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Comment #137031 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 7:10 am

Roland_F,

essentially good summary. But it wasn't just against Aquinas, but against all after him with various "omnipotence"-defences.

And not only would an extra-universal god be unable to interfere - an agent (a consciousness, a person) cannot coherently be conceived to be without material substrate - the concept of a mind without matter (or in fact a mind that isn't matter) is flawed - outright wrong.

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Comment #137022 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 6:40 am

some of the axioms in some theology are not just unreasonable, they are just plain wrong - they go against our scientific understanding of reality.

And not just that - some are inherently contradictory, so what they postulate cannot even possibly exist (what my article was mainly about).

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Comment #137004 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 5:43 am

Just because we can philosophise our way to deep and complex theoretical explanations of why a god would be required, doesn't for one moment mean that the theory must reflect reality.

Actually, if they were to demonstrate that concepts and theories we do use (premises we actually have) do necessarily require a god, then that would mean that for all we know they must reflect reality.

Conceptual necessity cannot just be waved off - it is a matter of logic, and it must be dealt with by showing that either the premises are flawed or the inferences are not drawn correctly - which is what is being done when we talk about why dualism is flawed and why theology is flawed.

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Comment #136931 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 3:40 am

AtheistAspy,

indeed. Theists can only use philosophy, ie critical reflective thinking about reality where it supports their case. The theists philosophy is much like the theists biology, not free inquiry but constrained to having to strengthen a specific position. Since philosophy naturally is all about rationality, it has to be twisted and abused to produce that. Really sad.


Paula,

thanks for having taken the time read the comment. I appreciate it. And I do think we should be careful to make clear that we only play their game to show them how that is incompatible with reality - and demand for evidence to the contrary before we take it seriously.

Steve,

eliminative materialism does indeed state that at least certain mental states claimed by folk psychology do not exist, while others are merely very much off the mark.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/

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Comment #136836 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 7:47 pm

robotaholic,

are you? last time you mentioned it, you seemed to be making fun of it...

Actually, I'm not sure... I'm somewhere in between teleofunctionalism and eliminative materialism.

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Comment #136825 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 7:25 pm

Brian,

well, so do I - but when have they ever played by the rules of rationality?

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Comment #136821 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 7:20 pm

Russell Blackford,

I agree with your post #136804... (and yes, I had discussed this)...


But there are two things I'd like to add:

"We are too limited to know" is definitely not a good answer. We can speculate about what exists, but we can generally never have sufficient justification for positively assuming that something exists which we cannot comprehend.

This is for several reasons:
1)A problem of referring: Entities are defined by their properties - if we cannot comprehend something, we cannot specify the properties of that assumed entity. We thus have no means of picking that entity out from the set of all things by referring to it, because we can only refer through a sufficiently definite description (even if implicit). It doesn't matter whether god exists or not for this - we can never even potentially refer to something if we cannot comprehend it.

Even if we have some attributes, if we don't know the nature of the thing, we do not know if they are sufficiently definite to pick out only that object in referring. I can say "That entity which has a mass of X"... but this will pick out extremely many entities. The description has to be known to be sufficiently definite.

2)A problem of inconsistency: The theists say god is basically not knowable... yet they assign a large number of properties to him - a contradiction.

3)A problem of epistemology: We can speculate that something exists which we cannot comprehend, but we can never have sufficient justification for assuming that something specific does, because this would exceed the limitations of our knowledge - the assumption is in any case unwarranted.

__________________________

Okay. But we are also too limited to specify what it's like to be a bat - assuming that bats have some kind of consciousness and that there's something that is like to be a bat.

Ah yes, the famous paper by Thomas Nagel - he is somewhat a mystic though concerning consciousness.
He thinks it is forever incomprehensible.
I think Dennett and Churchland have much better points. We need not assume that qualia exist, that there is anything it is to be like a bat, or indeed to have qualia at all. But if we do, we can access that from the third person view, as Churchland has demonstrated - from a neurocomputational perspective: We can even predict phenomenal experiences (see his wonderful paper "Chimerical Colours").

But this is off topic... the first part of this comment is at least somewhat on topic.

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Comment #136793 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 5:13 pm

Russell Blackford,

I think if you reread my original post, you'll find that I deal with the topic in your second paragraph... but I get your point, and I don't disagree. Your aim of challanging the cognitive and moral authority is mine as well, primarily but not exclusively.

