1901. Fleabytes

Comment #131125 by MPhil on February 22, 2008 at 1:56 am

In fact - let us all construct poofs in first-order logic for them!

Q.E.D.

1902. Fleabytes

Comment #131122 by MPhil on February 22, 2008 at 1:51 am

Quetz,

Indeed!

It makes so much sense. It is still puzzling to me how anyone could not see that. But then, the mind of the believer is clouded, they have not seen the light of LOgic. I do hope they will be saved in the end, though. I shall prove a statement in first-order predicate logic for them.

Let me go first, for the greater glory of Reason, so that the belivers shall be saved:

1903. Fleabytes

Comment #131111 by MPhil on February 22, 2008 at 1:21 am

Quetz!

You blaspheme against reason! How dare you! The book of reason doesn't say that we're "supposed to" - we must, or otherwise we draw upon us the scorn and righteous anger of LOgic. In the book of John (Leslie Mackie), 2, 10-11 (page 53 in your version) it sayeth that "If anyone comes to you and does not bring this teaching of rationality, do not take him into your house or welcome him. Anyone who welcomes him shares in his wicked work."

And, according to the "second law" (=Deuteronomy) of reason, it says:


13:6 If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers;

13:7 Namely, of the gods of the people which are round about you, nigh unto thee, or far off from thee, from the one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth;
13:8 Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him:
13:9 But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
13:10 And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die; because he hath sought to thrust thee away from REASON, which brought thee out of the land of stupidity.
__________________

Should be page 21 ... assuming that you do have the King Dawkins version.

1904. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130692 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 6:59 am

I'm sorry, you're being deliberately inflammatory, so I cannot be kind about this. First you're completely misrepresenting what I said (first response), then you just go on and on and on insulting the discipline I study while you have obviously not a clue about it, you make ridiculous dogmatic claims about the nature of theories (in this case you are making a hopeless attempt at philosophy of science yourself, namely metatheory) and finally you actually manage to repost your most stupid (I'm sorry, I cannot be kind about this) statement of all. "So? does it yield any new and interesting physics" - like accusing a geologist that his discipline is bullshit because it doesn't form rocks.

This discussion is terminated. You are obviously so dogmatically entrenched that you have to resort to the above things. It's a shame. You go on comment about this - feel free to do so if it gives you a false sense of victory in denying the validity of the scientific research and construction of valid theories that is going on in philosophy of science.

Good bye.

1905. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130683 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 6:41 am

Yes, everything clear.

In short, it's this here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1MlEDMW0YQU

I think we should give this link to every theist who starts spouting ridiculous bullshit here.

1906. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130670 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 6:28 am

God isn't made of nothing, he's made of goodness and holyness and wisdom and and fluffyness and happy-sunshinyness and righteous-wrathness and magic ghost stuff!

Seriously, how could you not know that!!!

1907. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130659 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 5:51 am

Of course, in some sense mathematics (and all sciences) are part of the natural world, as they are in essence brain activity (including the manipulation and understanding of symbols, observation etc).

But I think you were referring to the "objects" that mathematics studies versus the objects and processes that the empirical sciences study.

1908. Fleabytes

Comment #130657 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 5:46 am

What I am saying is that if evolution is indeed indifferent, if it neither knows nor cares, then it is meaningless to expend our energies in defense of the weak and vulnerable. The "survival of the fittest" theme will always have the last word. Human dignity is of no more importance than the dignity of compost.

Simply not true. Through our theoretical understanding and technological inventiveness, as well as through our social structure, we are shaping our own evolutionary path to some extent.
And please don't slip the "ethics aren't possible in materialism" issue in again. It has been dealt with too often to count.

btw, such statements, and those of wooter et al even more so always remind me of this wonderful, wonderful little sketch:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1MlEDMW0YQU

1909. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130647 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 4:43 am

Oh, the "confusing form with substance" thing again, the magical mystery of living, breathing mathematics and physics. No argument in this, sorry. It doesn't appeal and fails to account for the beauty of the living thing - I have reason to assume that you are scientifically minded, but I'm sorry to say this reminds me of anti-scientific propaganda.

