statements about the world.

1522. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161910 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:26 pm

just a small point:

Steve:

I am using complexity in terms of what information is required to produce an organism

Absolutely, and when it comes to genetic information you're correct - but don't forget how information from the environment also determines the complexity of an organism (depending on the organism's plasticity).
The human brain is so incredibly complex mostly because of synaptic connections that form in childhood learning - through conditioning of the neural net. And through culture and the increasing complexity of information in culture, through learning through language(s) - this is increasing in complexity as well.

1523. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161890 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:13 pm

I think what the whole knowledge things comes to basically this:

1)As Humans - and as Humans with certain languages, we understand the world around us through certain relative concepts. The universal languages such as mathematics help to reduce this locality of understanding immensely.
Notice it's just the locality of understanding, not of knowing itself, ie (for this argument 'true belief to which one came through a reliable mechanism').

2)All science (figuratively speaking) throws a net over the world to 'capture' the facts - and attempts to tighten the meshes. What this means is that it might never be perfect - but is constantly (thought not necessary linearly) improving the approximation.

Finally, even if we had perfect knowledge even of only one certain, very confined aspect of reality - we can never have second order knowledge that this is so (partly because the problem of induction)

Radesq:
to continue your story...

the epistemologist says: "those swans are white on at least one side given that our sensory apparatus is reliable and that those are actually swans and we are not being cleverly deceived" :)
See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

1524. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161133 by MPhil on April 14, 2008 at 10:21 pm

I will add it to the list of books I plan to get through eventually. Though, it is a large list.

Tell me about it... you do not want to know how many books I "plan on buying/reading/finishing"... one lifetime isn't enough... :)

But while you're at it, add John Ralws "Theory of Justice" as well. Absolutely brilliant (so are his other works).

Though, I felt that Nietzsche was by no means a nihlist,

Quite true - he wasn't.

and took the position that only the weak minded succum to nihlism after loosing their faith in absolute moral dictates.

Not exactly. Nietzsche thought that mankind is only a rope tied between animal and superman - and to cross the "abyss" over which the rope is tied, one first has to abandon all values, even the most basic and essential ones - to make oneself completely free. Only then can one look at the world as it is - and reevaluate all values - erect new ones.

Nihilism to Nietzsche thus was a stage, a step on a ladder - something to be overcome.

Ethical philosophy interests me the most.

I used to feel the same way - especially metaethics is highly interesting. But after reading Mackie, this has shifted a bit. Since I think he's right - that means that there are no metaphysical ethical truths to be discovered. However, that does not mean that the study of ethics is now useless - as the brilliant work "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" by Bernard Williams shows by example.

I find the most fascinating subject to be philosophy of mind - as it addresses what I find to be the most fundamental meaningful questions that can be investigated.

When it comes to ethics - the most interesting question to me is that of a just and stable society... and I find no one has addressed this more rigorously than John Rawls. I don't agree with everything he writes (I don't know of any philosopher with whom I agree 100%). He has produced an idea for investigating the question of what the principles of society should be... the "original position" - using this to determine the principles, the structure of society is one of the most striking ideas I have ever encountered.

(see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/)

I find it troubling that a meaningful discourse is not being persued about ethics and morality, because it appears to me that one large percentage of people are absolutist, and don't think it makes sense to discuss it, because they already know what to do, it has been dictated to them. Then another large percentage think that it is arbitrary and relative, and thus also doesn't make sense to discuss.

I think a very large part of the people on this planet either don't have the leisure to reflect philosophically about ethics - they're busy trying to stay alive.

Then there's the naively religious who just think it's all answered, absolute and final...

Then there's the huge part who just goes about their lives not reflecting much on anything - (probably also a large proportion of the people who would call themselves religious)

While I see no reason why it can't be treated like a system of logic. I see no reason why moral decisions cannot follow from our collective interests, and values, as a culture, as a people, as a species, and ultimately as living things.

Well, you gotta be careful not to commit the naturalistic fallacy - but yes, I think ethical decisions can and should be made logically - while taking into account facts about emotions, society, ecology - facts about living and living as human beings in a (specific) society.