I know about the other philosophers of religion, and they do have good arguments - better ones than the theists... but I fear there's no one of Mackie's calibre among them... but they still are very good... and I think I'm not doing bad either :)

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Comment #136787 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 5:07 pm

Brian,

it's more "physicalism means no intentionality, no qualia, no mind... but minds exist... and minds need god, therefore god exists"... drivel.

Oh, and just today the hopeless Plantinga-argument: "rationality could not have come about through evolution"

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Comment #136785 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 5:02 pm

I am not sure that is needed. I like Dawkins' approach of not wandering into the theologists' territory unless they can provide a reason for going there, and that would require them dealing arguments like that of the "Ultimate 747", and the fact that the work of Einstein and Planck means that (as I understand things) the theological ideas of tims and causality make little sense anymore. We can't let them beg the question.

Okay - conceded. I see no problem in showing them the blunders they make on their home turf, but perhaps we should make clear that this is just playing their game, not taking it seriously... for that they would have to demonstrate that it makes sense. After all, Dawkins does deal with omnipotence and Aquinas' "proofs" in TGD.

(Incidentally, I don't personally think PZ Myers' Courtier's Reply works that well in dealing with the issue of theology, as it begs the question in the matter of God's non-existence. We should take the position of God not being demonstrated (yet?))

I still take the position that interventionist Gods are impossible... but "not being demonstrated" works just as well I think.

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Comment #136780 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:57 pm

Sorry, my bad Steve... I shouldn't have linked to that site without explanation. I will edit my post with the link.

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Comment #136778 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:56 pm

Once the debate is finished, however... I think it would be wise for us to combine our intellects and strengthen Steve's position (without being insulting or demeaning, since Steve is right - Tennant is at least polite).

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Comment #136774 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:54 pm

Brian English,


I think it would be wise not to forestall the debate, as the arguments we might post as comments thus become less effective when Steve uses them, - they lose their "surprise"-value.

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Comment #136764 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:43 pm

Brian English,

tenured position? Maybe later... for now I just offered my assistance to the horseman for the more technical philosophical points about religion. They already got Dennett for philosophy of mind, so my I won't be able to contribute substantially in this - my main field... it's already filled by one of the best living philosophers... but maybe when it comes to philosophy of religion and of science, I could do some good :D

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Comment #136763 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:39 pm

Dr. Benway,

indeed - in fact, the Christian with whom Steve Zara is engaged in debates makes the particularly ludicrous leap from "this shows that an immaterial mind exists" to "therefore, a triune God does exist"...

I honestly didn't know whether to laugh or cry when I read what he obviously considered the "argument" for this. I didn't think it was possible to be convinced that anything like such an "argument" is valid (or sound).

EDIT: We should hold off with the comments on that debate until it is finished, I think.

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Comment #136748 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:21 pm

I can begin to see Robertson's ploy. Get Dawkins involved in such a pointless discussion with those more practised at it, then if Dawkins fails to impress, this would be some kind of "victory" on home ground for the theists, sidelining the issue of the existence of that which is omnipotent in the first place.

That's why I think Dawkins shouldn't do such a thing, and why I think we to elevate a "philosopher of atheism" who knows and can counter such arguments into "horseman" status.
Sadly, Mackie is dead... he was the best. But there are still a few very good ones left.

If there are no volunteers - I could fill in :P

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Comment #136735 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 4:15 pm

But doesn't Leftow realize that "as possible as the constraints of the universe allow" means that personhood and agency without substrate is impossible, that consciousness, not to speak of conscious creation of that of which one is an intrinsic part is thus impossible?

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Comment #136716 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 3:57 pm

The problem of evil is certainly a real problem. But the Christian dogma does include the concepts I attacked - and they need to have coherent concepts in order for them to even have the possibility of being descriptive of something. This is what they claim, so it's fair to attack that.

It should bother a Christian that the dogmas of the attributes of his/her god are inconsistent.

Of course they can just state that it really means something like invincible and 'just' incredibly knowledgeable.... but most want a lot more from their God than that.

And furthermore, the problems with consciousness, agency, personhood and being perfect - and outside of space(time) is something they cannot get around with any interpretation.