So, mathematics is dynamic and changing and beautiful - I agree wholeheartedly, but to say that studying what theories are for empirical sciences in a formal way "fails to capture the rich texture" and is thus "missing the point" is just like saying that botany is missing the point because it fails to capture how beautifully the flowers sway in the soft breeze. In the end, plants are structures of cells with certain functions. In the end, theories are propositions in a (more or less) formal system. The point of the section from stanford was the problem of theoretical terms - which is a real problem... To which you proposed an answer - which I found to be missing the point. There are scientific research programs, and schemata (methods) of investigation, but a proposed law is no such thing. Mathematics is very formal indeed, it's form is correctly described in terms of axioms, inference rules, theorems and sentences.

Having read the article you linked to - I think I understand your motivations better. I found the article very interesting, but using some very cheap, even hateful rethoric that borders on propaganda. Arnold's case - even if he doesn't say so explicitly, and even tries to obscure it, is one of definition, of description, of semantic conventions (which becomes entirely obvious when we talks of matrices and "axioms" vs "properties").

You dislike the term "axiom", and talking of axiomatization and so forth. That's your prerogative, but it is irrelevant. That fact is that the modus operandi you dislike is succesful and therefore appropriate.

To get back to the topic of structuralism:
Theories in physics do include observational terms, theoretic terms and underlying conversion rules. You can't get around that - and I supposes you see no need to. But from this, problems arise - such as the problem of t-theoretical terms. There was no false definition, none that missed the point, for reasons already stated.


One research program of structuralism was the possibility of 'ramseyfication'. Again, allow me to post a small section from Standford:

Ramseyfication consists in the replacement of the theoretical terms of a finitely axiomatized theory by bound higher-order variables. This involves combining all the theoretical postulates (which define theoretical terms) and correspondence rules of a theory (which link some of these theoretical terms with observational ones) in one long sentence and then replacing all the theoretical predicates that occur in it by bound higher-order variables. This is the so-called Ramsey-sentence of the entire theory; in it no theoretical terms appear, but it possesses the same explanatory and predictive power as the original theory: it has the same observational consequences.
_______________

The prosed possibility of this is a highly interesting and non-trivial theorem. Sneed showed that it is possible for classical particle mechanics.

Furthermore, there is no confusing of form with substance, as it's not about what the theories model (their substance), but about what theories are (their form) - there's no confusion. Your objection is like saying that a neuroscientist studying how the brain represents the world is missing the point because he is not investigating what the brain models.

I must say it seems that you are feeling as if such research is somehow intruding your personal space...

Anyways - it is nontrivial, I find it interesting, and the questions of Philosophy of Science are extremely relevant. They allow and deserve to be studied scientifically, which is being done.

And now, pleeeeeaaaaase - let's stop this.

Thank you for directing me to the article by Arnold. It was interesting, informative and helped me to understand your motivations. The disagreement remains as long as you stand by your categorical statements on Philosophy of Science, but this discussion should have shown at least that this is not clear cut, and that there is a real science in philosophy of science, whatever you might think of its specific approaches and its value.

Can we keep it at that?

1910. Fleabytes

Comment #130608 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 1:40 am

The only 'evidence' possible for this is conceptual necessity - which in turn begs the question of whether the concepts are the only plausible ones. Which brings us to metaphysical parsimony, which together with the new scientific concepts that are invoked to explain the phenomena shows that the classical, metaphysical ones are either incorrect, unnecessary or both.

1911. Feb 12th: Happy Darwin Day!

Comment #130600 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 1:28 am

B-E-A-UTIFUL!

1912. Fleabytes

Comment #130591 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 1:01 am

There are problems with materialism from within classical, unrefined concepts of mind, reason and morality. These are quite default, and it takes some understanding of cognitive neurosciences and neural network theories to be able to present an alternative. These sciences are extremely young, so the knowledge that there already are very elaborate sophisticated concepts and models, even experimental corroboration is not that widely known. Futhermore, they haven't been popularized a fraction as much as physics and biology these days - so the public understanding is very low, which is why I vote for a cognitive neuroscientists as Dawkins' successor.

These classical concepts are indeed incompatible with materialism - but they have no basis in fact. Scientific alternatives are researched as we speak.

1913. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130586 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 12:52 am

Well, then elevated levels of promine and dopamine and serotonin in the temporal lobe, elicited by the practices of the religious sure would act addictive and self-reinforcing.