So, today's recommendations for the reading list:

-Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong (John Leslie Mackie - his "The Miracle of Theism" is also probably the most wonderful book arguing against theism)

- A Theory of Justice (John Ralws)

Gotta try to catch at least an hour of sleep now - have to be at university in 3 hours... :/

1525. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161081 by MPhil on April 14, 2008 at 7:16 pm

Groan - are people really still on about the values thing?
I know I do this every time, but I recommend reading "Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong".

Evidence and logic make a very strong case against non interest relative, intrinsical, objective moral values. But some moral values are close to being universally shared - there is intersubjectivity of statements about moral values. While statements about moral values as implying objectivity are wrong - ethics and political philosophy is still possible.

Furthermore, given a shared goal (such as a stable society), imperatives can be derived - we can derive the necessary conditions for erecting and maintaining a society we are prepared to call just. Consequentialism in ethics is absolutely possible and can be totally coherent.

Nihilism fails to see these most basic truths.

1526. Richard Dawkins and Bill Maher

Comment #159345 by MPhil on April 12, 2008 at 1:56 am

Yes, sometimes he is - like with the Magic Johnson part in New Rules - but the final New Rule about the catholic church, especially the last statement on the topic hits the nail on the head:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w82G7LoATkw

1527. Richard Dawkins and Bill Maher

Comment #159310 by MPhil on April 11, 2008 at 11:43 pm

Used to like Maher quite a bit - especially his stand-up work - some good points, some good jokes and sometimes very good at performing.

But he's a hit and miss guy, really. Some very strange ideas - sometimes taking a good idea and pushing it into lunacy (careful with meds - don't take a pill for every little thing -> meds are evil for example). Also, some of his political positions are a little strange and unsubstantiated, and he doesn't seem to be able to acknowledge when he's wrong about them... but I do enjoy him now and then.

1528. German Church admits aiding Nazis

Comment #157800 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 2:42 pm

They didn't admit a fraction of the actual responsibility they shared and share... it's disgusting.

How about Stepinac? How about the Franciscans who worked as overseers in death camps?

How about the Rat Line?

How about the beatification of Stepinac?

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/267.html

1529. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157732 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 1:33 pm

Frankus -

indeed - it was the phosphor that made the air so hot that people burned just from standing on the street - and either died of the heat, the gases, the explosions or from suffocation.

Never forget any atrocity - a good policy.

1530. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157724 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 1:16 pm

Thanks Al,


I think we have this cleared up now :)

Back to making our local Holocaust-denier feel unwelcome!

1531. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157722 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 1:15 pm

Al,

I stand corrected. I did not realize that these cities were of no value to the Allies.

Let's say of little value - there were factories and roads there important for the military - but those could have been destroyed without bombing the whole city to the ground.

As for my position, I don't have one, I was simply saying that the argument "can be made" in favor of the bombings.

Definitely. See above - I think many were justified.

I will say every German shares some responsibility for what happened to the Jews and many other massacred people, as well as all those who died in their racist, imperialist military escapades. They had their chance to stand up for what was right, they didn't, for whatever reason.

I assume you mean everyone living back then who did not passively or actively resist?

Even then I'm not so sure... you know what indoctrination can do, you know what how propaganda can affect desperate people, starving and beaten. You know what fear can do in a totalitarian state. Not everyone was or is informed or brave.

The treaty of Versailles (blaming - wrongly, as any serious historian will tell you - WWI entirely on Germany) helped to deprive Germany of its essential resources to feed and shelter its population. Given that scape-goating is popular and the anti-semitism was rampant everywhere back then - Hitler had the perfect platform.

"Join the SA and get food and shelter"... add some brilliant rhethorics, and the hope of the people to help make "this nation great again" - and Hitler had them by the balls.

The people who were raised in Nazi households - or even only those who were educated in Nazi schools and were members of the Hitler youth - I don't think they are to blame. Nor do I think are the simple soldiers, the cannon-fodder to blame who were simply forced to obey (or be killed).

There is moral responsibility for not doing something once you have seen what atrocities you government commits, and possibly for not informing yourself where it was possible.