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Comment #136712 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 3:51 pm

Btw, Paula if you should happen to read this - I would really like to hear your opinion on my long post on page 50, since you have done such admirable work in the article.

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Comment #136706 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 3:36 pm

Russell Blackford,

still, the term "all powerful" is not a strict technical term, as it uses the concept of power or ability and the concept of degrees and absolutes... none of which are limited to theology. It's not like "brane" in String Theory or "relativistic time-dilatation"... they rely on concepts accessible to and used by all. Therefore the criticisms apply... and the inconsistencies of all the definitions are untouched by your argument.

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Comment #136701 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 3:33 pm

Brian English,

I don't know if they are lying or deluded... but I would think deluded. Well, at least they are intellectually engaging and attempting to deal with the arguments - not just the "But I'm right! I know I'm right!" kind of arguments that someone like Robertson uses.

...they're still wrong, but at least in a somewhat interesting way.

Quine,

absolutely!

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Comment #136686 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 2:59 pm

Steve,

oh my... yes, vitalism is unfalsifiable, but he doesn't really think it is therefore viable (and apply that 'reason' to his own argument)?

I think I really will enjoy my good mood for a little while longer and read it later.

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Comment #136683 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 2:55 pm

Thanks, Quine.

I empathise. It really is like that. However, philosophers haven't stopped debating theologians - unless you only mean face to face debates. From Bertrand Russell to John Leslie Mackie to Stegmueller, philosophers of the 20th century, early and late - have taken on theologians.

Great name btw.

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Comment #136675 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 2:46 pm

Thanks.

Steve, I've read the PM... I'll look at Bnonn's response once I feel I can stomach a heap of steaming pseudo-intellectual bullshit.


(too graphic? Maybe I shouldn't have used 'stomach' :)

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Comment #136661 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 2:26 pm

The Problem of Omnipotence - or how the Idea of an Omnipotent Creator is Doomed from the Outset



David Robertson,

yes indeed. You seem to have no thorough understanding of theology, apologetics or the history thereof, as evidenced by your remark about omnipotence.

First, isn't it astounding that it was read and is read by all who first encounter it as "being able to do everything" right until someone points out why that doesn't work? Then what is being done is an ad hoc, ex post facto reinterpretation to save the notion, with the mindset "it must be true, therefore I have to find out how I can twist the meaning so as to avoid the problem".

This is of course immense dishonesty - and a sign of despair, whatever the rationalization.


The only theological twist you seem to be aware of however is "Omnipotence doesn't mean 'being able to do anything'" as this would imply logical contradictions. Yet of course you have not provided a usable definition of "omnipotence" that leads to no contradictions either de facto or logical. Why am I not surprised?

I could of course have a little fun with you and ask you for one before I proceed, then demonstrate the problems with it - which would leave you in the predicament of either admitting that you have no useful definition (and in order not to be dishonest should abandon the notion) or to demonstrate yet another instance of ad hoc, ex post facto reinterpretation.

But I'm not malicious, so I'll just do it for you:

I suppose you would say "Well, it is most certainly the case that 'omnipotent' means that God can do anything that is not logically contradictory."

Wow, who would have thought that would be the first step, eh? The problems with this definition are 1) That the laws of logic are a constraint of god's powers - they are higher than god's powers.

What would a weasel say now? Yes, you guessed it "But God created the laws of logic, and thus restricted his own power of his own will".

Aside from the fact that a perfect being (perfectus est - lit. "it is done through", i.e. "finalized") can per definition have neither desire nor therefore will, this would mean that at one time his will and power were not thus limited, since he created these specific laws logic, and could have chosen not to constrict himself that way.

But this would require us to think that God did once have the power to do something that does not conform to these specific laws of logic, hence to do something logically contradictory. But this is the problem the definition was set out to avoid, so the theologian is back where he started - at having a belief that a logical contradiction is possible, in fact that all logical contradictions are possible.

In other terms, his beliefs still (implicitly) include:

'possible: A AND ~A'

Enter the dreaded 'ex falso quodlibet' - from a logical inconsistency (a logical contradiction) all statements, and thus all contradictions follow and the whole of the beliefs is rendered meaningless.