1914. Fleabytes

Comment #130585 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 12:49 am

But not even contemporary atheists are willing to grasp the implications of this: that talking about "human dignity" makes as much sense as talking about the "dignity" of caulilowers!

Cauliflowers don't conceptualize, they don't employ logic and reason, they don't have empathy - and certainly no awareness of self - no social structure.
Humans do. And that is all that is required for ethics.

1915. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130577 by MPhil on February 21, 2008 at 12:13 am

No, please - do so. It was off topic for far too long.

Promine... hmm... been reading alot about dopamine in that context, as well as unusually high activity in the temporal lobes.

1916. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130571 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 11:26 pm

I'm sorry, there is hardly an argument in your last post.

Studying formal systems is only part of philosophy of science, but a very major one (and logic, of course - was a philosophical invention).

Scientists do philosophy of science, but not in the way people who study logic and philosophy of science do it. It can be studied - research programs are done, just as in logic or mathematics.

You're right - the stuff that Sneed does for example is entirely impossible for anyone who is completely divorced from the actual theories and mathematics.

What it comes down to is: studying empirical sciences and their theories as phenomenona and then applying formal scientific methods (logic, set theory) to classify, categorize and formalize them is a valid science just like any other.

I take your point about the Bourbaki program, and I know it wasn't primarily metamathematics á la Russel and Whitehead. But they did attempt to integrate and formalize the various aspects into a formal system. Researching if such a thing is possible for empirical sciences and providing it for classica particle mechanics is what Sneed has done for examlpe.


There are really important questions in Philosophy of Science that the researching empirical scientists have an opinion about but don't study, which can and has been done fruitfully (vid Sneed, Suppes, Stegmüller, Moulines) Even to the more basic questions, reason can be rigorously applies, as is evident from the debates between Feyerabend and Lakatos. Also there's the theory of classification, the theory of measurement etc. All philosophers of science I know were brilliant when it comes to formal logic and set theory. That they don't incorporate the most modern of it might have to do with the fact that it isn't needed to describe scientifically and construct theories about the phenomena they study.



Let me post the first few paragraphs from the stanford-site I linked:


The three programs of Structuralism share the following characteristics and convictions:

* A metatheory of science requires a kind of formalization different from that already employed by scientific theories themselves.
* The structuralistic program yields a framework for the rational reconstruction of particular theories.
* A central tool of formalization is Bourbaki's concept of "species of structures", as described in Bourbaki (1986).
* Among the significant features of theories to be described are:
o Mathematical structure
o Empirical claims of a theory
o Function of theoretical terms
o Rôle of approximation
o Evolution of theories
o Intertheoretic relations


A physical theory T consists, among other things, of a group of laws which are formulated in terms of certain concepts. But an apparent circularity arises when one considers how the laws of T and the concepts acquire their content, because each seems to acquire content from the other -- the laws of T acquire their content from the concepts used in the formulation of the laws, while the concepts are often "introduced" or "defined" by the group of laws as a whole. To be sure, if the concepts can be introduced independently of the theory T, the circularity does not appear. But typically every physical theory T requires some new concepts which cannot be defined without using T (we call the latter "T-theoretical concepts"). Is the apparent circularity concerning the laws and the T-theoretical concepts a problem? Some examples will help us assess the threat.

An example
As an example, consider the theory T of classical particle mechanics. For simplicity we will assume that kinematical concepts, such as the positions of particles, their velocities and accelerations are given independently of the theory as functions of time. A central statement of T is Newton's second law, F=ma, which asserts that the sum F of the forces exerted upon a particle equals its mass m multiplied by its acceleration a.

While we customarily think of F=ma as an empirical assertion, there is a real risk that it turns out merely to be a definition or largely conventional in character. If we think of a force merely as "that which generates acceleration" then the force F is actually defined by the equation F=ma. We have a particle undergoing some given acceleration a, then F=ma just defines what F is. The law is not an empirically testable assertation at all, since a force so defined cannot fail to satisfy F=ma. The problem gets worse if we define the (inertial) mass m in the usual manner as the ratio |F|/|a|. For now we are using the one equation F=ma to define two quantities F and m. A given acceleration a at best specifies the ratio F/m but does not specify unique values for F and m individually.