I just don't think that is true of everyone living in Germany back then. Not even close.

Take my great grandfather. He was a member of the SPD (middle-left party) and had a relatively high position in Franconia. He was a member of the Bavarian parliament.

When Julius Streicher (editor of "Der Stürmer", the propaganda paper of the Nazis and good friend of Hitler's - also a very high Nazi official) spewed his bile in the Bavarian parliament, my great-grandfather got up and slapped his face...

whereupon he lost his position, his civilian job, and every hope for regaining it.
Then, in 1943 for many people the only way to survive (get a job to be able to afford food and shelter) was to enter the Nazi party.

So my great-grandfather grudgingly joined so as to be able to get a job and get his house back, to be able to keep his family alive. But he was never a friend of the Nazis, he hated them - always.

I wouldn't say he is to blame. Nor my grandfather who was sixteen when they forced him to put on a uniform, take up a rifle and fight the enemy - the "Volkssturm".


Anyway - I can see you have a reasonable position.

Just felt I should write this anyway.

1532. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157713 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 12:57 pm

The traffic routes and factories in Dresden could have been targeted without dropping bombs in the knowledge that they would burn down the whole city.

My grandparents have lived through that. I don't think anyone living in a country that never had a large military machine attack them directly can imagine what it is like. Seeing a 150 kilometre stream of bombers fly overhead, hearing the sirens - cowering for shelter in the basement, then hearing the explosions - going out to look for family members only to find that the fires are so large that the temperature on the streets is enough to burn your flesh, that you cannot really breathe - to see your house, and thousands upon thousands others reduced to rubble.



This is not meant as an appeal to emotion - merely to make clear the horror inflicted upon these people.

Yes, stopping Nazi Germany, stopping the death-camps, the invasions and the atrocities was absolutely necessary. But some things that were done to achieve that were atrocities as well - and should and could have been avoided. That's all I'm saying.

I am not condemning the bombing of Nazi Germany in general - absolutely not. The industry, the roads, factories, train-tracks etc, the military bases - that was absolutely justified. These and more - but not all of the bombings - and certainly not the ones specifically targeting civilians.

1533. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157703 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 12:43 pm

Al,

two things.

1. No it didn't - at least not generally. Many cities, towns and villages were bombed that did not support the war effort in any way anymore - many at a time when the Nazi War Machine was already on its knees. Dresden town centre for example was entirely unnecessary. Peenemünde - yes. Dresden, no!

2. If the bombings of elderly, women, children and generally civilians as was done there did help to bring down the Nazi War Machine it would do that in no other way than bombing almost all civilian settlements of any country during war would, because they are "raw-material" for the war machine. So you could say that it would be justified to carpet bomb Baghdad, Basra, Rome (during WWII), the Vichy-French cities etc.

Many cities, many civilians could have been spared by targeting only the infrastructure that was essential to the War effort. Certainly not the town centres and non-industrial districts of Dresden, Bayreuth and countless other cities.

Even in war - not everything is permitted to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible - for that would justify the worst atrocities. Killing hundreds of thousands of civilians is not justifiable in my opinion.

I can understand you position - maybe you can understand mine.

1534. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157692 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 12:26 pm

I'm sorry, but this

for every Dresden there was a Coventry. There really isn't any need for the allies to justify their position; it was war and war is not nice.

is just astonishing. What's that? The slaughtering of civilians is justified because the other side did it too - and to a larger extent? That's just plain disgusting. And no - it's not that for every Dresden there was a Coventry. Germany remains the only country to date with a first-world population density and culture where all larger cities, towns and villages were bombed to the ground, so much that you'd be hard pressed to find a single city that wasn't bombed.

Yes, waging war against Nazi Germany was necessary, stopping them was necessary - but that doesn't justify all atrocities that were committed in the process. Simply stating "well it's war" and "inter arma enim silent leges" won't do I'm afraid.

You can say that Nazi Germany in the end brought it upon itself, but that does not mean that the bombing of cities, towns and villages is justified.

An act of slaughtering civilians doesn't become justified simply because it happens during war and was committed against Nazi Germany.