"BUT," the theologian might say (indeed some have) "These laws of logic are part of God's nature - and acting against one's own nature would be a conceptual impossibility - so there was no possibility of God acting outside logic".

Oh dear, this won't help either - because what this means is that God is determined by his 'nature', which include these laws of logic. According to the classical concept of 'free will' as incompatibilistic (which theologians do, in fact must assume) this means that God is subject to determination and has no free will - there is no spontaneous causation, he is not the uncaused cause any more. God's will would be predetermined and all his supposed attributes therefore meaningless.

This brings us to another fatal flaw in the concept of an eternal, perfect deity "outside" or "above" time: The concept of agency, indeed the concept of consciousness and personhood (which are all attributed to God) necessitate being subject to change, which necessitates being inside time. An act is always the purposeful bringing about of change from one state (the act not yet having been performed) to another (the act having been performed), change can only happen in time. But space and time are inextricably linked (as evidenced by Einstein's relativity theory) - space-time. So God would have to be within space-time and thus subject to all the laws therein. It would of course then be impossible for him to have created it if the concept of "God" necessitates (which it does - via being conscious, a person - an agent) being inside space-time. (Even if Einstein was wrong - being inside time would suffice for this argument - but for all we know he wasn't wrong).

"Well," the theologian might say (again, some indeed have) "then God must just 'span all of (space)time'. See what I mean by "ad hoc, ex post facto reinterpretation"?
This of course does no good here, for it would not free God of being subject to all the laws that apply in space-time, and thus making it impossible that he has created it - as I explained above.

Any one of these arguments alone is fatal to theism - but we want to concentrate on the problem of "Omnipotence". Just to have some more fun, let us for a moment forget about the fatal flaws of the concept of an eternal, supernatural creator explained above. What can the theologian do to avoid the problem of implicit belief in the possibility of logical contradiction (possible: A AND ~A) now? Nothing, if he wants to retain the notion that God is the creator of logic or does have free will. But let's leave even that aside for a moment. Let's concentrate on the inherent problems of omnipotence.

So far we have already seen that the theologian must avoid the fatal problem of „God can do logically impossible things". But he also has to make sure that God cannot interfere with free will. This is another problem, as it is obviously a constriction of the power of god. Even if God could interfere with free will but doesn't �" this would be fatal, as then the will wouldn't be free, but dependent on God's will. So the theologians' answer has been mostly „God has limited his power of his own will so that he cannot interfere with free will, therefore he is still omnipotent".

This is of course blatantly false. I could incarcerate myself and throw away the key, but then I lack an ability I had before, namely moving in the realm outside the cell. Therefore this is a subtraction of my abilities. God is in that sense, not omnipotent any more.

„BUT", the theologian might say (you can see where this is going) „God could restore his power, so he still has maximum potential and is omnipotent". This is akin to locking myself in, but keeping the key instead of throwing it away. Granted I cannot walk to the door and 'just' open it. I would have to use the key first, but I can still walk outside the cell without any problem, so I can interfere with that outside of the cell, even though I may not want to or do so. This brings us back to the problem above - free will would not be free, but dependent on God's will.

It is astounding to me that any theologian can maintain the idea that a limitation so as not to be able to interfere with free will does not detract from "omnipotence". This is surely a most blatant ad hoc, ex post facto reinterpretation. For goodness sake, I can interfere with other's will and limit it. I can influence others deliberately through rhetoric, I can perform operant conditioning - all of which purposefully reshape the "freedom" of the will of others.

I'm not omnipotent, but apparently I can do something that God cannot do. Interesting.

But let's forget about that problem for a moment and allow the theologian to declare that a restriction of the ability so as to preserve free will is compatible with the concept of „omnipotence".

The attempts of apologetics to redefine 'omnipotence' have been astounding and saddening at the same time. It truly does look desperate and dishonest.


Here is a definition used by Flint and Freddoso (in 'Maximal Power'):

A person S is omnipotent at a time t if and only if S can
at t actualize any state of affairs that is not described by counterfactuals
about the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible
for someone to actualize, given the same hard past at t and the same
true counterfactuals about free acts of others.
(cited in William Lane Craig, „Theistic Critiques of Atheism", Cambridge Companion to Atheism)


Craig claims that this is a successful definition. No non-theologian, no one who doesn't have the agenda to rationalize, to save a concept without evidence in the face of so many problems could come up with something like this.
Aside from all the fatal problems I mentioned above, this definition suffers from another problem.