In more formal terms, the problem arises because we introduced force F and mass m as T-theoretical terms that are not given by other theories. That fact also supplies an escape from the problem. We can add extra laws to the simple dynamics. For example, we might require that all forces are gravitational and that the net force on the mass m be given by the sum F=ΣiF i of all gravitational forces Fi acting on the mass due to the other masses of the universe, in accord with Newton's inverse square law of gravity. (The law asserts that the force Fi due to attracting mass i with gravitational mass mgi is Gm_gm_gi ri / ri³, where m_g is the gravitational mass of the original body, ri the position vector of mass i originating from the original body, and G the universal constant of gravitation.) That gives us an independent definition for F. Similarly we can require that the inertial mass m be equal to the gravitational mass m_g. Since we now have independent access to each of the terms F, m and a appearing in F=ma, whether the law obtains is contingent and no longer a matter of definition.

Further problems can arise, however, because of another T-theoretical term that is invoked implicitly when F=ma is asserted. The accelerations a are tacitly assumed to be measured in relation to an inertial system. If the acceleration is measured in relation to a different reference system, a different result is obtained. For example, if it is measured in relation to a system moving with uniform acceleration A, then the measured acceleration will be a′ = (a - A). A body not acted on by gravitational forces in an inertial frame will obey 0=ma so that a=0. The same body in the accelerated frame will have acceleration a′ = -A and be governed by -mA = ma′. The problem is that the term -mA behaves just like a gravitational force; its magnitude is directly proportional to the mass m of the body. So the case of a gravitation free body in a uniformly accelerated reference system is indistinguishable from a body in free fall in a homogeneous gravitational field. A theoretical underdetermination threatens once again. Given just the motions how are we to know which case is presented to us?[1] Resolving these problems requires a systematic study of the relations between the various T-theoretical concepts, inertial mass, gravitational mass, inertial force, gravitational force, inertial systems and accelerated systems and how they figure in the relevant laws of the theory T.

Similar problems arise in the formulation of almost all fundamental physical theories.

_____________
So, I know your reservations, and I agree to your point about real philosophy of science being impossible without some actual knowledge of the field of empirical sciences one models (of course) and a lot of knowledge in logic and set theory. This is all given. I disagree that the scientists themselves can do it just as well as people who study it scientifically and I disagree that it is worthless. Let's leave it at that - we aren't getting anywhere, just reiterating our differences. Furthermore, we have continued to be off topic for a little long. So, Josh might move this to the alternate comments thread if he wishes.

1917. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130556 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 8:45 pm

Anyway - I'm sorry, but it's 5:30 am here and I just got up shortly before we started this. Seems we're not getting anywhere so we might as well leave it at this disagreement. I still think it might be a good idea for you to take a look at it after all. If you don't think the questions are interesting, that's your prerogative, and I can only say that I find this somehow sad in the same vein as Richard Dawkins finds it sad when people aren't interested in science. But please don't assume that it cannot provide very good theories or isn't rigorously scientific without having studied it yourself.

Gonna get something to eat now and read the morning newspaper.

Have a nice (whatever time of day it is where you are)!

1918. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130554 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 8:38 pm

See, now that was a good comment - with at least attempts at real arguments.

The reflective scientist would have a private opinion and it is just as good the philosopher's, even though he may not be buttress it with big words and citations.

It's not about absolutes. What you don't seem to understand is that we can study that. We can actually form well-founded theories on whether scientific realism is true or not. A private opinion is not 'just as good' if it isn't as rigorously investigated.

You think scientific community wouldn't be able to ferret out pseudo science without asking the philosopher? Gimme a break.

They would be pragmatically able to do it, but provide a scientific justification? What I was saying was - if they do, as soon as they talk talk about demarcation criteria, they are doing philosophy of science.
You see, empirical scientists always make assumptions of philosophy of science, tacitly or explicitly. But as I said - this can be investigated just as rigorously as the empirical phenomena themselves.

And what about it? Is this a trick question?

No, I should have said "What about the actual trustworthiness and explanatory power of induction and deduction - another question of philosophy.

More big words. They may be interesting models that fall within the realm of mathematical logic, but these things are just models and they take on their own lives.