People who know me will know that I condemn the crimes of the Nazis absolutely - but you're position is simplistic, black-and-white and altogether not very humane.

1535. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157620 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 10:47 am

hungarianelephant,

good post. I generally agree.

What troubles me is that this ignores the evidence that a lot of local commanders were acting on their own initiative.

I wasn't really aware that this is not general knowledge. Of course Hitler, Heß, Himmler etc still had the plan for the final solution, approved of whatever the local commanders did to kill the jews (preferably have them work beforehand in the later years). And of course the logistic effort was still largely planned from above. But that the local commanders share responsibility - is that really questioned?

The Nazis were not solely Germans. They were drawn from every one of the occupied countries. Had the invasion of Britain succeeded, it's reasonable to assume that there would have been a Vichy-style government based somewhere like York or Durham, and that Brits would have volunteered for the SS - so no moral highground for us either.

Also true - the Nazis received high praise internationally before people knew of the death camps. They had supporters everywhere - Britain, the US, France, Russia, Hungary etc.

The catholic clergy deserves a lot of blame as well. Many people do not realize the extent.

Stepinac, the Roman Archbishop and friend and supporter of Nazi-puppet Pavelic (Ustashe) oversaw the forced conversion and otherwise execution of thousands. (although he later changed his mind concerning the extermination of the jews)

Franciscan monks worked in concentration camps (as overseers mind you)

There are literally dozens of pictures showing Roman catholic clergymen saluting Hitler.

Have a look at these:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aloysius_Stepinac

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ante_Pavelic

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ustaše

Anyway - good post hungarianelephant!

1536. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157598 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 10:13 am

Peacebeuponme,

you're right - given that the evidence is there and overwhelming, and the responsibility is there to learn from that, I find the act immoral, but perhaps not the person who honestly does not know better - but then, if there is one topic where you COULD know better, it's this... so maybe there still is a moral dimension.

1537. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157585 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 9:55 am

Can I just ask though: what did you think of the Jewish fellow on the programme? He seemed to indicate that Jewish suffering was such a special case that it needed a different application of law. That is not something I would subsrcribe to. The Mongol expansion did not happen by negotiation, but if I put forward the view that Ghengis Khan was a jolly fine fellow, I would be rebutted and ridiculed. I wouldn't expect the Chinese and most of Asia to want to imprison me. Of course that was over 600 years ago and WWII was pretty recent. However, I get disappointed by what seems to me to be special pleading for the Jewish case from time to time.

Well - the Holocaust was unique at least in the respect that never before have such detailed, strict, industrial logistics so coldly been applied in genocide. The "technology" used and especially the logistics of the Holocaust is what makes it unique. It is also what accounts for the "banality of evil", to quote Arendt. Eichmann himself said that it made no difference whether he was managing the logistics of shipping potatoes or sending millions of people to their death - it was logistics and his duty.

I do feel that it is morally unacceptable to deny the holocaust, to have Hitler as one's hero or even say that this all wasn't that bad - I feel at least as long as the survivors of Auschwitz, Dachau, Flossenbürg etc and their immediate relatives and friends, as well as the liberators are still alive, a special situation in Germany where denial of the Holocaust is an offence is not morally illegitimate.

But generally, and in perhaps a few decades time, I hope we won't need that any more - it should go without saying that we find something like that disgusting.

And maybe then the education about Germany in other countries will also be able to make sure that kids don't grow up associating Germany and Germans inextricably with Naziism, that they know that this was a 12-year period in a millenium of history including some of the most famous writers, composers, philosophers, scientists and so on - maybe one could also include in the curricula how modern Germany has successfully dealt with its past. This would surely serve to normalize the situation again.

So - it still is something special, mostly as long as the people it affects are still alive - and we should never forget, we should all learn the lessons from this (including the ones that Germany has learned) - but taking into account the technological and logistical means, it wasn't unique in history and this should be acknowledged. Genocides have taken place in the US, in Turkey, in China, in Mongolia and other places... but sensitivity to the survivors is definitely a good thing.

1538. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157577 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 9:35 am

okay then...