And yes, it is the old „Can God create an object too heavy for him to lift" problem. Because contrary to what most people assume, this is not a logical impossibility. In fact, people can do that easily. One can assemble molecules in a way that the object that results is too heavy for me to lift. A welder could weld metal together for that purpose.... or a glass-manufacturer could melt sand to create a glass-object too heavy for him to lift.

The fact that in such cases, we are not the creators of the molecules is of no importance, because the object assembled from them is still created by the one who forms the object: He brings it about and it wouldn't have come into existence without him.

So again - if people can actually do something, it isn't logically impossible. This is a state that is „not described by counterfactuals about the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible for someone to actualize [...]"

Under that description, God would have to be able to do it. But then there is again something he cannot do, namely lift that object. Of course the theologian could attempt to weasel out by saying "this would be a physical action, and we all know god isn't a physical being". Nice try... but that would limit God's power even more, now wouldn't it? Suddenly, an uncountably infinite set of things becomes impossible for him: All physical actions, of which the set of all physical actions possible for all humans is just a subset.

Now that's some omnipotence, isn't it? This of course brings us again to the problem of agency outside of space-time - which is a contradictory concept (as I have shown above). Furthermore, Jesus was physical at least in some sense that he could perform physical acts such as actually walk, raise his hand and whatnot. But since Jesus is also God (the impossible concept of the trinity), the "but god isn't a physical being" defence doesn't work for yet another reason.


The history of apologetics is really a sad story, full of such attempts to desperately save a concept that is doomed from the outset. Such attempts to rationalize an incoherent ancient myth can be dealt with, as I have shown - but I'm not sure that this would be really necessary. It is blatantly obvious that all these reinterpretations are ad hoc and ex post facto. That is why the concept of God has changed so much over the centuries. We can safely assume that they will continue... but no amount of twisting the meaning of words will make a supernatural interventionist deity a possible concept, or even one reconcilable with physics, namely the causal closure of space-time.
Thus, the old claim that "you cannot prove that God does not exist" is shown to be false. We can show (as I have done) that it is impossible for the Christian God to exist, as the attributes ascribed to him are either inherently or mutually contradictory, or irreconcilable with the necessary ontological commitments of the concepts they rely upon (agency, personhood, consciousness). The same is of course true for any deity with these attributes. And since the causal closure of space-time renders an interventionist supernatural deity impossible, all we are left with is a deistic deity - and this is dispensed with by the famous Occam's Razor: It is a superfluous hypothesis without explanatory value.

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Comment #136659 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 2:25 pm

As David Robertson has made a very rich comment on Prof. Dawkins' critique of omnipotence... I felt obliged to respond.

The comment I wrote became longer and longer - the final version is now slightly over 2000 words long.

I am going to post it nevertheless - if you like it, maybe we could ask Josh (and possibly Richard) if it warrants being slightly rewritten and posted as a small article of its own - since it is rather thorough.

I'd be interested to know what you think of it:

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Comment #136348 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 11:39 pm

You could rationalize that by stating that this world was a gift from god and part of our 'evaluation' will depend on how we treated it.

- But yes, I too think this "Oh well - there's another world waiting, so it isn't that bad" is a dangerous mindset.

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Comment #136345 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 11:10 pm

the christians WANT it all to fall into the rumbling boil.

To be fair - THOSE really are a small minority (especially if you consider Christians worldwide).
I suspect the number of Christians who think that the second coming of Jesus will be in their lifetime (which is highest in the US, but almost noone in Europe would think that) is far larger than those who really do associate this with armageddon and will wish for that.

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Comment #136344 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 11:07 pm

In America anyway, dunno how it is in Europe...

Not as crass I would say (at least not in the Central Europe I know) but basically the same.

There needs to be more education about critical thinking and what a rational debate consists of.

That's what I've been saying for a long time.
Good schools teach you facts and a thorough comprehension of certain fields - but the basics of rational inquiry and debate... currently, only very good teachers do that in the course of teaching the curriculum.