I am not confusing models with what they intend to model. The same thing is true of theories of empirical sciences themselves. Empirical science models the world - and rigorous philosophy of science models the structure, dynamics, explanatory power etc of empirical science. It is a science. Just as our brains process information and cognitive neurosciences model how they do that.

Btw, ever heard of the Bourbaki program for mathematics? That's what Sneed, Stegmüller and Moulines outlined for physics.

As I said, it's really just another science - not parasitic, and certainly not worthless. Again, the geology-analogy I gave is accurate.

Glad we're on a more civil level again.

1919. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130549 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 8:17 pm

Radesq, surely.

Philosophy of Science (especially metatheory of emprical sciences) tries to formulate a theory as to what theories in empirical sciences are, logically speaking, how the sets of sentences and mathematical symbols that make them up connect to each other and how they refer to and relate to data, among other things. They will provide an account of this in formal logic. Thus, they are constructing theories of how theories in empirical sciences work.

Furthermore - theories claim to be explanations, they claim to give us knowledge. This would be their 'epistemological status'. But why and how do we get knowledge from this, what exactly is scientific explanation?

And what is the difference between 'real' science like evolutionary biology and pseudoscience, like Intelligent Design. What makes a theory of empirical sciences scientifc? That is the question of the demarcation criteria.

Then, modern physics, and most other empirical sciences work with mathematics. Mathematics is a closed, formal system. What is the logical relation between this formal system, or the specific statements within this formal system, with the data of science and the knowledge it is supposed to provide in virtue of having explanatory power. What is explanatory power.


What is the difference between theoretical terms and empirical terms? How 'theory-laden' are observations? What can we infer from this concerning scientific 'realism' (The entities that theories postulate - do they actually exist or are they, too just models?)

Radesq (and Bonzai, too), have a look at this:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-structuralism/

1920. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130543 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:58 pm

Parasitic activity my ass. Metatheory of empirical sciences is one of the most rigorous fields there is. It's applied logic. But you wouldn't know that, would you... probably just having heard something second hand about Popper and nothing else. Try to get through the formal logic of "Logical Foundations of Mathematical Physics" and see if actually learn something.

What reason is there for assuming scientific realism?
You think demarcation criteria which scientists use naively everyday are not a problem and shouldn't be given a metatheoretical justification? Demarcation criteria between science and pseudoscience for example - a metalevel question which empirical science itself cannot answer, it's a topic of Philosophy of Science and everytime a scientist says something about it - he's doing Philosophy of Science. And mostly just taking things for granted.

How about inductin versus deduction?

How about commensurability or incommensurability of scientific paradigms? How about the Ramseyfication of empirical claims? T-Theoreticity and set theoretic predicates?

Tell you what, search "Logical structure of mathematical physics" in Google, click the Google-books link at the top and have a look at pages 41-44. Then come back and tell me that's not rigorous theoretical work.

It's mathematical logic including set theory applied to provide a metatheory and foundation of empirical theories.

If you think empirical sciences don't need a foundation, you're incredibly naive.

____________

And in response to your latest post: You have evidently no idea what modern philosophy of science is or does. You are willfully ignorant and arrogant in dismissing it without knowing it.
And the thing about metatheory "if they don't even know exactly what the "theory" is"... that proves it.
All theories in empirical sciences have similar structures. Empirical sentences, logical inferences etc. Metatheory of empirical sciences explains and sets a foundation for empirical theories in general. Philosophers of Science have a better idea of what constitutes a theory than empirical scientists themselves (although many, like Sneed are or were actually physicists!), because that is part of what they study - what are the demarcation criteria for "theory" what are their logical structures. How can their structure be described in a way that does justice to their supposed epistemological status. What is the relation between data and theory, between sets of propositions of the theory and their inferences. Honestly, have a look at Ramseyfication.

Look, you obviously don't know what modern philosophy of science is doing, and that many people doing it were empirical scientists themselves. So why not have a look and judge when you have attempted to understand it? Because you just 'know' that it's worthless.
You can't know that without having understood it. It's like a bible basher saying he doesn't believe in evolution because the Bible has all the answers he needs. It's like saying geology is worthless because it hasn't contributed to the formation of rocks.

1921. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130535 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:35 pm

So, providing a theoretical, formal logic foundation for empirical sciences is worthless?