"Someone denying the Holocaust - that makes a battalion of bells, an army of alarm-bells, a peal, a carillon go off in my head"

Everyone happy now? :)

1539. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157574 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 9:28 am

Cartomancer,

you're right of course... but since it is somehow amusing, I'm not going to change my post :)

1540. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157568 by MPhil on April 9, 2008 at 9:20 am

Despite my critiques of Israel, the saying "Never Again" says exactly what I feel.

My feelings exactly. And I am very glad that this is deeply etched in the collective conscience of the world - and most of all Germany. Some will get defensive when some stupid assholes from Britain, the US or elsewhere will lift their right arm and cry "Sieg Heil" whenever they meet a German, when they still think Germans are generally Nazis and when these 12 years are the only thing they know about when it comes the millenium of German history. All the composers, philosophers, scientists, painters, writers and other cultural figures of world rank are disregarded, only these horrible, disgusting 12 years count. This is so incredibly sad that I understand that this elicits a blocking reaction or even an aggressive one.

Still, never forget, never let anything like it happen again. That is one of the foremost duties of every nation on earth.

But at least the denazification worked, German society and politics is as aware of the dangers of nationalism, unquestioning, rallying-round-the-flag patriotism, and militarism as can be... and we (or at least I) will always point the finger at any person, group or nation that is moving in that direction.

Would that all nations learned as much from the crimes in their history.

Someone denying the holocaust... makes a battalion of alarm-bells go off in my head.

1541. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157290 by MPhil on April 8, 2008 at 9:09 pm

ASMarques,

My goodness - that's sickening.

You are without a doubt the (willing or not) victim of a conspiracy theory of the largest scale - which is extremely disgusting in its denial of one of the planned mass exterminations in history.

We have the original documents of the deportations, the photos, the gas canisters, the confessions on record, the eye-witness reports, the films, the survivors, some surviving descendants of the victims or other family members - we have the confessions, the radio reports.

I've been to the concentration camps - I've talked to survivors, I've talked to an American soldier who saw these things, I've seen the confessions, heard and read both the official statements of the Nazis concerning the Final Solution, their propaganda, - for goodness sake, I have seen the evidence both for the Reichspogromnacht, the Deportation and the extermination myself.

You however support a disgusting conspiracy theory - and the evidence against it couldn't be better documented and preserved. I'd like you to tell your story to anyone who has lost family members in Auschwitz, Dachau, Flossenbürg etc.. or to the Soldiers who liberated the camps, or to the few remaining survivors themselves... although on second thought I wouldn't want you to inflict that kind of cruelty on those people.

Being a conspiracy theorist of the worst kind, you will (as you have) "blame" my reaction on being "blinded" by the conspiracy, on being misinformed and not allowed or willing to see the truth.

You are figuratively spitting on the graves of the victims of the Holocaust, in the faces of the survivors and the families and friends of the deceased...

... I think I speak for all of the people on this site when I say that this is entirely unacceptable behaviour, and that this site, a place of truth, reason AND empathy is no place for someone like you!

1542. Richard Dawkins on The Big Questions

Comment #157266 by MPhil on April 8, 2008 at 7:40 pm

ASMarques:

and then about the so-called "Holocaust" (in fact the latest politically and religiously motivated aggiornamento of Judaism, riddled with contradictions and straight falsehoods that fly in the face of careful examination).

Are you denying that the holocaust took place?

If not, forgive the following - but if so, this is for you:


Claiming that the actual sites of the atrocities (which I visited), the perpetrators (who confessed), the detailed accounts (remember Eichmann?), the video (which I saw), the incredible amount of actual evidence and above all -
the eye-witness reports (I talked to survivors of the camps) and the people still alive who knew the people who were slaughtered....

.... that this is somehow forged?

I - as a German, an Atheist, someone who has studied the history, and mostly as a human being capable of rationality and empathy - have to say:

I am disgusted beyond words by denial of the holocaust, and by any person capable of that!

1543. Fleabytes

Comment #156196 by MPhil on April 7, 2008 at 4:34 am

Just want to say I don't like being singled out by Robertson for intelligent and rational comments. There are so many amazing people on here - almost all of which I would call intelligent and rational. Some very much so - to the point of some admiration from me.