Most people I knew in school were quire knowledgable in certain fields (at least those who made it to the 13th grade) - but didn't care about being a rationalist, ie they didn't see that rational inquiry can and should be applied whereever we make truth-claims, whereever we want to find out about something.

Mind you, debate clubs don't do much good either - they're good for learning rhethorics, but not rationality - it's like politics.

So I think "critical thinking" or "rational inquiry" should be incorporated in the curricula somehow.

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Comment #136335 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:40 pm

Diacanu,

definitely... I mean, sometimes I wonder if these people would recognize a good argument if it shat them on the face. It's not like there aren't any. As I once said, Craig's philosophical apologetics have some good arguments. They're wrong - but at least interesting and intellectual.

As has been mentioned - Robertson's arguments are limited to "YES IT IS!!!" and "NO IT ISN'T!!!", as in

"The universe appears to be designed - but these facts show that this hypothesis is incorrect for all we know"

-"NO IT ISN'T!!!"

or

"Atheism isn't inherently nihilistic for the following reasons..."

-"YES IT IS!!!"

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Comment #136331 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:32 pm

Nevermind... I was just thinking that the exchange of ideas on Buffy wasn't influenced by what I posted... probably better that way. I would have missed that last part about "DILFs" - which was somehow disturbing... and goodness knows I wouldn't want to have missed that :)

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Comment #136326 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:25 pm

Seems I was interrupting a private coversation..
:/ - or rather :) ?

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Comment #136324 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:21 pm

As I was mentioning "Once more with feeling"...

I was actually quite impressed that they put in meter-changes in "Give me something to sing about" (4/4 with 7/8).

And yes, I'm crazy about such stuff.

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Comment #136322 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:18 pm

Anthony Head

... who has a very nice singing voice :)

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Comment #136319 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:15 pm

And yes, Hannigan is cute - not as cute as Trachtenberg though IMHO (somehow I despise the Dawn character nevertheless).

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Comment #136317 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 10:12 pm

To mention another TV series....

I feel like I'm in the twilight zone right now :)

Nah, never liked Buffy that much - too cliché and kitsch... BUT I thought the self-irony, the genre-parody elements were great.

Let's not talk about the acting - it isn't that important anyway...

And I simply loved "Once more with feeling"... actually, I can sing (and play) most songs by heart.


All in all - nice (very light) entertainment IMO - if you like it for the 'right reasons' that is :)

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Comment #136259 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 3:23 pm

Thanks, Storeo... Downloading now for later viewing.

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Comment #136238 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 2:55 pm

Dito, Steve.


Well said.

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Comment #136232 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 2:46 pm

And while we're at it, whatthe...

As long as you haven't bought or read the works I recommended... here's something for your reading pleasure:

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Intentionality

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Encyclopedia_of_computational_neuroscience

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness

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Comment #136230 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 2:42 pm

The causal closure of spacetime (thermodynamics) means that all effects in spacetime are caused by entities in spacetime. In short (and somewhat imprecise): Only physical entities or phenomena can effect physical phenomena... So a metaphysical god could not intervene in the physical world.

This is positive and fatal evidence against interventionist gods.

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Comment #136226 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 2:39 pm

2208 MPhil

I have read Daniel Dennetts Darwins Dangerous Idea in which he challenges John Lockes assertion that matter and motion can never, by themselves, result in mind. Dennett dismisses this argument by appealing to A.I. However, A.I is the creation of human intelligence therefore it is reliant for its existence on a intelligent cause.

You completely misunderstood the argument then. Just goes to show... and of course Darwin's Dangerous Idea isn't mainly about Consciousness.
The point he was making there was against dualism. And he's right.

1. Dualism is impossible
2. Dualism is insufficient - you need a material substrate to process information
3. We have very good theories of how the mind is the brain (or rather the function thereof)

Read "Consciousness Explained" or even "Kinds of Minds" and some works by the Churchlands.

Having shown that dualism is untenable and false, the argument for the evolution of minds is easy:

Consciousness and intelligence are essentially high-level processing of information with feedback. What these do is model the outside world and derive predictions from that.

An organism that can do this has a huge advantage over an organism that cannot.
In "Kinds of Minds" this gradual increasement of complexity in awareness in intelligence is explained brilliantly.