Just goes to show that you're incredibly ignorant and arrogant. It's not about 'making a direct contribution', but about metalevel explanation and actually putting empirical sciences on a theoretic groundwork that is logically and epistemologically sufficient. But you don't think that's worthwhile at all, do you?

Again, just goes to show.

1922. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130528 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:15 pm

Wow, Bonzai. What a mischaracterization of Philosophy of Sciences. I won't even get into the blatant mistake about falsification, or the insulting "philosophical caricatures". Just go to a university library, see if they have Joseph Sneed's "The logical structure of mathematical physics" and try to read and understand it. It's not a philosophical caricature, it's an attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for theories in empirical sciences in general, and mathematical physics specifically.

Off now, this is too much misrepresentation for one day.

1923. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130243 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:34 am

So OT has inherent contradictions as well as contradictions to NT... so what do you chose to ascribe to god? That which you like best yourself? That which is stated most often?

Furthermore, some things you just can't get around - the genocides and torture for

1924. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130227 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:24 am

You quoted Hebrews - NT. So it clearly contradicts OT.

1925. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130219 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:18 am

Well, since you're a monotheist, you have to believe that all gods but one are man-made. Yet you've got nothing more to show for the truth of the proposition that your god exists than others have (or had) to show for the truth of the proposition that their god(s) exist.

It is the most parsimonious explanation - and, what's more... we've seen it happen: Scientology with their space-aliens, the book of Mormon etc.

Ever watched "Kissing Hank's Ass"?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDp7pkEcJVQ

Seem familiar?

What's the most reasonable conclusion? Hank is made up.

1926. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130206 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:12 am

Their 'own' ideas of sacrifice? Leviticus is quite clear on that: God likes the smell of burning flesh, he likes to see blood -

# "Flay the burnt offering; cut it into pieces." 1:6

# Burn the head, fat, and entrails for "a sweet savour unto the Lord." 1:8-9

# "Kill it and sprinkle blood round about." 1:11, 3:2, 3:8, 3:13

# "Cut it into pieces and burn it for a sweet savour unto the Lord." 1:12-13

# "Wring off its head and burn it." 1:15

# "For a sweet savour unto the Lord." 1:17

# "Part it in pieces... it is a meat offering." 2:6

# "It is a thing most holy of the offerings of the LORD made by fire." 2:10

# What to do with the fat, kidneys, and liver of your burnt offerings. 3:3-4, 3:9-10, 3:14-16

# "Kill the bullock before the Lord and take of the bullock's blood." 4:4

# "The priest shall dip his finger in the blood and sprinkle the blood seven times before the Lord." 4:6, 4:17

# "Pour all the blood at the bottom of the altar." 4:7

# What to do with the fat, kidneys, liver, skin, head, entrails, and dung from your burnt offerings. 4:8-11

# "The bullock shall be killed before the Lord." 4:14

# "Kill it and pour out the blood." 4:24-25

# "Slay it for a sin offering, pour out the blood, and burn the fat for a sweet savour unto the Lord." 4:29-31

# Slay it for a sin offering, put the blood on your finger, and pour out the blood at the bottom of the altar. 4:33-34

# Wringing off the heads of pigeons for God. 5:8-9

# Kill the sin offering before the Lord. "It is most holy." 6:25

1927. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130190 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 7:00 am

No, we found many many many many many many 'bits' that advocated a disgusting code of ethics, like the ones I linked you to.
We found contradictions upon contradictions.
We found meaningless concepts (okay, the trinity is not directly in the bible, but that's not the only one) and stuff that could only be ridiculous metaphor or simply bullshit.
We found ludicrous assertions without any evidence. We found everything else that is to be expected from a book based on a bronze-age myth: outdated fairytales, copied material from other myths (like the mithras-cult), a steaming pile of superstitions and so on and so forth.

What did you find? A comfortable illusion of a loving and kind big-brother (based on selective interpretation marginalizing about 2/3rds of what the bible says about the personality of god) who will even save you from death? Easy but clearly wrong and entirely baseless 'explanations' for apparently every 'deep' question that has been studied by serious philosophers and scientists for centuries or millenia - all of them having more to show for their views than religion?

You're right - we're soooo outgunned.