Furthermore, Mr. Robertson - if you should happen to read this (the above being your final post notwithstanding) - two small points:

1. There are atheists who still argue for metaphysically objective moral values, and they can - but in that sense they are not "brights". The two mustn't necessarily always go together. And as I said - one can simply postulate metaphysical entities, no deity needed.

but more importantly

2. That many people including me think there are no metaphysically objective moral values does not mean that we think there are no rather universal moral realities - such as evolved constants of behaviour. Objectively necessary imperatives for the survival of individuals and the species. Now if we can have the shared goal of survival of the individuals in question and the human (and other) species, these objectively necessary imperatives become moral values derived from objectively necessary imperatives given one shared goal (it might be an evolutionary constant that this goal is shared...)

-MPhil

1544. Dawkins warns of human extinction

Comment #155732 by MPhil on April 5, 2008 at 12:08 pm

Sehr interessant, danke Paula.

Schon traurig wenn man bedenkt dass man in den meisten Fällen keine Chance auf eine höhere Ausbildung hatte wenn man kein Parteimitglied war, beziehungsweise wenn die eigenen Eltern keine Mitglieder waren - oder gar politische Gegner.

(And for the non-German speakers :) -

Very interesting - thanks Paula.

It's sad that in most cases you didn't have a chance to get a higher education if you weren't a party member, or if your parents weren't party members... not to speak of political opponents. [which, in a one-party system comes down to "undesirables"].)

1545. Dawkins warns of human extinction

Comment #155726 by MPhil on April 5, 2008 at 11:47 am

ZekeCDN,

the difference is quite astounding. While I haven't been to East Germany before 1990, I am thoroughly educated on how it was there, and have spoken with many people who lived there and went to school at that time.

Nowadays it's pretty much like west Germany - only that there are more "Plattenbauten" (70s giant, ugly concrete buildings), more xenophobia (especially in the rural areas) and slightly less prosperity. Otherwise it's just like West Germany. And of course the many national and international treasures are now more beautiful than ever - the Dresden Frauenkirche, the Leipzig Thomaskirche (where J.S. Bach was Thomaskantor), the Berlin palace is about to be rebuilt, the Alexanderplatz, the Anna Amalia Bibliothek etc.

Really a lot to see - and well worth the trip.

But I'm still interested to hear how Paula got into an East German School - since they were official, public schools where the teachers were screened pretty thoroughly by the Stasi and had to meet with government approval.

1546. Dawkins warns of human extinction

Comment #155720 by MPhil on April 5, 2008 at 11:20 am

Paula,

how did you - a westerner - get to teach English in East Germany before the Reunification? (And in which city, if I may ask)?

And can I gather from this "dass du ein wenig Deutsch sprichst?" :)

1547. Pastor attacks scientist's talk

Comment #154983 by MPhil on April 4, 2008 at 3:29 am

Cartomancer,

I would go even further.
If something exists which we can know nothing about, then we couldn't even perceive it, observe it or recognize it - because that would already imply knowing something about it - namely that it's there.

So unless one wants to declare complete intellectual bankruptcy by asserting that we have a "sensus divinitatis" or some such thing - all we can possibly perceive is physical and even the speculation that something more exists can never be anything else than unwarranted.

Even if we observe a phenomenon we cannot explain at all - that would give us no justification for postulating anything supernatural.

1548. Pastor attacks scientist's talk

Comment #154971 by MPhil on April 4, 2008 at 3:18 am

I'm with Cartomancer...

two and a half millennia of philosophy have failed to show what you (Artful Dodger) assert, and in the last century of philosophy of mind, especially the last four decades very good accounts have been forwarded of how materialism can deal with these things.

1549. Fleabytes

Comment #154403 by MPhil on April 3, 2008 at 7:22 am

"sodden vibrator" - lol
btw - anagram finder:

http://wordsmith.org/anagram/

1550. Fleabytes

Comment #154373 by MPhil on April 3, 2008 at 6:34 am

Sorry, couldn't resist - but our theist friend's response to "Paul suffered a heatstroke" was just too much... it immediately reminded me of the last picture in this comic.