Every organism has discrimination mechanisms - most aren't conscious. A lock can discriminate the right key, a virus can discriminate a cell, bacteria can discriminate healthy from unhealthy environments - as shown by their behaviour (moving in a two-phase solution away from the slightly toxic and towards the nutritious)... none of this is conscious, or consciousness... but consciousness as we know it just different in degree, not in quality (although hugely different in degree).

Mount such discrimination mechanisms up - to higher complexity including feedback monitoring and manipulation.... repeat for millions and millions of years (evolution)... and you end up with human consciousness.

1792. Fleabytes

Comment #136199 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 2:13 pm

Steve,

it's not as technical as Churchland's works... but it's very interesting nevertheless IMO... and as it was one of the first books I read on that subject, I value it immensely.

1793. US Treaty with Tripoli

Comment #136196 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 2:08 pm

Al,

Nothing does, thats why I was puzzled.

"Things" referred to dealing with slave trading and persecuting criminals in general.

I apologize for being oversensitive, as I said - it was unintentional.

1794. Fleabytes

Comment #136185 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:59 pm

On the subject of "how could consciousness arise in a material universe", there is a wonderful book (probably the #1 book on my nonfiction list) by Daniel Dennett, called

"Kinds of Minds"

Very much recommended.

1795. US Treaty with Tripoli

Comment #136180 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:54 pm

I think I wasn't being oversensitive, as the first part of that sentence in combination with that second seemed to imply that I was ready and willing to hand over my civil rights to the government.

If that was not the intended meaning, I apologize for having misread you... it wasn't deliberate.

Before we get into this, I'd like to hear your opinion on the following:

-What are the rights of states in contrast to that of the overall government that would require a military force whose chain of command ends at the state level and not at the level above?

-Do you assume that "a well regulated militia" applies only to militia of and by the individual states?


EDIT:
Sorry, Bonzai and Cartomancer already asked that question.

1796. US Treaty with Tripoli

Comment #136155 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:39 pm

MPhil,



No, I was giving you a hard time.

You trust your government to deal with your rights at all times. You ready to sign that power over permanently?

Also, go read the 2nd Amendment and tell me what you think.

Excuse me?

All I am handing over (willingly) in this case is the right to persecute and trial offenders... sorry, but I don't want no "might makes right", law of the jungle, which would be the alternative to handing that particular right over.

I happen to be very much for the protection of civil rights. But I don't want laws that would do no good. I am not against the right to own guns (non-automatic) with a permit (a hunting licence or a weapon-ownership license - with strong restrictions on who can own a gun, where to store then and how to handle them).

I'm sorry but I don't think it was right to insult me that way. I do not renounce all my civil rights.

(And I did read the 2nd amendmend... actually, I read quite a lot of the american constitution.)

Can we please refrain from insults? I just wanted to debate, not throw feces at each other.

1797. Fleabytes

Comment #136145 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:30 pm

AAARGG...

I am asserting that interventionist nonphysical gods CANNOT exist !

It's (for the umpteenth time) the causal closure of spacetime


....sorry about the tone, but noone seemed to be paying attention :)

1798. Fleabytes

Comment #136140 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:28 pm

whatthe...

Oh please tell me you're not a dualist! I might feel obliged to ridicule you in front of everybody.

Dualism is impossible via the causal closure of spacetime, it is philosophically absolutely out of fashion... the problems are just insurmountable.

Furthermore - we have very very good explanations for the arise of intelligence and consciousness from evolution. Read some Dennett ("Consciousness Explained") and Churchland (Paul and Patricia)!

The claim you are making is one of philosophy of mind, the field I study. You might want to learn something about the field in which you make claims, otherwise you'll look absolutely ridiculous - as you did with that assertion.

1799. US Treaty with Tripoli

Comment #136135 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:23 pm

O please... the slave trade (assuming you mean the fact that people from eastern europe force women and girls into prostitution and smuggle them into western Europe) is being dealt with - with increasing effectiveness, through cooperation between the various international government agencies.

Furthermore... what does gun control have to do with that? Should a militia storm every brothel and erect an intelligence service to check the identities of the women there? The government deals with such things.

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Comment #136125 by MPhil on February 29, 2008 at 1:19 pm

Actually, "atheism" means "without god(s)", not "no gods".

But yes, theism is disproven by the causal closure of spacetime.