1928. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130171 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 6:45 am

Jesus's standards are even higher than the Law's

That's true, the punishment for violating old testament laws was mostly being put to death, but it stopped there. Jesus has offenders (for such unimaginable crimes like not accepting him as master) being tortured for all eternity, to the delight of the righteous who will smile on this in heaven. What a delightful bunch.

Yes, Jesus did indeed set new standards of cruelty and malevolence.

I mean seriously, torture for all eternity?
Auschwitz only worse and for all eternity?
That nullifies all the things Jesus allegedly said about being kind.

1929. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130165 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 6:41 am

Verifying the results of an experiment is unproblematic in principle, as it is a matter of (direct or indirect) observation, since the result of experiments is data.
Verifying a theory is something different. As a synonym for corroboration, it seems to contradict the literal meaning of verify, "making true"

Falsifying rival theories/hypotheses just makes the one left the best we have, but doesn't give us knowledge that it's true (but I guess that's why you used inverted commas)

Completely agree on the toolbox.

1930. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130144 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 6:20 am

the mountains and hills
will burst into song before you,
and all the trees of the field
will clap their hands

So what is so unusual about that?

Beginning to suspect this is an atheist having some fun... sounded quite ironic to me.

1931. Why Darwin matters

Comment #130137 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 6:13 am

The Bishop,

many of us have read the Bible, and found its violence and twisted ethics (stone to death children who disobey their parents, stone to death adulterers, stone to death homosexuals, genocide is okay if god commands it, hell as eternal Auschwitz where your loving god sends you if you don't love him back and obey his commands, that evil bastard etc etc etc)


Or don't you know that this and much more is in there? Haven't you read your Bible, OT and NT?

http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/cruelty/ot.html

http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/cruelty/nt.html

You can't cry foul, or rather "misinterpretation" since it's so entirely obvious. It takes a masterpiece of selective interpretation and/or repression to deny that.

1932. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130129 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 6:06 am

No (dammit :), I didn't define verifiable as provable in logic, if you reread my comment you will notice I stated that nothing can be verified except logical inferences: Presupposing axioms, inference rules and premises, the conclusion can be verified.

To verify is derived from latin veri-facere, make true, to verify is defined as ascertaining the truth of something. Ie - proof.

But let's not dwell on this, I'd be much more interested in how you would define "to verify"...?

1933. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #130109 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 5:21 am

I don't define "verifiable" as "provable in formal logic", just as provable. It's just that no theory in empirical sciences can be proven to be true, because of the induction problem. That's not an uncommon definition of verifiable, and the fact that theories in empirical sciences can never be absolutely proven, and are therefore not verifiable is generally accepted by philosophers of science and most (if not all) scientists I know.

1934. Fleabytes

Comment #130091 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 3:53 am

A tiny bit simplified and distorted... :)

1935. Fleabytes

Comment #130079 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 3:29 am

she places into our hands the weapons with which we can counter-attack, should the need arise

Yes, but we should also deal with the 'good', or at least superficially logical, good arguments for theism and against atheism that are too sophisticated, too technical to find the flaws in them ad hoc. And this is where Craig comes in. I think we should really take on his arguments, as well as those of Plantinga, van Inwagen and Swinburne.

I would love to see Dennett, Harris and Dawkins take them on, though it will be very hard indeed for a non-philosopher to come up with sufficiently detailed and formal logical refutations.

1936. Fleabytes

Comment #130070 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 3:01 am

And as an "antidote" against Craig's argument, which are very hard to conquer even for philosophers, you gotta read "The Miracle of Theism" by John Leslie Mackie. - and for more "up to date" arguments, the "Arguments against Theism" section in the Cambridge companion to Atheism. (In which one paper by Craig appears as well)

Also, this site is interesting: http://www.jcnot4me.com/Items/contra_craig/contra_craig.htm

1937. Fleabytes

Comment #130068 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 2:51 am

I know of one Christian apologist who is a brilliant debater and is able to use logic to argue for religion quite brilliantly. I still don't buy his conclusions because I don't accept his definitions and some premises - and his beliefs and unshakability is certainly absurd, but nevertheless - some of his papers and debates have provided the greatest challange for me so far:

William Lane Craig

I have seen and read 5 debates he had with atheists or agnostics, and he's only ever lost once (against Tabash) - without shouting or polemics. But his really sophisticated arguments don't even appear in the debates - he has a paper in the "Cambridge Companion to Atheism" however.

For someone who is in for more of a real challange, I suggest Craig. Some of his arguments are bullshit, all of his positions are, but some of his arguments, as well as his debating and arguing "technique" are quite good.


His best known books are "Reasonable Faith" and "Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide".

1938. Fleabytes

Comment #130061 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 2:06 am

MPhil, what can I say? You are clearly quite mad. Thanks for the laugh! :-)

Pleasure. But nah, not mad - just bored and in for the joke ...although, maybe I am a bit mad on the side... the discussions I usually participate in testify to that I think.

1939. Fleabytes

Comment #130055 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 1:53 am

P.S. (BAEOZ): If you haven't done so yet - check your email.

1940. Fleabytes

Comment #130054 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 1:49 am

BAEOZ,

not weird at all :)

1941. Fleabytes

Comment #130053 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 1:47 am

Here you go:



Wasn't easy, finding a picture of a harp taken from the right angle, then finding a picture of a hand, taken from the right angle and roughly having a correct hand-position that I could rotate :)

1942. Fleabytes

Comment #130047 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 1:15 am

Give me a minute... :)

1943. Fleabytes

Comment #130045 by MPhil on February 20, 2008 at 1:12 am

Paula,

I think your avatar needs a halo!

Your wish is my command... behold:




Man, I really must be bored... oh well, got a lot of reading to do, so I'll better start.

1944. Fleabytes

Comment #130000 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 9:34 pm

So are Schopenhauer, Hegel, Fichte and Schelling.

P.S.: Check your PMs.

1945. Fleabytes

Comment #129995 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 9:25 pm

Hey, I'm German studying at a German university, and I'm all for analytical philosophy. :)

Many of my fellow students are more interested in idealism, but the required seminars in our course of studies are almost entirely in the analytical tradition. But there is philosophy of all kinds there, and of course a lot of courses on German idealism. After all, it had some of the best thinkers of all time. Kant was definitely a genius. I don't agree with him, but that doesn't change the fact that he was brilliant.


On the topic of the synthetic a priori, and the analytic-synthetic distinction in general, the best texts I know (also widely regarded as some of the best work in analytical philosophy of language) I recommend Saul Kripke's "Naming and Necessity" and Willard van Orman Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in his wonderful collection of papers "From a logical point of view" (a must have IMO).

1946. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #129992 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 9:14 pm

Anyway, that doesn't mean that we can infer from a lack of understanding the existence of something specific in addition to what we know to exist, or indeed any knowledge.

You simply cannot infer positive knowledge (insight) from 'There are true statements which we do not know'

1947. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #129990 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 9:11 pm

You think it possible to completely understand everything, knowing all true statements? I am very sceptical about that.

And then of course there's the problem that second-order knowledge is impossible. We might actually have a completely correct and final theory in empirical sciences, but we couldn't know that we had, for reasons Popper and others have pointed out.

A theory of everything, or even correct theories of everything - might be possible. But there are systems so complex (like societies) that it seems impossible to ever be able to correctly predict their behaviour in every detail.

Also, there's the problem of observation changing the state of what is observed.

Maybe I'm just being pedantic again. If so, I apologize.

1948. Fleabytes

Comment #129986 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 9:02 pm

Thanks for the clarification, Steve.

John Done,

what's with the German? (*whispers in his ear* It's actually "Vielen Dank")

1949. Fleabytes

Comment #129979 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 8:49 pm

I have already recovered, thanks for your concern :)

they could still be explained entirely within the laws of physics

By invoking a non-physical mind which in some way interacts with matter in violation of thermodynamics? Or did I misinterpret 'communicate with matter', which seems to imply that what does the communication is not matter?

Oh, never mind. Not important, I think I have a good idea of your current view on the matter :)

1950. Why do we believe in God? 2m study prays for answer

Comment #129974 by MPhil on February 19, 2008 at 8:42 pm

a natural realisation that there is more to life than the human mind comprehends.

That makes no sense to me. Why would an emotional reaction in a desperate situation constitute an 'insight'. Of course our knowledge of the world is incomplete, but that just means that we don't have sufficient reason to postulate the existence of specific entities.